Even the Russians know they suck, Part 3

C. The Crew

1. “How seniors in rank and position relate to juniors, particularly to the sailors”.

This was a topic that the French officers paid special attention to. There was much yelling and cursing on the BPK and subordinates were often belittled (even senior officers in the presence of sailors.

The Chief of Staff refused to talk with a Russian communications officer (who had told the COS that he was a Captain 3^rd rank) over the HF radio (I.E for the whole world to hear) to resolve some sort of problem. The French interpreter interpreted this conversation for the French servicemembers present. And they were very surprised: “Why doesn’t he want to talk to a Captain 3^rd Rank?”

It was noted by the French officers that similar relations between people in France would be intolerable.

2. “There are a lot of officers on the ship”.

There are twenty four officers in the three hundred person crew on the Tourville. On board the BPK Admiral Chabanenko, with just a little more crew, there were twice as many officers, and taking into account embarked staff – four times as many. French officers were surprised at the amount of senior officers on board, especially Captain 1^st Ranks – seven, whose functions could not be understood (on the Tourville, there is only the captain).

3. “Lots of musters”.

Russian liaison officers didn’t observe one crew muster onboard the Tourville in a week.

On the BPK, musters came one after another.

4. “Another BPK commander is onboard the Chabanenko, but he outranks the commander of the Chabanenko”.

After the Chief of Staff (the commander of the BPK Admiral Kharlamov) briefed the French, he was asked, “How can the commander of one BPK give orders to the commander of a second BPK?” and “How the commander of the BPK Admiral Chabanenko Captain 1^st Rank S. Grishin takes such orders?”

D. The Ship’s Watch

1. Organization of the bridge watch

While spending a lot of time on the underway bridge of the BPK, the French liaison officers (the first one – the navigator, who normally stands officer of the watch and the second one – the electronic warfare officer, who normally stands watch as the combat officer) noted the following:

- The constant presence of the captain or senior on the bridge, who runs the ship: he works the radio himself, he himself evaluates the situation, he himself gives the wheel and engine telegraph commands. The watch officer plays no role in the running of the ship. The function of the watch officer is not understood.

In the French Navy, ships and submarines are run by the watch officer. There is no command watch. In normal situations, the commander appears on the bridge only episodically (on submarines, surfacing is done without the commander): in complicated situations, he will be there but he does not take control, but is there to support the watch officer. The watch officer, in turn, trains his assistant (the warrant officer). In 2003, during a refueling evolution, the Latouche-Treville came along side the Admiral Chabanenko twice for refueling: the first time, the watch officer brought her along side (with advice from the commander), while the second time, the commander didn’t participate as the watch officer advised his assistant.

- Stationing an additional navigation watch.

On the French destroyers, the plot is kept by the watch officer or by one of his

two assistants (a warrant officer and a senior sailor who also is the signalman). The plot is kept on the bridge with the aid of GPS. Besides that, the plot is kept in the combat information center on an electronic map on a personal computer.

- Conflicting commands are issued.

Often, conflicting commands were issued when the commander of the ship, the chief of staff and task force commander were on the bridge. The French liaison officers were surprised when someone corrected the orders of the ship’s commander.

- Tense situation on the bridge.

This was noted especially in areas with a lot of shipping traffic. There was much screaming and cursing on the bridge. The BPK, even having the right of way in accordance with MPPSS-72, would initiate unpredictable maneuvers, confusing the transports proceeding in their own lanes. The French liaison officers asked, “Don’t you ever have intensive marine traffic transiting your area?” (Note: This whole paragraph is bracketed in the report).

- Current information for the watch standers are written on cardboard cards.

On French ships, all the current information (course, speed, callsign) is written in marker on glass on any convenient place, including the bridge windscreen.

2. “Many watchstanders have unclear roles”.

The French liaison officers, probably, have in mind the supplementary watch, stationed in the corridors and hatches along their routes.

3. “There are more watches on the BPK”.

There aren’t many differences between the French and Russian Navies concerning how watches are relieved or when. ON the Tourville, watch turnover is at 0400, 0800, 1200, 1500, 1800, 2000, and 2400 (on the BPK there is no turnover at 1500, but at 1600 instead). But they have four watch sections (and in certain situations, three) while we have two or three watch sections.

Even the Russians know they suck, Part II

B. The ship.

1. “Presence on board of unnecessary, but potentially dangerous objects and materials”.

French officers paid attention to the presence on board the BPK of a large number of:

- large mirrors (which can shatter during explosions and seriously cut people standing nearby; and the shards are potentially dangerous);

- plastic and wooden surfaces (which burn well and put out toxic smoke).

The sauna is potentially dangerous.

In the French Navy, the presence on board of dangerous objects and materials without good reason is categorically and strictly controlled. (Note: Big handwritten exclamation mark here).

2. “Slippery decks: both the weather decks and the interior spaces”.

The metal decks, especially when they are wet or covered in salt, are very slippery. There is a great probability of falling and receiving serious injury during pitching. The guests often slipped. The decks on French ships (as well as on American, British and Norwegian ships) are covered with a rough paint which limits slipping even when wet. The ladders also have a special coating, kind of like emory board, that limits slipping.

3. “Many commands given on the 1MC”

Only reveille and the command to begin damage control training and the man overboard drill were announced over the 1MC on the Tourville. All underway evolutions, including watch change, happened without a command. The crew acted on their own in accordance with the plan of the day. (Note: Handwritten exclamation mark here).

4. “Radar detection of air targets didn’t work all the time”.

The air search and surface search radars on the French ships were on in active mode constantly, monitoring the air and surface picture. (Note: Bit exclamation mark in the margin here). On the BPK, the air search radar was periodically switched off, resulting in the detection of a British Nimrod and a British civilian helicopter only after they made a low altitude flyby.

5. “There is no accessible and clear way to deliver ship wide information to the crew”.

Russian liaison officers were invited to briefings held once per day on board the Tourville and the Latouche-Treville for the officers. Briefing topics included: weather forcast, disposition of foreign forces in the sailing area, the plan of the day for the current day and a provisional plan of the day for the next day, training events for the joint training and a supply and armament report. Information was presented in the form of slides, projected on the screen with interesting photographs made that day. There is a television in the central corridor on which the whole crew could watch information about the briefing.

There were similar events on board the BPK twice a day. Information was provided to the underway staff officers only, using maps. The French liaison officers weren’t invited. No notes were given to the crew.

6. “Hygiene on board the ship”.

On board the more than thirty year old Tourville, there was hot and cold fresh water in all the compartments and showers all the time. (Note: in the margin, someone scribbled “No comment!!!”). The Tourville boils about a hundred tons of fresh water a day.

French officers were surprised that onboard the most modern Russian ship, provision of hot water to the staterooms wasn’t even planned for and that cold water was available once a day for ten minutes.

The entire crew (450 people) washed once every ten days, over the course of eight hours. Each man had three to four minutes in the shower. The French officers paid attention to the appearance of the Russian sailors. By the end of the deployment, lice was found on the sailors. (Note: Exclamation mark in the margin).

Even the Russians know they suck, Part I

I ran across an interesting document, an after action report detailing "living conditions on board ships of the Russian Navy, observations by officers in the French Navy during joint Russian-French exercises and a port visit to Brest, France by ships of the Northern Fleet" dated 28 October 2004. There are a lot of interesting observations here, which can be summarized thusly:

They have hot water! Shit, the French have water at all! The watch actually stands watch! Goddamn, we're dirty! Paint mixed with sand on the decks so people don't slip and break their necks? Mon dieu! Musters! Do we really need so many musters? And maybe our ships wouldn't be so dirty if we gave our guys stuff to clean with. Or if we let them shower more than once every two weeks!

Well, not quite, but pretty close.

Part I:

To the Commander of the Northern Fleet
Vice Admiral Abramov

Report

On the issue: “Some details on living conditions on board ships of the Russian Navy, observations by officers in the French Navy during joint Russian-French exercises and a port visit to Brest, France, by ships of the Northern Fleet”

The second joint Russian-French training exercise in the north-east Atlantic took place from 14-27 September, 2004. The large anti-submarine ship (BPK) Admiral Chabanenko, attack submarine K-157, French destroyer Tourville and submarine Emeraude participated. According to plan, the first evolution was an officer exchange: two Russian officers went to the Tourville and two French officers went to the Admiral Chabanenko. The liaison officers spent seven days on board, until the port call in Brest (21-26 Sep 2004). During direct interaction with French officers (on separate occasions), ((something)) managed to indirectly obtain information about the issues that they paying attention to during the joint exercises and port visit….

Event------------------------- Tourville--------------Chabanenko
Reveille-----------------------0745-------------------0700
Breakfast----------------------0700-0900----------First shift 0730-0745
(Officers serve themselves)--------------------------Second shift 0815-0830

Page 2

Event--------------------Tourville-------------------------Chabanenko
Shipboard evolutions---0900-1100----------------------0830-1125
Lunch:-------------------First shift -1100-1200----------1130-1145
---------------------------Second shift-1200-1300--------1210-1230
Rest----------------------Until 1445------------------------Until 1400
Shipboard evolutions---1500-1900-----------------------1400-1725
Dinner-------------------1st Shift 1900-2000-------------1730-1745
----------------------------2nd Shift 2000-2100-----------1810-1830
Shipboard evolutions----N/A------------------------------1830-2045
Free time----------------From 2100-----------------------2035-2200
Evening tea--------------N/A-------------------------------First shift 2330-2345
(Coffee, tea, juice, beer, etc.--------------------------------Second shift 0010-0020
always available to crew for free)
Taps---------------------Anytime after 2000---------------0030


Darken ship on French vessels is at 2000: the lights in the staterooms and common areas are covered and night lights are turned on in corridors (daylight lighting is turned on at 0800). As opposed to the lighting on the BPK, only running lights are visible from the outside.
There are no shipwide evolutions on the Tourville after 2000 except:
1. Night training (for instance, night time TOLs by the helicopter);
2. When the need arises because of a casualty.

Thus, French sailors (not standing watch) have twelve hours in which to relax
while Russian sailors have but six.

Page 3

2. “Typical shipboard evolutions during the week…”

The commander of the Tourville established three types of days at sea when he assumed command, depending on the situation:

1. Combat training day
2. Maintenance day – when the crew concentrated on repairs and material condition.
3. Sunday (rest day) – one or two times a week. Shipboard evolutions are kept to a minimum or just not carried out. No reveille. (“Sunday” was announced as one of the days during the joint exrcises).

Special attention was given to damage control and man overboard drills. They were carried out on maintenance days and also in parallel with joint training.

Man overboard drills are organized in an interesting manner. In secret from the crew, the First Lieutenant would give the signal and he would go to a cabinet and take out a manikin, throw it overboard and give the command “Man Overboard!”. The command is given over the 1MC. The watch officer presses the special button on the GPS to mark position and turns the ship around to return to that same position. At the same time fast rubber boat is prepared for launch. Launch of the boat is made without a crew aboard for safety reasons. Two members of the crew and a diver were lowered into the boat with a line after the boat was lowered into the water and placed under tow. The rubber boat was launched toward the manikin from the approaching ship. Upon return of the boat, the boat was secured to the ship and a Jacob’s ladder was lowered, and only then they raised the boat. The rescue operation – from the moment the “Man overboard” command was given to the recovery of the manikin on board in sea state three or four – took twenty minutes. No one from the ships command team took part in the drill. Action on the bridge was directed by the watch officer – a warrant officer. (Note: There is a big, handwritten exclamation point here).

3. “Multiple and prolonged cleaning events”.

Planned cleaning on the French ship is done once a day. The cleaner, who has a wide variety of cleaning implements and household chemicals, decides himself if he has cleaned enough or if he should clean some more.

LTC Paul Yingling, O.G. (Originalist Gangsta)

In order to prevent future debacles, LTC Paul Yingling calls for a return to running an army the way the Founders intended - by making Congress actually work and do shit. And shit:

A RETURN TO CITIZEN SOLDIERS

The U.S. should therefore abandon the all-volunteer military and return to our historic reliance on citizen soldiers and conscription to wage protracted war. This approach proved successful in both world wars and offers several advantages over the all-volunteer military. First and most important, this approach demands popular participation in national security decisions and provides Congress with powerful incentives to reassert its war powers. Unlike the all-volunteer force, a conscripted force of citizen soldiers would ensure that the burdens of war are felt equally in every community in America. Second, this approach provides the means to expand the Army to a sufficient size to meet its commitments. Unlike the all-volunteer force, a conscripted force would not rely on stop-loss policies or an endless cycle of year-on, year-off deployments of overstressed and exhausted forces. Third, conscription enables the military to be more discriminating in selecting those with the skills and attributes most required to fight today’s wars. Unlike the all-volunteer force, a conscripted force would not rely on exorbitant bonuses and reduced enlistment standards to fill its ranks. Finally, this approach would be less expensive. Unlike the world wars of the 20th century, today’s dangers will not pass quickly, allowing for a return to a smaller and less expensive military establishment. Imposing fiscal discipline on the Pentagon would not only strengthen America’s depleted finances, but also constrain executive ambitions for adventures abroad and congressional appetites for pork-barrel projects at home.

...

Others may dispute these methods of raising and funding military power on the grounds of political expediency. Imposing conscription, mobilizing National Guard and reserve forces, raising taxes and cutting domestic spending to pay for military expenditures will be politically unpopular. However, the development of America’s military forces and their commitment to protracted wars were never intended to be politically expedient. The Founders placed these powers in the hands of Congress to ensure that such momentous decisions were undertaken carefully after sober public deliberation. The Founders did not expect that America would “go to war with the Army we have” but rather that Congress would raise the Army we need to prosecute carefully thought out war aims to a successful conclusion.

...

In many ways, the prosecution of the war in Iraq is a cautionary tale against bypassing the war powers of Congress. If members of Congress had to impose conscription and fully mobilize the National Guard, they might have been more skeptical of the case for war. Had members of Congress been required to cut popular domestic programs to pay for the war, they might have insisted on prosecuting the war more intelligently and vigorously. Instead, Iraq edged toward chaos over the course of four years, costing the lives of thousand of volunteers and hundreds of billions of dollars in borrowed money. Members of Congress held hearings and asked questions, but took no action to change the course of events in Iraq. The public did not have to endure conscription as it did during the Vietnam War; the nascent anti-war movement therefore never approached the size and intensity of its Vietnam-era counterpart. Congress played only a minor role in the 2007 change of strategy in Iraq, the so-called “surge” that has created a remarkable, if fragile, turnaround. Nonetheless, the underlying fact remains that our conduct of the war in Iraq calls into question both the intelligence and vigor of America’s capacity to wage war.

I can already hear the screams of the so-called "originalist conservatives" of "America hating traitor" and "why does the Russian Navy Blogger and LTC Yingling hate America so much that they are advocating disarmament?"

Because that is how those wanna be, gonna be prankstas in the non-serving Bill Kristol/Rush Limbaugh/Glenn Beck wing roll...

A Unique Operation in Gremikha, Pt II

More than a year ago, I made a snide remark about how Gremikha looked kind of like the Book of Eli meets S.T.A.L.K.E.R.. Apparently, they CAN carry out those types of "unique operations" there:











I'll never underestimate the technical ability of a country that looks like the set for a remake of "Planet of the Apes" again.

I have no love for the Russians, but...

...the morons who considered this need to be identified so they will never again allowed near the levers of power. What were these advocates of riding to Georgia's rescue thinking? That trading Tbilisi for Chicago or New York in a potential nuclear exchange would be a fair trade? That this was an "emotionally difficult" decision is absurd.

I want names!

President George W. Bush and his senior aides considered — and rejected — a military response to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, according to a new history of the conflict and interviews with former officials in the Bush administration.

“There were people on [Vice President Dick] Cheney’s staff and [National Security Adviser Stephen] Hadley’s staff who said, ‘We can’t let Georgia go down like this.'”