Cold War Stories: Guardfish vs. K-184, Part I

Details about American submarine special operations aren't very common. While it is "common knowledge" and "everyone knows" that American submarines conduct special operations off the coasts of foreign countries, especially with the publication of books such as "Blind Man's Bluff", operational details are (rightfully) rare.

There are exceptions. There is a little bit of operational detail of one particularly tense, wartime operation at Guardfish.org, a website dedicated to the men who have served on board the USS Guardfish (SSN 612). Entitled The Saga of the 1972 Guardfish Patrol, it is a little bit of Commander David Minton's account of operations by the USS Guardfish that ranged from the Sea of Japan to the South China Sea in the late spring of 1972.

There are always men on the eyepiece of the other periscope and their stories (in English) are even rarer. In what may be a unique instance, we have the memories of two Cold War submarine captains on opposite sides of the periscope participating in the same events. Commander Minton has his story, as does Admiral Al'fred Simenovich Berzin, who as a Captain First Rank (K1R) commanded Echo II class SSGN K-184, the Guardfish's target, in 1972 during its transit to Vietnam in response to the failure of the Paris Peace Talks.

This is his side of the story, "Guardfish vs. K-184":

Not long ago, someone gave me a book, “United States Submarines”, in which I read an article by retired Navy Captain David Minton called “The Guardfish Trails an Echo”. I immediately understood that David Minton trailed the K-184, which I commanded at the time. I will tell you about this event from my side, paying attention to David Minton’s commentary.

While serving in the position of commander of the SSGN K-184 in the Pacific, I had to participate in reconnaissance operations against the strike carrier America, the anti-submarine carrier Ticonderoga and the submarine Guardfish. The experience received benefited me in my further service. During my education at the naval institue, at the post-graduate courses and at the Naval Academy, an officer had to receive a deep understanding of how to conduct reconnaissance, have a practical mastery of reconnaissance assets, know how to analyze information obtained about the enemy and make corresponding conclusions which is necessary to make a decision about employment of torpedoes or missiles or to decline (break off) from the anti-submarine warfare forces of the enemy. This learning process must continue even in the fleet, that is, it a constant process. For any submarine commander in peace time, the opportunity must present itself to get experience conducting a reconnaissance operation against surface and subsurface vessels of the probable enemy. Our commander must completely know the following facts about the submarine of the probable adversary:

- noise level,
- capability of the sonar system,
- parameters of the radar set,
- tactical action,
- acoustic countermeasures,
- maximum and minimum speed,
- maximum diving depth, and
- capabilities of the torpedo and missile armament.

The submarine I commanded, K-184 was already on combat duty for a month in Bukhta Pavlovskaya on the 9th of May, 1972. That morning the whole division mustered on the parade ground, the division commander Contra-Admiral I.I. Vereniki greeted us and congratulated the whole crew on Victory Day and afterwards we marched past the division commander's reviewing stand. After that I went to the duty officer and read the intelligence summary:
“The area of the Indo-China Peninsula. Combat action against the patriotic forces of Indo-China from the Tonkin Gulf (130 miles to the north of Da Nang) carried out by the strike carriers Coral Sea, Kitty Hawk and Saratoga; and from an area 170 miles to the south east of Saigon the strike carrier Constellation with 38 ships in support. The carriers have launched 353 sorties, 256 of them strike sorties.”
In the second half of the day the Pacific Fleet went to a higher state of readiness and our submarines sounded general quarters, while the alarm was sounded on our boat and the crew responded, the crew on the boat was ordered not to fire up the main reactor. That evening the division commander Contra-Admiral I.I. Vereniki called me to his office and said succinctly, “Go to the South China Sea and support our Vietnamese brothers.” I also found out from him that behind us were going Echo I SSGN K-45 (Captain First Rank Yu.N.Ganzha, commanding) and Echo II SSGN K-57 (Captain First Rank Yu.F.Shipovnikov, commanding).

10 May. By morning both reactors were brought on line to the turbo-generators. The combat orders came in the form of a telegram, which was given to me along with the route charts by the Division Chief of Staff, Captain First Rank M.B.Abramov. I received my final instructions from the division commander and then we slipped away from the pier and got underway.

David Minton writes: In the summer of 1972, the USS Guardfish (SSN 612) was in the Sea of Japan when world events pushed her and her crew into participating in a key event. With the collapse of the Paris peace talks, the war in Vietnam took a more forceful turn on the 9th of May and our troops began to mine Haiphong and other important North Vietnamese ports in order to cut the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) off from sea resupply. A message came to the Guardfish warning of operations at sea on the part of the Soviets in response. The world situation was white hot. No one knew how the Soviet Union would react to the mining. The Guardfish took a position near the Soviet Pacific Fleet's largest base at periscope depth. Later that night on the 10th of May, a submarine was sighted visually, intersecting our course at a high speed and heading straight for the Guardfish, which was expecting her. Closer contact allowed us to visually identify the maneuvering black mass as a Soviet Echo II class SSGN. This SSGN, which displaced 5000 tons, was equipped with a nuclear reactor and carried eight surface to surface Shaddock cruise missiles which could destroy targets at a range of 200 miles. The Guardfish followed behind her. Soon the Echo II submerged and took a course to the south-east at high speed. Was this sortie the answer to the mining of Haiphong harbor?(/i)

To be continued...

Cold War Stories: Guardfish Vs. K-184, Part V

(Photo: USS Ticonderoga (CVS 14)).

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV

The deployment turns into the "Seinfeld" of deployments - a patrol about nothing. K-184 aimlessly punches holes in the ocean very slowly as Guardfish follows, at least until K-184 makes up for the deafness of her sonar shack...

28 May. We took station in the Philippines Sea. Two messages were received in which there was an order to take up a new area in the form of a circle with a radius of 50 miles; also it was reported that it was leaked to the American press that Soviet submarines were discovered in the South China Sea. Admiral N.I.Smirnov, the Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet calls upon us to maintain our covert posture and curses K-57 for reporting the fact that she took station. Covertness was lost by Headquarters during our workups for deployment: the transit route was available to anyone who wasn’t lazy, all the boats set out on the same route, they ordered us to report our position by radio, there wasn’t any sort of cover story created to cover our departure from base. During our PD to receive the broadcast we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 170 relative. The horizon was clear. We weren’t able to determine the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) or the pulse duration since the radar operated only three seconds. Its possible that it’s a BPS-9 carried by a Permit class SSN.

David Minton writes: After passing through the Bashi Straits, the Echo II established a new patrol zone in the Philippines Sea south of Okinawa. It was the worst acoustic conditions that you could imagine. At night, natural ambient noise and frequent rains deafened sonar. It became ever more difficult to maintain contact so Guardfish had to maintain trail of the Echo II at an even closer distance. Shore worked out a detailed procedure for handing off the Echo II to another US boat. We got that message on the broadcast.

29 May. We took position in the new water, speed 6 knots, with no explicit mission. I made the decision to begin a search for American and Japanese surface ships. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 175 relative. The horizon was clear. We weren’t able to determine the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) or the pulse duration since the radar operated only five seconds. Its possible that it’s a BPS-9 carried by a Permit class SSN.

30 May. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 175 relative. The horizon was clear. I heard out a suggestion from the XO and Combat Systems Officer on how to flush out the foreign submarine and break off contact.

31 May. We got a message on the broadcast ordering us to yet another area and also received word that supposedly the US found out about the locations of all of our boats in the South China Sea. Other areas were assigned to K-7, K-45 and K-57. The transit lane to these areas border some reefs and bars. The Pac Fleet Command reminded us about navigational safety. The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” is approaching the Philippines Sea. President Nixon flew to Iran and his Secretary of Defense gave the order to shut down the “Safeguard” anti-ballistic missile system.

01 June. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 175 relative. The horizon was clear. We got the intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” arrived in port Guam for refueling. There are three CVAs in the Gulf of Tonkin and one CVA to the east of Saigon.”

02 June. We carried out a special maneuver to attempt to flush out the foreign submarine that was possibly following us. We didn’t find anything. That day we came to PD for the broadcast and we observed a 10,000 ton displacement transport bearing 280 true, range 40 cables. Sonar didn’t detect anything before coming to PD because the acoustics were so bad.

03 June. We read in the intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” is transiting to the Philippines.” K-45 was ordered to transit the Bashi Straits to occupy new water, once again past the bars and reefs. And again came the warnings on navigation from Fleet Headquarters. Soon we’ll have spent a whole month at sea, splitting atoms for no apparent reason, although they could have given us the task of searching for and following a carrier. For a month we cruised at 6 knots in the same 50 mile radius circle, hearing and seeing nothing.

04 June. Intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” is entering the Luzon Strait.

05 June. Intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” has arrived in port, Subic Bay.” I called the department heads together to discuss the patrol report, warning that I didn’t want any whitewashes and to write what happened in actuality.

06 June. From 29 May to 06 June during our time at periscope depth receiving the broadcast, we were making brief detections of a radar operating astern of us, following us in our baffles at low speed, executing special maneuvers, although we couldn’t detect anything. At 1200, we came to PD and caught the broadcast. I made a low power periscope sweep and followed it up with a high power examination of the horizon, and there it was in our port quarter – I see a submarine periscope at a range of 5 or 6 cables about 2 meters out of the water. I gave the scope to the XO, K3R L.V.Shaipov and he confirmed that he saw a periscope. When I went to look again, it was gone. Sonar didn’t detect anything. I immediately sent a message to shore informing them of the detection of an American submarine. We detected a radar in single sweep mode operating astern of us and assumed it was a BPS-9 belonging to a Permit class SSN. We dove to 80 meters, turned about to search our baffles, speed four knots. After 30 minutes, we broke off from the American boat, changing speed and course, using active acoustic countermeasures.


David Minton writes: “Shore has worked out detailed procedures for turning over trail of the Echo II SSGN to another American boat. We got the message on the broadcast. As Guardfish was at periscope depth, we got an urgent message that the Echo II had suddenly come to PD and visually detected Guardfish. Maneuvers subsequent to this were aggressive and at high speed. To continue the trail of an alerted foe wasn’t possible and we lost contact with the Echo II.

To be continued...

Cold War Stories: Guardfish Vs. K-184, Part IV

Compartment six (Reactor), Project 675 Echo II class cruise missile submarine.
(Photo: The Pilot's Blog)

Part I
Part II
Part III

K-184 gets jerked around by shore, dogged by Neptunes and Orions, averts another disaster and finds a new friend.

20 May. We have taken station in area number one. We came to periscope depth at 0830 to catch the broadcast and fix our position. Immediately, dead ahead at a range of 10 cables, I saw an American auxiliary ship heading directly for us. We filled the emergency dive tank and dove to a safe depth. Sonar didn’t hear the ship. The bathymetry was bad – generally, we don’t hear anything. Therefore every surfacing or PD was potentially dangerous due to the possibility of collision with a surface vessel.

David Minton writes: “Eight days the sub has patrolled at low speed in an area in the shape of a rectangle located about 700 miles from out from our carriers cruising along the coast of Vietnam and far outside the 200 mile range of her missiles. For now, the tracking party has tried not to lose contact with the Soviet boat….

If military conflict starts now, then the Sea of Japan will become a trap for the Pacific Ocean Fleet, like the Gulf of Finland became one for ships and submarines in 1943. The straits: La Peruse, Sangarskiy and the Korean Straits can quickly become anti-submarine barriers and right now, our likely foe most probably controls the movement of our submarines. (TR Note: I think the "Sangarskiy" Straits are actually better known as the Tartar Straits between Sakhalin Island and the Asian mainland.)

22 May. We detected an ASW P-3 Orion’s AN/APS-80, weak signal strength. We diverted course away from the aircraft.

23 May. We came to periscope depth at 0830 to catch the broadcast and get a position fix. Political information: “The Fleet Komsomol activities were held”. Not one word more. Of course, it was “very important” information for a submarine in the South China Sea. We detected an ASW P-3 Orion’s AN/APS-80, weak signal strength. We diverted course away from the aircraft.

24 May. We received instructions along with K-45 and K-7 to report our positions. We sent our lat/long at 1200. We sent the message three times because atmospheric conditions in the area were bad. From the intel summary: “Nixon is holding talks in Moscow”. We detected a weak signal strength AN/APS-20 from a P-2 Neptune ASW aircraft and diverted course away from the aircraft. The last two AN/APS-20 intercepts were analyzed and we came to the conclusion that the aircraft was conducting an ASW search.

25 May. Sometime after lunch, the engineer, K2R M.S.Bayburin reported that there was a leak of KhGCEhN-601 from the port side reactor and I made the decision to cut it off since a build up of the levels of radioactive gasses and aerosols began in compartment 6 (TR Note: if there is anybody who knows what ХГЦЭН - 601 is, please leave it in the comments section. There is only ONE reference to it on the intertubes and I am dying to know what it is). We remembered the search operation we were on in the Sea of Okhotsk from 24 September to 05 October, 1971. The boat entered the search area on 26 September, took up the search area and began to look for the “blue” submarine. On 29 September at 1230 at a depth of 80 meters there was a release of radioactive gas in the forward equipment space in the 6th (reactor) compartment. The radioactive gas and aerosol levels quickly grew in the forward equipment space to 20 times the normal allowable limit on the second and third levels of the 6th compartment. The signal and announcement of “radioactive danger” was given immediately and a special emergency zone was declared in the 5th, 6th and 7th compartments. The engineer, K2R Bayburin and the chemical defense officer, K3R G.B.Yagoshin reported the boats condition and suggested a course of action. I decided to surface and ventilate the 6th compartment to the open air. Ten minutes later we surfaced and began the ventilation. Literally two minutes later, ESM detected an AN/APS-80 and an American P-3 Orion appeared out of the clouds and began to over fly us at an altitude of 100 meters. I decided to alter course, emergency dive and clear the datum by 20 miles. By this time the situation with regards to the gas and aerosol radioactivity was more complicated: it was 300 times allowed levels on the third deck in compartment 6. In the forward equipment space it was 5000 times allowable. On the second deck, 1700 times and in the 5th and 7th compartments it was around 40 times. To leave personnel in these compartments any longer was impossible, and since they were removed from the affected compartments, I sent a message to shore detailing the deteriorating situation. We began to ventilate compartments 5, 6 and 7 to the atmosphere. Sometime by 2400 on 29 September, the levels in the 5th and 7th compartments were down to normal and in the 6th compartment they were down to just 1-2 times the allowable levels. The levels had reached 5-10 times norms by this time in the other compartments. In the 5th, 6th and 7th compartments, the level of contamination reached 100 counts/minute and we began shutting down those compartments. By 1200 on 30 September, the situation on board had stabilized: the gas and aerosol levels throughout the boat fell to normal levels. We sent a message to shore on our condition and asked for permission to return to base submerged. We received permission an hour later. Part of the crew suffered head aches, chest pains and fatigue that didn’t go away for a month. When we got back to base, no one bothered to examine us.

26 May. We came to periscope depth at 0200. I immediately saw a 10,000 ton displacement ship dead ahead, range 10 cables. Sonar didn’t hear anything. We made an emergency deep to a safe depth. The next broadcast we got a message from shore ordering us to return to base.

David Minton writes: “…world events began to take on a more peaceful tone. After long negotiations, President Nixon went to Moscow, where he held an historic meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev. During this meeting with Brezhnev on 24 May, the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger informed Brezhnev that the US knew about the deployment of Soviet submarines and that their presence so close to the combat zone in Vietnam was a provocation and very dangerous. Two days after this standoff, the Soviet Echo II submarine turned north.

27 May. That night we received a message canceling the order to return to base. Instead they gave us an order to take up a new position in the Philippines Sea which was in the shape of a circle with a radius of 30 miles. What we were to do in that circle, they didn’t say. K-57 and K-189 also received water space in the Philippines Sea. We passed through the Bashi Strait and fixed our position visually using an island. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 172 relative. In the periscope, the horizon was clear. We couldn’t determine the parameters of the radar. I started the tracking board with the goal of identifying our pursuer during every PD excursion. On it I noted the incoming messages, the weather, visual observations and our maneuvering. It was possible that the radar was a BPS-9 belonging to a Permit-class nuclear attack boat.

To be continued....

Cold War Stories - Guardfish Vs. K-184, Part II

Part I

K-184 suffers a potentially significant casualty and Captain Minton sends a CRITIC:

11 May. Depth 100 meters, speed 12.5 knots. We turn off course 090 every hour to listen astern – to hear if any American submarines are trailing us. Life on board a submarine is organized and falls into a routine. From the intel summary: “There are six strike carriers and two helo carriers in Vietnamese waters.” During the broadcast, electronic support measures (ESM) detected an AN/APS-20 carried by a P-2 Neptune anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft: the signal strength was weak. We changed course and dove to 200 meters. Thirty minutes later, the missile officer, K3R V.I.Tsimbalenko, came to the conn to report that there was a leak in the cable raceway in missile container six, that is, container six wasn’t hermetically sealed and it contained the missile with the special combat section. If the container was flooded, that meant that the missile would have to be taken out of service, and actually, it was a potential weapons casualty. From the start of the deployment we were vexed by this situation: what to do in this case? Having heard the missile officer’s report and suggestions from the engineer, K2R M.S.Bayburin, I decided to open the drain valve in compartment seven so that the water in the cable raceway in container six would drain into the bilge so the leakage rate could be measured – 10 liters a minute – and periodically I ordered the water to be pumped from the bilge overboard. In addition, I decided to surface and try to fix the opening (or crack) in the cable raceway in container six. At 1520, we surfaced, raised containers five and six and a party of specialists went out to investigate container six. Ten minutes later, the silhouettes of two Japanese trawlers appeared on the horizon on a course headed away from us and at 1535 ESM reported a weak signal strength APS-20. I gave the command to make an emergency dive to avoid the aircraft. K3R Tsimbalenko and K2R Bayburin reported that the inspection was complete, everything was whole with no defects, that is, there was no visible cause of the leak. Thirty minutes later water again came through the drain valve in compartment seven. I decided to surface in order to deal with the leak. K2R Bayburin suggested winding the flange joint with bindings impregnated with epoxy. At 2000, we surfaced and carried out his suggestion and also transmitted a report to shore about the leak in container six. We got the intel report:
The strike carriers “Coral Sea”, “Kitty Hawk” and “Constellation” are located 190 miles north of Da Nang. The strike carrier “Midway” is east of Saigon with 47 vessels in support. The carriers flew 369 sorties in a 24 hour period, 279 strike sorties. In the last 24 hours ships of the 7th Fleet joined by bombers struck port structures with bombs and gunfire in Haiphong and Kam-Pha, the island of Kak-Ba and the Do-Shon Peninsula. As a result of the bombardment in Kam-Pha, the Soviet ship “G. Akopyan” was set on fire. The helicopter carrier “Okinawa” with accompanying amphibious group is located 180 miles north of Da Nang.

David Minton writes further: “In the course of the next two days, the Soviet SSGN often slowed and was at periscope depth for a long time, evidently receiving additional instructions from HQ. During the trail of the Echo II, Guardfish slowed her speed, significantly increasing the frequency response of her sonar. To the surprise of the crew, they could hear at least two, maybe three additional Soviet boats in the area. To follow three submarines is more complex than just following one, while following four is impossible. The tracking party on Guardfish has concentrated all of its efforts on maintaining contact with the Echo II, which we have already visually identified.

12 May. Water again began to come out of the cable raceway in container six through the drain valve in compartment seven. Accordingly I made the decision to continue at depths no greater than 80 meters. At 0600 we passed abeam of Ulin-Do. At 1200, I came to periscope depth to determine our position. There were up to 50 Japanese trawlers on a bearing of 120 to 250 on the horizon at a range of seven miles. The sonar officer, K3R V. Voronin reported that the depth finder went out of service. The navigator determined our position instead using the sun and Loran A and C. At 1634, we got the depth finder working again and thankfully passed abeam a bank with depths ranging from nine to thirty meters.

David Minton writes: Since the Echo II was proceeding to the south-east toward the exit of the Sea of Japan, as the captain, I had to make two important decisions. First, if it was worth breaking radio silence to report sighting three or maybe even four Soviet submarines. The first task during submarine surveillance operations is to report unusual Soviet vessel deployments as soon as possible after recognition. Those types of reports are known as “critics”, and although one had not been sent before, I decided that this was one of those times when Guardfish should break radio silence and inform the CinC about the situation. Second, should Guardfish break off from its surveillance mission and trail the Soviet boat. The orders were silent on this issue. But it occurred to me that the CinC would want to know where the Soviets were going. Since I didn’t have enough time to wait for orders, I remembered the motto of our CinC: “The faint of heart don’t become heroes” and we pressed on.

To be continued...

Cold War Stories - Guardfish Vs. K-184, Part III

(Photo: Ship Encyclopedia)

Part I
Part II
K-184 continues her transit toward the Gulf of Tonkin. Damage control drills are conducted and hilarity ensues:

13 May. Sky was completely overcast, visibility 2-5 miles, sea state 3-4. We approached the Korean Straits, 15 miles from Okinosima Island. We determined our position with a single sweep of the radar and then continued at depth of 50 meters, speed 12 knots. We systematically swept the area with active sonar. We entered the East China Sea and the water temperature became warmer, +22 degrees Celcius.

14 May. We are in the South China Sea. We are approaching the area where the Kuro-Sivo Current reaches a speed of 2.5 knots. The Executive Officer K3R L.B. Shaipov reported on deficiencies which were discovered during watch drills and his suggestions on improving on them in the future.

David Minton writes: Trailing is a complicated task. In order to remain undetected, the boat must determine the position, speed and course of the contact by means of passive sonar. Estimation of range by passive sonar demanded from Guardfish constant maneuvering in order to get changing bearings to the contact. Too close and they can detect you, too far and contact can be lost. These maneuvers usually took place in the baffles, the dead zone behind the stern. Just about hourly the Echo II turned around to listen to this zone. From time to time it was a passive turn 90 degrees so that their sonar could hear everything that was behind her, and sometimes it was pretty aggressive, turning 180 degrees and reversing course, heading directly at Guardfish. This was a very dangerous maneuver and risked collision. When the distance between us shrank, the Echo II had a real chance of detecting Guardfish. Each time the Echo II performed a baffles clear, Guardfish had to guess which way she was turning so that Guardfish could follow her from the opposite side. Additionally, Guardfish quickly slowed while trying to maintain silence so that the Echo II had enough time and distance to come about on her previous course.

15 May. We entered the Philippines Sea. We got a message giving us water space in area one in the approaches to the Gulf of Tonkin. The area is similar in shape to a coffin lid. K-45 was given area two, an area with a lot of bars and banks. We were ordered to be prepared to use conventional weapons on command and in self-defense. That night I received political information: “Officer Kuz’min said that he condemns the aggression by the USA in Vietnam”. This was “very important” information for the boat.

David Minton writes: “Situation reports are often demanded in Washington so that they can determine the Soviet threat level and intentions. President Nixon and his National Security Advisor received these reports every day. Since radio broadcasts from Guardfish sent at high frequency and power could be intercepted and Guardfish’s position fixed by the Soviets, we used an alternative way to get the message out. An ASW P-3 made a few secret fly overs to Guardfish’s assumed position and received a short message transmitted in UHF at periscope depth or with the help of a SLOT buoy so that Guardfish could remain at proper depth to maintain trail. During this pursuit, any submarine in the Pacific Ocean would immediately re-position to support the carriers operating along the Vietnamese coast and also participate in the search for other Soviet submarines. This created a problem, both for Guardfish and for command. Guardfish was clearly following the Echo II wherever she went and so command had to move other submarines out of the way so as to guarantee that any other, quieter submarine didn’t jeopardize the safety of Guardfish or any other submarines.

16 May. We continue to travel to the designated area after passing Okinawa and we only came to PD twice to get the broadcast. I called the missile officer, K3R Tsimbalenko, to the conn. Out of all the watch officers, Tsimbalenko was the most prepared, the best educated and he knew the missile business like no one’s business. He reported that everything was normal in container six and the water flow from the cable raceway wasn’t increasing.

17 May. Sea state three with swells, fog, tropical rains. We came to PD to determine our position before continuing through the Bashi Straits. We fixed our position using Loran A and C and also got a radar fix. From the intel summary: “A cruiser and destroyer left the Tonkin Gulf in the direction of Saigon. Nixon plans to be in Moscow for talks on the 25th of May. Intensity of military activity in Vietnam has significantly decreased.”

David Minton writes: “Once, while in the Philippines Sea, the Echo II turned to the south-west, in the direction of the Bashi Strait between Taiwan and the islands to the north of Luzon. The Bashi Strait is the often-used entrance to the South China Sea and I was sure that it is the Soviet boat’s goal, though it went further south than usual. The Echo II slowed, came to PD and then began to move quickly, orienting herself with high-frequency active sonar not usually used at that depth. She was lost. While at PD, she apparently fixed her position and then turned back on course for the Bashi Straits and increased speed to 16 knots. After sending a report via SLOT buoy about this quick change of course, Guardfish darted off after the Soviet boat, knowing that American boats may be re-locating to the area. In order to avoid collision with other American boats, Guardfish made her depth 100 meters, the depth often used by Soviet boats and which I knew American boats would avoid. My caution was vindicated when Guardfish detected an American boat, heading away to the north at high speed.

18 May. Today the commo, K3R V.F.Tereshchenko outlined his plan to search for enemy surface ships and submarines in area one as well as well as reporting on the bathymetry and possible measures that could be used to mask the boat from enemy ASW forces.

David Minton writes: “The Echo II has entered the South China Sea and has proceeded to a point located approximately 300 miles from the island of Luzon.

19 May. Today we conducted a check of all the emergency escape gear on the boat. A couple of discrepancies were discovered but they were quickly rectified. Before we went to sea back in April, our boat was inspected by a commission from the Navy General Staff headed by Contra-Admiral Ivanov. They inspected all the escape gear and the Chief of Navy Staff was of the opinion that it would work in the event of an emergency. There was nothing particular of note. At the end of the inspection, Admiral Ivanov initiated a drill. This was part of the scenario: “The boat has lost way. The sea state is four. You have to take on board a tow line from a salvage tug.” I called the missile officer, Tsimbalenko and the forward line handling team to the bridge. We prepared a rocket for the shot line. I gave safety instructions to Tsimbalenko and indicated the direction of the shot – to the side of the signal post. They shot and Tsimbalenko fell over from the recoil, into the sail, the damage limited to a soft spot and a scare. The rocket took off for the signal post, the line unwinding behind it, one end attached to the missile, the other to the boat. The missile smacked into the signal post, scaring the duty signalman sitting in the signal shack, who called up the division duty officer: “A rocket flew off of Berzin’s boat and hit the signal post!” The duty officer, confused at first, because when he heard “missile”, immediately thought a P-6 missile (SS-N-3 Shaddock), the main armament of the project 675 boat. Well, he called the fleet duty officer and quickly got straightened out. Everyone had a good laugh after that remembering that episode. The line handling team headed by Tsimbalenko didn’t laugh about it though. They had to collect up and store in its special configuration 300 meters of line.

Bring Back That Practice Torpedo Or Let No Man Come Back Alive!

Admiral Al'fred Berzin, who last made an appearance on this blog with his reminisces about Cold War submarine encounters in K-184 vs. Guardfish has a very cool Livejournal page, too.

I don't know how the US Navy does it, but the Russian Navy apparently places a premium on retrieving spent practice torpedoes such as this one:



Admiral Berzin assures us that this is not an authorized manner of torpedo recovery, no matter HOW lost the torpedo retriever is:





And here is Hotel II SSBN K-178 demonstrating an alternative method of practice torpedo recovery back in 1989 (click for a magnified view):



Admiral Berzin offers a wealth of Cold War stories and more on his Livejournal page.

Cold War Stories: Guardfish Vs. K-184, Part VI

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Part V

07 June. We got a message from Pacific Fleet Command: “Maintain caution, do not execute a trail of the American submarine.” We detected a possible BPS-9 bearing 172 relative in single sweep mode. By the end of the broadcast, sonar detected and held propeller sounds bearing 090 relative for five minutes. We detected a leak of KhGTsEhN-601 (TR Note: again, in Russian ХГЦЭН – 601) from the starboard reactor and I decided to vent it since the level of radioactivity and aerosols began to rise in the 6th compartment. The crew heard the propeller noises from a possible submarine on the port side throughout the boat.

08 June. Our break-off maneuver from the American submarine didn’t yield any results. Sonar could still detect it periodically. We sent three messages about detecting the American submarine. During the broadcast that night all the lights on the “Nakat” ESM screen were lit up (“flash” type), which gave the impression that there was, maybe 1-2 cables away, a radar operating nearby, so we immediately dove to 60 meters. The next time we came to PD to catch the broadcast, we detected a BPS-9. We continued our break-off course, speed and depth while using active countermeasures.

09 June. Sonar detected a submarine bearing 150 relative. I decided to break contact with the American boat, creating two pockets of water turbulence, placing two active countermeasures between the boats and opening range by changes in course, speed and depth. I went to the navigator’s stand when the junior navigator, Junior Lieutenant A.V.Konev (now a Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet) told me a joke: “Comrade Commander, isn’t it just like a circus ring, where our boat runs in a circle while the American boat plays trainer?” I smiled. Right then the Political Assistant, K2R G.Ya.Antonov, called me up and asked, “Can’t we just talk to the Americans?” Once the joking started, I answered back in jest, “Don your IDA-59s!” The situation on the conn was tense. You could read on people’s faces the weight on their souls, but if you joked around a little bit, it meant that everything would be okay. We broke off from the Americans, since we couldn’t detect them anymore. An Orion ASW aircraft flew in the area of the lost datum, conducting a search, but we were already gone. We got the order to begin searching for an SSBN along a route measuring 400 NM and then return to base, arriving on the 19th of June. The route back to base was exactly the same as the route out.

10 June. We took up our assigned position an began to search for the SSBN at 0600. Periodically we executed a maneuver to uncover any submarines following us. None were found.

11 June. Mid-day we came to PD for the broadcast and detected a ship visually bearing 070, range 40 cables. Sonar once again didn’t detect anything. Acoustic conditions for us were terrible. At 1837, sonar heard propeller sounds. While maintaining caution, we came to periscope depth. At periscope depth we saw the stern of a 15,000 ton displacement ship heading away from us at a distance of about 9 cables. In this way, you can say that we determined the effective range versus surface contacts of our passive sonar.

12 June. At 2200, we finished our ASW search for the SSBN and began to transit back to base. Forty days on deployment and there wasn’t one message that came in that wasn’t inflammatory in some way, and this was peace time!

13 June. We got the intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Tripoli” is en route Okinawa”. We will soon pass Okinawa and exit the East China Sea.

14 June. We continue in the East China Sea.

15 June. We came to PD that night for the broadcast and nothing came to our address. Cloudiness was 3, sea state 2, visibility 3 miles. We shot stars and used Loran to determine our position. The crew is preparing the boat and the reports for the return to base.

16 June. At 0200 we fixed out position near the island of Dandzo: we got a visual bearing to the light and distance to the island using the radar in single sweep mode. At 0600, we fixed our position again and entered the Korean Straits submerged at a depth of 40 meters. At 1200 we fixed our position using Loran A (four lines intersecting in one spot). On the approach to Tsushima, I wanted to confirm our position, but sonar heard the sounds of propellers bearing 148 which escorted us for 40 minutes. Sonar couldn’t classify the noise. After that we again came to PD to confirm our position. The weather: still, hazy, visibility 20-30 cables.

17 June. We passed Ulin-Do island in front of surfacing point one. The depth there went to 2000 meters and more. Weather: fog, sea state 2.

18 June. There is a mass hair cutting and showering amongst the crew and everyone changes into their special clothes.

19 June. And now we have moored. The staff, an orchestra and the division commander, Kontra-Admiral I.I.Verenikin met us. A new task was put before the crew: meet the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, who will inspect the boat and the shore accommodations. They just took away our rest and relaxation.

Next: The conclusion...