The former Bezzavetnyy, shown in typical Ukrainian colors
Two different views (with my very rough translation of Russian report):
Twenty years ago, an attempt to enter Soviet territorial waters ended with the US Navy learning a lesson. Here is a unique view of the two powers in the Black Sea.
They came to test us. The 12th of Feb. 1988 is a date that the crews of the cruiser Yorktown and the destroyer Caron will always remember. That’s the day that a ship of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet shoved them out of Soviet territorial waters. Literally.
Everything was normal. The international situation was okay. The former head of the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee Valentin Fapin remembers:
There was provocation in the Black Sea which consisted of a violation of our air space by an American aircraft. The Americans did this several times because they were implementing a new Maritime Doctrine emphasizing strikes on Soviet bases, on Soviet ports, with non-nuclear weapons.
Two Soviet escorts, the Bezzavetnyy and SKR-6 met the ships of the US 6th Fleet at the exit of the Bosphorus in order to accompany them. The US ships answered that they didn’t need any assistance. It is not acceptable for Russians to ignore guests, the Soviet side countered.
On the 12th of Feb, at about 1100, the task group commander reported to headquarters that “ the Yorktown and Caron are within two miles of our territorial waters”. There was a short colloquy between the Soviet and American ships:
Soviets: Your course takes you to denied territorial waters.
Good Guys: We are not violating anything. We are continuing on course and speed.
Vice Admiral Valentin Selivanov gave the command: sound collision. It wasn’t a ram (I.E. a deliberate attack), but rather a high speed approach to the rear quarter of the other ship, gently nudging the other ship off course. The Bezzavetnyy approached the Yorktown, while SKR-86 approached the Caron. The assignment wasn’t simple.
Vice Admiral Selivanov:
The cruiser Yorktown displaced at least two times the escort ship Bezzavetnyy and the frigate (sic) Caron displaced four times the escort ship SKR-6. But we issued our orders and the captains did their jobs correctly, suffering minimal damage.
First the Bezzavetnyy hit the Yorktown’s port side, damaging the Harpoon launcher and destroying the captain’s gig. The Americans, who had been smiling, were now sounding the alarm and bringing hoses to the missile launcher.
Vladimir Bogdashin, Captain of the Bezzavetnyy:
There was a group of sailors on the stern, mostly black sailors, with fire hoses. When they saw those missile warheads, they got out of there. They came back about 15 minutes later, to see what was going on. It was completely unexpected. The ship was in shock.
The Caron saw what was going on and changed course. The order was given again. This time, it was more like a ramming attack. The strike occurred in the area around the helo deck. A high, sharp blow and the bow ended up on deck, rolling the Bezzavetnyy to port 15 or 20 degrees…At that moment, the ships entered a thick cloud. A fire started on the Yorktown near the anti-submarine missiles. The Caron wheeled around and the American ships attempted to put the Bezzavetnyy into a pincer. Meanwhile, the Bezzavetnyy readied it’s RBU-6000, armed with depth charges.
Bogdashin:
Everyone knows that if you give the Americans a shove, they’ll withdraw when things aren’t going their way and concentrate their forces at another point. (Note: Bastard smirks here).
The Yorktown readied two helicopters, but two Soviet Mi-26s (sic) carrying full combat loads circled the American ships. The helos were rolled back into their hangers and within the hour, the Americans departed territorial waters. Within a day the battered ships of the US 6th Fleet headed to depart the inhospitable, Soviet controlled Black Sea. (end of video)
There is another Russian language account of the incident here. Maybe I'll translate it on a day that I'm not feeling so lazy and the HBO series "Rome" starring the super hot Polly Walker isn't beckoning...
Admiral Al'fred Berzin, who last made an appearance on this blog with his reminisces about Cold War submarine encounters in K-184 vs. Guardfish has a very cool Livejournal page, too.
I don't know how the US Navy does it, but the Russian Navy apparently places a premium on retrieving spent practice torpedoes such as this one:
Gist: The victims of two accidents are being comemmorated in Baykonur. An R-16 ICBM (SS-7 Saddler) blew up during final preparations for launch 41 years ago, killing almost the entire development team headed by Mikhail Yangel'. By a tragic coincidence, exactly three years later a launch failure killed eight more.
This day is always a cold day in Baykonur, almost winter like, but everyone in the Baykonur space city comes to the memorial, which is a grave for 70 people killed during missile testing. The two tragedies took place on the same day, three years apart, in 1960 and 1963 and killed 132 people. It was the first test of the R-16 ICBM, called the "new nuclear shield against the potential enemy". At 1845, after failing to take off, the missile exploded. The second stage spontaneously activated. Seventy six people died in the fire immediately, among them the Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin. The main designer Mikhail Yangel' miraculously survived. Information about the failures were kept secret for years. The dead were said to have simply died in the course of their official duties. Now at the cosmodrome there is evidence of the tragedy. There is now a memorial at launch site 41. Until the 90s, it simply wasn't possible to visit. The tragedy was only acknowledged at the cosmodrome 35 years after the fact. Since recognition in 1995, relatives of the victims have come to pay their respects. There is an eternal flame at the launch site. The wind blows so hard that the flame is almost extinguished and people have trouble standing. All missile and space activities stop on this day to remember.
It was the beginning of October 1986. The latest acheivements of Soviet labor blared from the television screens. Although deep in the background were reports of a Soviet submarine catastrophe that went nearly unnoticed - there were only three lines about it in the newspapers - that was a first. It was the first time that they admitted openly that our warships ran into problems off the coasts of America. And the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev informed Ronald Reagan this fact during a meeting in Reykyavik caused one to think about the seriousness of the accident and the possible consequences that those of us for whom the words and phrases "combat patrol", "thermonuclear warhead", "megaton", "TNT equivilent" were nothing more than professional jargon.
Ten years have passed since then (now its more than 20 years). Mass media has more than once tried to cast light on the causes of the loss of the K-219, meanwhile it is impossible to describe in the newspaper the kind of damage suffered by the submarine and the heroic efforts of the crew to save her. I turn you attention to an article written by the President of the Saint Petersburg Submariner's Club K1R (Ret.) Igor' Kirillovich Kurdin, who for a long time served as the XO of Project 667AU SSBN K-219.
The Motherland Says You Must
SSBN K-219 got underway on patrol according to plan on 4 September, 1986. The commander of the submarine, K2R Igor' Anatol'yevich Britanov was an experienced submariner, having been allowed to independently captain a Yankee I SSBN since 1981. While it was his third patrol as commander and his 13th patrol overall, he didn't command his own ship - the watch on board K-219 was actually the first crew of K-241including 31 officers, 38 warrant officers and 49 seamen as well as some highly qualified specialists. But this time preparations to get underway were confused like never before.
The Cold War continued and our Navy (like the Strategic Rocket Forces) carried the burden of strategic deterrance between the two superpowers. The combat forces of the Soviet Navy were the first response to American deployment of the Pershing missile in Europe and patrol areas by our SSBNs were moved closer to American shores. This was done to make the flight time of our missiles to American territory the same as the flight time of American cruise missiles pointed at our military and civilian facilities.
There was pressure to increase patrols to two or three a year. The resources to support this op tempo were pushed to the limits and maintenance wasn't able to keep up. Submariners were in an even more precarious situation - two or three patrols a year, unused leave, and crew muddles became the norm. Under pressure, the high command had to shut their eyes when crews went to sea on boats other than their "home" boat.
An analysis of the sailing list of the combat patrol crew on K-219 shows that eleven of 31 officers were changed out between preparations for sailing and patrol, including many key officers - XO, Missile Officer, Torpedo Officer and the Radio Officer. There was a similar situation in the Warrant ranks - out of 38 warrant officers, 16 were replaced including the two senior warrants in the weapons department. But I never raised a finger to point blame at the then 19th Division Chief of Staff for Personnel, then Rear Admiral N.N. Malov, since five SSBNs were ordered on patrol at that time.
Why didn't the captain himself refuse to take an unprepared, strange boat to sea with a half-unknown crew? Because they just would have replaced Britanov with someone else. But lets turn to the events of 3 October 1986.
(The families of the crew of K-219 at the pier, Gadzievo, August 1986. Source: submarine.id.ru)
Explosion in the Missile Tube
Thirty days in the the deployment, K-219 maneuvered into her assigned water in the Sargasso Sea. The boat came to periscope depth at 0456 on 3 October for the regular broadcast and after five minutes began to dive to 85 meters. Conditions at that moment were the following: the main power plant was operating in single eschelon mode, the starboard reactor was operating at 30 percent while the port reactor was scrammed with all the dampers and the steam generator and turbine were in a ready state; the starboard turbine was turning the screw while the port shaft was hooked up to the emergency electrogenerator.
At 0514, the Missile Officer and the machinist in the fourth (missile) compartment found a leak from the seal around the number six launcher. Under pressure, the water became a stream. After reporting water in launcher six (the third launcher on the port side), the captain ordered a change of depth to 46 meters for safety at 0525. Pumps were turned on to de-water launcher six. At 0532 a reddish-brown fog of oxidizer began to leak from the seal on launcher six in compartment four. The Missile Officer declared an emergency in the compartment and reported the situation to the conn.
Non-essential crew evacuated the fourth compartment. Nine men remained in the affected compartment. The captain sounded general quarters. Within a minute the crew was performing damage control tasks, including sealing the compartments. The boat came to a safe depth. After five minutes, there was an explosion in launcher six at 0538.
Black smoke appeared in compartment four and then water contaminated with missile fuel began to pour into the compartment from destroyed piping in the upper part of the launcher. The captain immediately gave the order to emergency surface. There were other consequences of the explosion: the atmosphere in the fourth compartment was highly toxic and there was about 4.5 tons of water in the bilge; control was temporarily lost over the environmental conditions of the missiles in the rest of the launchers; other systems were damaged: the 1MC, the missile control communications circuit in the fourth and fifth compartments; the R-651 radio transceiver was partially knocked out, lights and lamps in the compartments were broken and the high pressure air piping was damaged. Indicators on the reactor control panel indicated that the 220 volt DC bus on the port side was knocked out, that the automatic valves feeding water to the steam generators on the port side were open and that the seperate valves on the third loop were open. The control panel of the "Kama" electrical system indicated that insulation resistance in both busses had reached zero. Control ordered atmospheric overpressure in the third and fifth compartments as a precaution.
At 0610, the crew in the fifth and sixth compartments (the auxiliary machinery compartment) were transfered to the eighth compartment (turbine). Seven minutes later came word that the fourth compartment would have to be abandoned because of high temperature and toxic gas. The captain ordered the fifth compartment to be prepared to receive the crew of the fourth. At 0635 the crew of the fourth compartment was withdrawn, leaving behind three people, including the Missile Officer. The port emergency generator was brought on line at the order of the Engineer.
A two man emergency party was sent into the fourth compartment at 0645 to evaluate the situation and render assistance to the crew remaining there. But the team could neither find the Missile Officer nor examine the condition of the sixth missile launcher because of heavy smoke. They did drag the bodies of Seaman I.K.Kharchenko and Seaman N.L.Smaglyuk. The team couldn't turn off any electricity consuming equipment in the fourth compartment nor could they find the source of the fire.
The fourth, fifth and sixth compartments were vented to the atmosphere beginning at 0725. At dawn the XO observed the casualty in launcher six from the top of the sail. The launcher hatch was gone, the front section of the missile was not visible, the hinge of the cover was turned to the side, the outer hull around the launcher was damaged, the hydrodynamic covers of launchers one, three, four, five and seven were torn and hung overboard and the deck in the vicinity of the launcher was deformed. Reddish-brown smoke wisped weakly from launcher six.
At 0831 two more men were again sent into compartment four. Atmospheric contamination in the compartment lessened and visibility improved. The flow of water from the upper part of launcher number six stopped. The investigators found the body of the Missile Officer K3R A.V.Petrachkov without signs of life.
By that time they got the overboard drainage pumps for launcher six working and were able to de-water the bilge in the fourth compartment using the main pumps. After turning on the pump to drain the launcher, water and thick smoke began to pour into the compartment from damaged piping in the upper part of the launchers. The pumps were ordered shut off. They removed the body of the Missile Officer, the gas analysis equipment and emergency protection suits.
At 0925 the port reactor was brought on line. Both steam generators were switched on and the level of power was the following - starboard side 30 percent, port side 50 percent.
The captain decided to give the order to emergency drain the oxidizer and de-water the launcher. He instructed four crew members from engineering and weapons departments to go into the fourth compartment with this in mind. All attempts to begin to de-water the launcher led to additional bursts of oxidizer and water steam into the compartment. The next group started the emergency oxidizer drain pumps. Water under pressure flooded the electrical equipment, including the fourth compartment electrical distribution panel. A short circuit occured and a fire broke out in the fourth compartment. The fire burned out the electrical equipment in the compartment and the pumps stopped. Under orders from control, the emergency party evacuated the fourth compartment.
Under orders from control, at 1754 freon flooded the fourth compartment from the chemical extinguishing system in the third compartment and because of damage to the freon supply piping, the freon gas began to leak into the third compartment and so the supply of freon to the fourth compartment was turned off. Around 1800, the atmosphere in the third compartment began to worsen and the levels of nitric oxide in the air reached 10-40 times acceptable levels. The crew in the third compartment was ordered to don protective gear. Some of the crew retreated to the second compartment. The crew was forced to abandon the communications and encryption stations and as a result, radio communications were lost (no situation reports were sent and instructions and advice from Northern Fleet HQ weren't received).
At 1840, investigators opened the hatches between the fourth and fifth compartments. Encountering smoke which they mistook for fire, they reported the situation to control. Control ordered the fifth compartment flooded with freon from the extinguishing station in compartment six.
At 1930, as a result of the loss of the 380 volt, 50 hertz bus on the starboard side, the starboard reactor scrammed and the reactor moderator lattice failed to go into the lowered position.
Twenty minutes later the reactor compartment reported smoke in the lower level of the sixth compartment to control. The compartment was evacuated, the ventilation between the fifth and sixth compartments were closed and people were transfered to the seventh (reactor control) compartment. Soon it was discovered that the hydralic pressure had fallen to zero. In the interests of maintaining safety in the starboard reactor, specialists from the Machinery Division were sent into the reactor compartment to lower the moderator lattice by hand - Senior Lieutenant N.N.Belikov and Seaman S.A.Preminin. After the Sr.Lt. lost consciousness, Preminin lowered the moderator lattice by himself. At the same time, control ordered the ventilation of compartments eight, nine (turbine) and ten (aft) to the atmosphere and air pressure in those compartments dropped to atmospheric levels, while pressure in compartment seven remained elevated as compared to compartment eight. Because of this, the crew in the eighth compartment couldn't open the hatch to the seventh compartment. Attempts to even the air pressure between the two compartments using equipment in compartment eight, lower level produced thick smoke from the piping. Seaman Preminin was ordered by control to open the exhaust valve to the ventilation, but he couldn't do it. The damage control team in the neighboring compartment couldn't do it either. Seaman Preminin ceased responding to further questions.
Ships from the Soviet Merchant Fleet began to approach the area at 2130, including the Fedor Bredikhin, the Krasnogvardeysk and the Bakaritsa. By 2300 (according to reports from the crew), the atmosphere on board became more toxic, the protective gear had exhausted its resources and the temperature of the bulkhead between compartments three and four was rising. Based on the reports, the captain concluded that there was a fire in compartments four, five and six, that pressure was building in compartment seven and that the possibility of fire in compartments eight, nine and ten couldn't be excluded. Given that the resources for the emergency protective equipment had already been expended and that there was the possibility of one of the missiles exploding in compartmets four or five because of fire, the captain of the submarine decided to shut down the port reactor and to prepare to evacuate the crew to the merchant ships.
The port reactor emergency switch was thrown and the reactor put into cooldown mode. The crew evacuation began, which was finished by one in the morning on the night of the fourth. After the evacuation of the crew, the hatches in the sail and the stern were shut and dogged. Six officers including the captain remained on the bridge.
At 0146, one of the merchant ships sent a message to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet from the captain of K-219: "Fire in all compartments, dead in the water. Six remaining on the boat. Heavy fire in the lower levels of the fourth and fifth compartments. The captain awaits orders to abandon ship." At 0300 came word from the Northern Fleet Command for all officers, except the captain, to abandon ship.
At 2245 a damage control party led by the XO boarded the submarine and investigated compartments one, two and three. These compartments were dry, pressure was normal and the emergency lights were lighted. Besides that the batteries were only partially discharged, the high pressure air was at only 50 percent and there were no hydralics. The pressure hull of the submarine abover the fourth and seventh compartments were burned - its possible that this is from residual heat from the reactor. The pressure hull in the area around other compartments were at air temperature. The bulkhead between compartments three and four up to the upper edge of the intercompartment hatch was cold but above that it was warm.
When the damage control party returned to the forward part of the boat, they leveled out the trim by blowing the forward ballast tank and began to make preparations to tow the submarine. They couldn't investigate the aft end of the submarine since the aft hatch was flooded. With darkness, work on preparations to tow the boat were suspended and the damage control party left the boat.
At dawn on the 5th, the damage control party continued preparations for towing. At 1815 the Krasnogvardeysk began to tow the boat. The submarine continued to settle a bit and the trim began to get out of adjustment. At 0620 on the 6th of October, the towing line snapped and the forward and aft entry hatches went under water. Because of the list, the damage control team couldn't enter the lower hatch on the sail to enter compartment three. The submarine continued to lose seaworthiness and when the boat sank so that the water came up to the deck, the damage control party abandoned ship. At 1100, when the boat sank up to the sail planes, the captain abandoned ship by the order of the Commander of the Navy. On the 6th of October, 1986, at 1102, K-219 sank.
Investigation
A criminal inquery was launched into the circumstances surrounding the loss of the K-219, an investigation that lasted almost a year. As always, the guilty party turned out to be those people who tried to save men and the ship. The captain, the Politcal Officer and the Engineer were forced out of the service for conduct unbecoming and the crew was dispersed. Out of the entire crew, only Seaman S.A.Preminin received any sort of decoration, the Red Star awarded posthumously. (Later, Preminin was named Hero of the Russian Federation in 1997).
It is necessary to note the heroism of the crew, which maintained normal radiation safety during the accident. The maintenance of the reactor cores and systems up to the moment of the sinking prevented the possibility of a nuclear explosion. The control party and the crew correctly organized damage control efforts. The boat was able to surface. All the compartments were successfully hermetically sealed and the correct air pressure was maintained in compartments three and five. The port reactor was brought up correctly and compartments were investigated and corrective actions taken properly when problems were discovered in the missile launcher. Some of them were remedied. The investigations done allowed evaluation of the situation in the fourth compartment and the ventilation of the fourth, fifth and sixth compartments. As a result of all the measures taken, the situation was temporarily stabilized. Both reactors worked at their ordered power levels, the cooling units worked and the boat had electrical power and a speed of 13 knots when she met the merchant ships. Despite all this the boat's command team did not take all the precautions that they should have to prevent the loss of the boat.
The following was established by the investigative commission:
1. The cause of the accident was a water leak in the number six missile launcher. This led to destruction of the missile airframe and the leak of missile fuel into the launcher. The reason for the leak of water into the launcher in the first place could not be established.
2. The reason why nitric oxide spread from the fourth compartment and contaminated the stern compartments was because investigative teams opened the hatch to the fourth compartment too many times to offer help, to begin venting the air in the compartment, to de-water the launcher and emergency drain the oxidizer. The start up of the pumps and the de-watering of the launcher led to additional discharge of nitric oxide from the launcher into the compartment. It was this that led to the short circuits in distribution panels seven and eight and the fire in the compartment.
3. The reason for the loss of K-219 was uncontrolled flooding of overboard water into the fourth compartment which led to the loss watertight integrity and seaworthiness of the boat. The flooding of the fourth compartment came through the open hatch of launcher six. This led to the flooding of compartments five and six through open ventilation valves between compartments four and five and five and six.
07 June. We got a message from Pacific Fleet Command: “Maintain caution, do not execute a trail of the American submarine.” We detected a possible BPS-9 bearing 172 relative in single sweep mode. By the end of the broadcast, sonar detected and held propeller sounds bearing 090 relative for five minutes. We detected a leak of KhGTsEhN-601 (TR Note: again, in Russian ХГЦЭН – 601) from the starboard reactor and I decided to vent it since the level of radioactivity and aerosols began to rise in the 6th compartment. The crew heard the propeller noises from a possible submarine on the port side throughout the boat.
08 June. Our break-off maneuver from the American submarine didn’t yield any results. Sonar could still detect it periodically. We sent three messages about detecting the American submarine. During the broadcast that night all the lights on the “Nakat” ESM screen were lit up (“flash” type), which gave the impression that there was, maybe 1-2 cables away, a radar operating nearby, so we immediately dove to 60 meters. The next time we came to PD to catch the broadcast, we detected a BPS-9. We continued our break-off course, speed and depth while using active countermeasures.
09 June. Sonar detected a submarine bearing 150 relative. I decided to break contact with the American boat, creating two pockets of water turbulence, placing two active countermeasures between the boats and opening range by changes in course, speed and depth. I went to the navigator’s stand when the junior navigator, Junior Lieutenant A.V.Konev (now a Vice Admiral and Deputy Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet) told me a joke: “Comrade Commander, isn’t it just like a circus ring, where our boat runs in a circle while the American boat plays trainer?” I smiled. Right then the Political Assistant, K2R G.Ya.Antonov, called me up and asked, “Can’t we just talk to the Americans?” Once the joking started, I answered back in jest, “Don your IDA-59s!” The situation on the conn was tense. You could read on people’s faces the weight on their souls, but if you joked around a little bit, it meant that everything would be okay. We broke off from the Americans, since we couldn’t detect them anymore. An Orion ASW aircraft flew in the area of the lost datum, conducting a search, but we were already gone. We got the order to begin searching for an SSBN along a route measuring 400 NM and then return to base, arriving on the 19th of June. The route back to base was exactly the same as the route out.
10 June. We took up our assigned position an began to search for the SSBN at 0600. Periodically we executed a maneuver to uncover any submarines following us. None were found.
11 June. Mid-day we came to PD for the broadcast and detected a ship visually bearing 070, range 40 cables. Sonar once again didn’t detect anything. Acoustic conditions for us were terrible. At 1837, sonar heard propeller sounds. While maintaining caution, we came to periscope depth. At periscope depth we saw the stern of a 15,000 ton displacement ship heading away from us at a distance of about 9 cables. In this way, you can say that we determined the effective range versus surface contacts of our passive sonar.
12 June. At 2200, we finished our ASW search for the SSBN and began to transit back to base. Forty days on deployment and there wasn’t one message that came in that wasn’t inflammatory in some way, and this was peace time!
13 June. We got the intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Tripoli” is en route Okinawa”. We will soon pass Okinawa and exit the East China Sea.
14 June. We continue in the East China Sea.
15 June. We came to PD that night for the broadcast and nothing came to our address. Cloudiness was 3, sea state 2, visibility 3 miles. We shot stars and used Loran to determine our position. The crew is preparing the boat and the reports for the return to base.
16 June. At 0200 we fixed out position near the island of Dandzo: we got a visual bearing to the light and distance to the island using the radar in single sweep mode. At 0600, we fixed our position again and entered the Korean Straits submerged at a depth of 40 meters. At 1200 we fixed our position using Loran A (four lines intersecting in one spot). On the approach to Tsushima, I wanted to confirm our position, but sonar heard the sounds of propellers bearing 148 which escorted us for 40 minutes. Sonar couldn’t classify the noise. After that we again came to PD to confirm our position. The weather: still, hazy, visibility 20-30 cables.
17 June. We passed Ulin-Do island in front of surfacing point one. The depth there went to 2000 meters and more. Weather: fog, sea state 2.
18 June. There is a mass hair cutting and showering amongst the crew and everyone changes into their special clothes.
19 June. And now we have moored. The staff, an orchestra and the division commander, Kontra-Admiral I.I.Verenikin met us. A new task was put before the crew: meet the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, who will inspect the boat and the shore accommodations. They just took away our rest and relaxation.
The Soviet Echo II class SSGN K-22 was finishing up operations in the Mediterranean Sea near Crete. On 28 August, 1976 the boat was 150 miles to the south-west of the island when it came to PD at 1628. The commander spotted the Knox-class frigate Moinester (FF 1097) in the periscope. The captain immediately estimated bearing and range by eye, bearing 183 relative, range 40-50 cables (in reality, B192 R20 cables). Instead of breaking off, the captain decided to maintain contact for training.
At 1636 the boat dove to 140 meters, turning on C110 10kts and began to close the American frigate. The water depth was 2900 meters, SS 1-2, wind 280 3m/sec, visibility daytime unlimited. The captain of the submarine considered himself as detected by the frigate and maneuvered and varied his speed in order to carry out a break away maneuver. Thanks to his incompetent actions he created a poor sonar environment for his sonar and received spotty data from the targets, and didn’t have a clear view of the surface situation. Maneuvering on a parallel course with the Moinester, distance became 17.5 cables, unacceptably close (course 050).
In these conditions, he came to PD three times – 1650, 1738 and 1753 – and never saw the second frigate. The submarine captain gave the verbal order to quit updating the log, did not sound a general alarm, did not share the data on target movement with the XO, the Nav or the tracking party. He constantly made mistakes in estimating distance and more than once approached at high speed into the skip zone (3-5 cables) from the frigate Moinester. At 1753, the captain detected the frigate bearing 062 relative, 7 cables and turned sharply left, beginning a zig-zag maneuver. The SSGN continued on a general heading of 320 at a depth of 4-5 meters, exposing the sail above the surface of the water. Because of the zig-zagging and the vibration produced by the violent maneuvers, observation through the periscope was difficult and the captain lost sight of the frigate several times, finally losing contact at 1815.
Ten minutes later, unexpectedly for him he saw a second American frigate at very close range. At 1825 the commander of K-22 gave the command “Emergency deep” and “Down periscope”. These measures were too late and the SSGN plowed into the port side of the frigate Voge a minute later at 17 knots under the helo hanger. The blow was struck by the bow of the boat and followed up with the forward part of the sail. The boat received huge dents in the hull, cracks in the bulkheads and a damaged screw. The Voge lost way and was towed at first to the base in Crete and to Toulon, France for repairs in September. The Soviet boat suffered damage to the bow on the outer hull and the sonar dome for the “Kerch’” system was damaged as was the “Argument” missile guidance antenna. The boat had to surface and departed the area of the accident under its own power while being escorted by Soviet ships. Emergency repairs were conducted at Kithera anchorage and after than the boat returned to Severodvinsk for major repairs.
Time Magazine described the incident in its 27 March 1977 issue like this:
One day last August a Soviet Echo Il-class submarine cruising almost submerged trailed a slowly steaming American frigate, the U.S.S. Voge, for nearly an hour. Suddenly, the sub turned straight toward the Voge and sped up sharply. The American sailors, who photographed the sub as it charged toward them, waited for it to turn away. But it kept coming. Moving fast—about 17 knots—the sub slammed into the left quarter of the Voge, bounced off, then wallowed in the frigate's wake. The Voge limped off with one injured crewman and a gashed hull. The sub, with damage visible on its bow, deck, conning tower and missile ports, eventually churned off slowly in another direction.
The deployment turns into the "Seinfeld" of deployments - a patrol about nothing. K-184 aimlessly punches holes in the ocean very slowly as Guardfish follows, at least until K-184 makes up for the deafness of her sonar shack...
28 May. We took station in the Philippines Sea. Two messages were received in which there was an order to take up a new area in the form of a circle with a radius of 50 miles; also it was reported that it was leaked to the American press that Soviet submarines were discovered in the South China Sea. Admiral N.I.Smirnov, the Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet calls upon us to maintain our covert posture and curses K-57 for reporting the fact that she took station. Covertness was lost by Headquarters during our workups for deployment: the transit route was available to anyone who wasn’t lazy, all the boats set out on the same route, they ordered us to report our position by radio, there wasn’t any sort of cover story created to cover our departure from base. During our PD to receive the broadcast we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 170 relative. The horizon was clear. We weren’t able to determine the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) or the pulse duration since the radar operated only three seconds. Its possible that it’s a BPS-9 carried by a Permit class SSN.
David Minton writes: After passing through the Bashi Straits, the Echo II established a new patrol zone in the Philippines Sea south of Okinawa. It was the worst acoustic conditions that you could imagine. At night, natural ambient noise and frequent rains deafened sonar. It became ever more difficult to maintain contact so Guardfish had to maintain trail of the Echo II at an even closer distance. Shore worked out a detailed procedure for handing off the Echo II to another US boat. We got that message on the broadcast.
29 May. We took position in the new water, speed 6 knots, with no explicit mission. I made the decision to begin a search for American and Japanese surface ships. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 175 relative. The horizon was clear. We weren’t able to determine the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) or the pulse duration since the radar operated only five seconds. Its possible that it’s a BPS-9 carried by a Permit class SSN.
30 May. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 175 relative. The horizon was clear. I heard out a suggestion from the XO and Combat Systems Officer on how to flush out the foreign submarine and break off contact.
31 May. We got a message on the broadcast ordering us to yet another area and also received word that supposedly the US found out about the locations of all of our boats in the South China Sea. Other areas were assigned to K-7, K-45 and K-57. The transit lane to these areas border some reefs and bars. The Pac Fleet Command reminded us about navigational safety. The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” is approaching the Philippines Sea. President Nixon flew to Iran and his Secretary of Defense gave the order to shut down the “Safeguard” anti-ballistic missile system.
01 June. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 175 relative. The horizon was clear. We got the intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” arrived in port Guam for refueling. There are three CVAs in the Gulf of Tonkin and one CVA to the east of Saigon.”
02 June. We carried out a special maneuver to attempt to flush out the foreign submarine that was possibly following us. We didn’t find anything. That day we came to PD for the broadcast and we observed a 10,000 ton displacement transport bearing 280 true, range 40 cables. Sonar didn’t detect anything before coming to PD because the acoustics were so bad.
03 June. We read in the intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” is transiting to the Philippines.” K-45 was ordered to transit the Bashi Straits to occupy new water, once again past the bars and reefs. And again came the warnings on navigation from Fleet Headquarters. Soon we’ll have spent a whole month at sea, splitting atoms for no apparent reason, although they could have given us the task of searching for and following a carrier. For a month we cruised at 6 knots in the same 50 mile radius circle, hearing and seeing nothing.
04 June. Intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” is entering the Luzon Strait.
05 June. Intel summary: “The ASW carrier “Ticonderoga” has arrived in port, Subic Bay.” I called the department heads together to discuss the patrol report, warning that I didn’t want any whitewashes and to write what happened in actuality.
06 June. From 29 May to 06 June during our time at periscope depth receiving the broadcast, we were making brief detections of a radar operating astern of us, following us in our baffles at low speed, executing special maneuvers, although we couldn’t detect anything. At 1200, we came to PD and caught the broadcast. I made a low power periscope sweep and followed it up with a high power examination of the horizon, and there it was in our port quarter – I see a submarine periscope at a range of 5 or 6 cables about 2 meters out of the water. I gave the scope to the XO, K3R L.V.Shaipov and he confirmed that he saw a periscope. When I went to look again, it was gone. Sonar didn’t detect anything. I immediately sent a message to shore informing them of the detection of an American submarine. We detected a radar in single sweep mode operating astern of us and assumed it was a BPS-9 belonging to a Permit class SSN. We dove to 80 meters, turned about to search our baffles, speed four knots. After 30 minutes, we broke off from the American boat, changing speed and course, using active acoustic countermeasures.
David Minton writes: “Shore has worked out detailed procedures for turning over trail of the Echo II SSGN to another American boat. We got the message on the broadcast. As Guardfish was at periscope depth, we got an urgent message that the Echo II had suddenly come to PD and visually detected Guardfish. Maneuvers subsequent to this were aggressive and at high speed. To continue the trail of an alerted foe wasn’t possible and we lost contact with the Echo II.
K-184 gets jerked around by shore, dogged by Neptunes and Orions, averts another disaster and finds a new friend.
20 May. We have taken station in area number one. We came to periscope depth at 0830 to catch the broadcast and fix our position. Immediately, dead ahead at a range of 10 cables, I saw an American auxiliary ship heading directly for us. We filled the emergency dive tank and dove to a safe depth. Sonar didn’t hear the ship. The bathymetry was bad – generally, we don’t hear anything. Therefore every surfacing or PD was potentially dangerous due to the possibility of collision with a surface vessel.
David Minton writes: “Eight days the sub has patrolled at low speed in an area in the shape of a rectangle located about 700 miles from out from our carriers cruising along the coast of Vietnam and far outside the 200 mile range of her missiles. For now, the tracking party has tried not to lose contact with the Soviet boat….
If military conflict starts now, then the Sea of Japan will become a trap for the Pacific Ocean Fleet, like the Gulf of Finland became one for ships and submarines in 1943. The straits: La Peruse, Sangarskiy and the Korean Straits can quickly become anti-submarine barriers and right now, our likely foe most probably controls the movement of our submarines. (TR Note: I think the "Sangarskiy" Straits are actually better known as the Tartar Straits between Sakhalin Island and the Asian mainland.)
22 May. We detected an ASW P-3 Orion’s AN/APS-80, weak signal strength. We diverted course away from the aircraft.
23 May. We came to periscope depth at 0830 to catch the broadcast and get a position fix. Political information: “The Fleet Komsomol activities were held”. Not one word more. Of course, it was “very important” information for a submarine in the South China Sea. We detected an ASW P-3 Orion’s AN/APS-80, weak signal strength. We diverted course away from the aircraft.
24 May. We received instructions along with K-45 and K-7 to report our positions. We sent our lat/long at 1200. We sent the message three times because atmospheric conditions in the area were bad. From the intel summary: “Nixon is holding talks in Moscow”. We detected a weak signal strength AN/APS-20 from a P-2 Neptune ASW aircraft and diverted course away from the aircraft. The last two AN/APS-20 intercepts were analyzed and we came to the conclusion that the aircraft was conducting an ASW search.
25 May. Sometime after lunch, the engineer, K2R M.S.Bayburin reported that there was a leak of KhGCEhN-601 from the port side reactor and I made the decision to cut it off since a build up of the levels of radioactive gasses and aerosols began in compartment 6 (TR Note: if there is anybody who knows what ХГЦЭН - 601 is, please leave it in the comments section. There is only ONE reference to it on the intertubes and I am dying to know what it is). We remembered the search operation we were on in the Sea of Okhotsk from 24 September to 05 October, 1971. The boat entered the search area on 26 September, took up the search area and began to look for the “blue” submarine. On 29 September at 1230 at a depth of 80 meters there was a release of radioactive gas in the forward equipment space in the 6th (reactor) compartment. The radioactive gas and aerosol levels quickly grew in the forward equipment space to 20 times the normal allowable limit on the second and third levels of the 6th compartment. The signal and announcement of “radioactive danger” was given immediately and a special emergency zone was declared in the 5th, 6th and 7th compartments. The engineer, K2R Bayburin and the chemical defense officer, K3R G.B.Yagoshin reported the boats condition and suggested a course of action. I decided to surface and ventilate the 6th compartment to the open air. Ten minutes later we surfaced and began the ventilation. Literally two minutes later, ESM detected an AN/APS-80 and an American P-3 Orion appeared out of the clouds and began to over fly us at an altitude of 100 meters. I decided to alter course, emergency dive and clear the datum by 20 miles. By this time the situation with regards to the gas and aerosol radioactivity was more complicated: it was 300 times allowed levels on the third deck in compartment 6. In the forward equipment space it was 5000 times allowable. On the second deck, 1700 times and in the 5th and 7th compartments it was around 40 times. To leave personnel in these compartments any longer was impossible, and since they were removed from the affected compartments, I sent a message to shore detailing the deteriorating situation. We began to ventilate compartments 5, 6 and 7 to the atmosphere. Sometime by 2400 on 29 September, the levels in the 5th and 7th compartments were down to normal and in the 6th compartment they were down to just 1-2 times the allowable levels. The levels had reached 5-10 times norms by this time in the other compartments. In the 5th, 6th and 7th compartments, the level of contamination reached 100 counts/minute and we began shutting down those compartments. By 1200 on 30 September, the situation on board had stabilized: the gas and aerosol levels throughout the boat fell to normal levels. We sent a message to shore on our condition and asked for permission to return to base submerged. We received permission an hour later. Part of the crew suffered head aches, chest pains and fatigue that didn’t go away for a month. When we got back to base, no one bothered to examine us.
26 May. We came to periscope depth at 0200. I immediately saw a 10,000 ton displacement ship dead ahead, range 10 cables. Sonar didn’t hear anything. We made an emergency deep to a safe depth. The next broadcast we got a message from shore ordering us to return to base.
David Minton writes: “…world events began to take on a more peaceful tone. After long negotiations, President Nixon went to Moscow, where he held an historic meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev. During this meeting with Brezhnev on 24 May, the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger informed Brezhnev that the US knew about the deployment of Soviet submarines and that their presence so close to the combat zone in Vietnam was a provocation and very dangerous. Two days after this standoff, the Soviet Echo II submarine turned north.
27 May. That night we received a message canceling the order to return to base. Instead they gave us an order to take up a new position in the Philippines Sea which was in the shape of a circle with a radius of 30 miles. What we were to do in that circle, they didn’t say. K-57 and K-189 also received water space in the Philippines Sea. We passed through the Bashi Strait and fixed our position visually using an island. During the broadcast, we detected a radar operating in single sweep mode bearing 172 relative. In the periscope, the horizon was clear. We couldn’t determine the parameters of the radar. I started the tracking board with the goal of identifying our pursuer during every PD excursion. On it I noted the incoming messages, the weather, visual observations and our maneuvering. It was possible that the radar was a BPS-9 belonging to a Permit-class nuclear attack boat.
Part I Part II K-184 continues her transit toward the Gulf of Tonkin. Damage control drills are conducted and hilarity ensues:
13 May. Sky was completely overcast, visibility 2-5 miles, sea state 3-4. We approached the Korean Straits, 15 miles from Okinosima Island. We determined our position with a single sweep of the radar and then continued at depth of 50 meters, speed 12 knots. We systematically swept the area with active sonar. We entered the East China Sea and the water temperature became warmer, +22 degrees Celcius.
14 May. We are in the South China Sea. We are approaching the area where the Kuro-Sivo Current reaches a speed of 2.5 knots. The Executive Officer K3R L.B. Shaipov reported on deficiencies which were discovered during watch drills and his suggestions on improving on them in the future.
David Minton writes: Trailing is a complicated task. In order to remain undetected, the boat must determine the position, speed and course of the contact by means of passive sonar. Estimation of range by passive sonar demanded from Guardfish constant maneuvering in order to get changing bearings to the contact. Too close and they can detect you, too far and contact can be lost. These maneuvers usually took place in the baffles, the dead zone behind the stern. Just about hourly the Echo II turned around to listen to this zone. From time to time it was a passive turn 90 degrees so that their sonar could hear everything that was behind her, and sometimes it was pretty aggressive, turning 180 degrees and reversing course, heading directly at Guardfish. This was a very dangerous maneuver and risked collision. When the distance between us shrank, the Echo II had a real chance of detecting Guardfish. Each time the Echo II performed a baffles clear, Guardfish had to guess which way she was turning so that Guardfish could follow her from the opposite side. Additionally, Guardfish quickly slowed while trying to maintain silence so that the Echo II had enough time and distance to come about on her previous course.
15 May. We entered the Philippines Sea. We got a message giving us water space in area one in the approaches to the Gulf of Tonkin. The area is similar in shape to a coffin lid. K-45 was given area two, an area with a lot of bars and banks. We were ordered to be prepared to use conventional weapons on command and in self-defense. That night I received political information: “Officer Kuz’min said that he condemns the aggression by the USA in Vietnam”. This was “very important” information for the boat.
David Minton writes: “Situation reports are often demanded in Washington so that they can determine the Soviet threat level and intentions. President Nixon and his National Security Advisor received these reports every day. Since radio broadcasts from Guardfish sent at high frequency and power could be intercepted and Guardfish’s position fixed by the Soviets, we used an alternative way to get the message out. An ASW P-3 made a few secret fly overs to Guardfish’s assumed position and received a short message transmitted in UHF at periscope depth or with the help of a SLOT buoy so that Guardfish could remain at proper depth to maintain trail. During this pursuit, any submarine in the Pacific Ocean would immediately re-position to support the carriers operating along the Vietnamese coast and also participate in the search for other Soviet submarines. This created a problem, both for Guardfish and for command. Guardfish was clearly following the Echo II wherever she went and so command had to move other submarines out of the way so as to guarantee that any other, quieter submarine didn’t jeopardize the safety of Guardfish or any other submarines.
16 May. We continue to travel to the designated area after passing Okinawa and we only came to PD twice to get the broadcast. I called the missile officer, K3R Tsimbalenko, to the conn. Out of all the watch officers, Tsimbalenko was the most prepared, the best educated and he knew the missile business like no one’s business. He reported that everything was normal in container six and the water flow from the cable raceway wasn’t increasing.
17 May. Sea state three with swells, fog, tropical rains. We came to PD to determine our position before continuing through the Bashi Straits. We fixed our position using Loran A and C and also got a radar fix. From the intel summary: “A cruiser and destroyer left the Tonkin Gulf in the direction of Saigon. Nixon plans to be in Moscow for talks on the 25th of May. Intensity of military activity in Vietnam has significantly decreased.”
David Minton writes: “Once, while in the Philippines Sea, the Echo II turned to the south-west, in the direction of the Bashi Strait between Taiwan and the islands to the north of Luzon. The Bashi Strait is the often-used entrance to the South China Sea and I was sure that it is the Soviet boat’s goal, though it went further south than usual. The Echo II slowed, came to PD and then began to move quickly, orienting herself with high-frequency active sonar not usually used at that depth. She was lost. While at PD, she apparently fixed her position and then turned back on course for the Bashi Straits and increased speed to 16 knots. After sending a report via SLOT buoy about this quick change of course, Guardfish darted off after the Soviet boat, knowing that American boats may be re-locating to the area. In order to avoid collision with other American boats, Guardfish made her depth 100 meters, the depth often used by Soviet boats and which I knew American boats would avoid. My caution was vindicated when Guardfish detected an American boat, heading away to the north at high speed.
18 May. Today the commo, K3R V.F.Tereshchenko outlined his plan to search for enemy surface ships and submarines in area one as well as well as reporting on the bathymetry and possible measures that could be used to mask the boat from enemy ASW forces.
David Minton writes: “The Echo II has entered the South China Sea and has proceeded to a point located approximately 300 miles from the island of Luzon.
19 May. Today we conducted a check of all the emergency escape gear on the boat. A couple of discrepancies were discovered but they were quickly rectified. Before we went to sea back in April, our boat was inspected by a commission from the Navy General Staff headed by Contra-Admiral Ivanov. They inspected all the escape gear and the Chief of Navy Staff was of the opinion that it would work in the event of an emergency. There was nothing particular of note. At the end of the inspection, Admiral Ivanov initiated a drill. This was part of the scenario: “The boat has lost way. The sea state is four. You have to take on board a tow line from a salvage tug.” I called the missile officer, Tsimbalenko and the forward line handling team to the bridge. We prepared a rocket for the shot line. I gave safety instructions to Tsimbalenko and indicated the direction of the shot – to the side of the signal post. They shot and Tsimbalenko fell over from the recoil, into the sail, the damage limited to a soft spot and a scare. The rocket took off for the signal post, the line unwinding behind it, one end attached to the missile, the other to the boat. The missile smacked into the signal post, scaring the duty signalman sitting in the signal shack, who called up the division duty officer: “A rocket flew off of Berzin’s boat and hit the signal post!” The duty officer, confused at first, because when he heard “missile”, immediately thought a P-6 missile (SS-N-3 Shaddock), the main armament of the project 675 boat. Well, he called the fleet duty officer and quickly got straightened out. Everyone had a good laugh after that remembering that episode. The line handling team headed by Tsimbalenko didn’t laugh about it though. They had to collect up and store in its special configuration 300 meters of line.
K-184 suffers a potentially significant casualty and Captain Minton sends a CRITIC:
11 May. Depth 100 meters, speed 12.5 knots. We turn off course 090 every hour to listen astern – to hear if any American submarines are trailing us. Life on board a submarine is organized and falls into a routine. From the intel summary: “There are six strike carriers and two helo carriers in Vietnamese waters.” During the broadcast, electronic support measures (ESM) detected an AN/APS-20 carried by a P-2 Neptune anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft: the signal strength was weak. We changed course and dove to 200 meters. Thirty minutes later, the missile officer, K3R V.I.Tsimbalenko, came to the conn to report that there was a leak in the cable raceway in missile container six, that is, container six wasn’t hermetically sealed and it contained the missile with the special combat section. If the container was flooded, that meant that the missile would have to be taken out of service, and actually, it was a potential weapons casualty. From the start of the deployment we were vexed by this situation: what to do in this case? Having heard the missile officer’s report and suggestions from the engineer, K2R M.S.Bayburin, I decided to open the drain valve in compartment seven so that the water in the cable raceway in container six would drain into the bilge so the leakage rate could be measured – 10 liters a minute – and periodically I ordered the water to be pumped from the bilge overboard. In addition, I decided to surface and try to fix the opening (or crack) in the cable raceway in container six. At 1520, we surfaced, raised containers five and six and a party of specialists went out to investigate container six. Ten minutes later, the silhouettes of two Japanese trawlers appeared on the horizon on a course headed away from us and at 1535 ESM reported a weak signal strength APS-20. I gave the command to make an emergency dive to avoid the aircraft. K3R Tsimbalenko and K2R Bayburin reported that the inspection was complete, everything was whole with no defects, that is, there was no visible cause of the leak. Thirty minutes later water again came through the drain valve in compartment seven. I decided to surface in order to deal with the leak. K2R Bayburin suggested winding the flange joint with bindings impregnated with epoxy. At 2000, we surfaced and carried out his suggestion and also transmitted a report to shore about the leak in container six. We got the intel report: The strike carriers “Coral Sea”, “Kitty Hawk” and “Constellation” are located 190 miles north of Da Nang. The strike carrier “Midway” is east of Saigon with 47 vessels in support. The carriers flew 369 sorties in a 24 hour period, 279 strike sorties. In the last 24 hours ships of the 7th Fleet joined by bombers struck port structures with bombs and gunfire in Haiphong and Kam-Pha, the island of Kak-Ba and the Do-Shon Peninsula. As a result of the bombardment in Kam-Pha, the Soviet ship “G. Akopyan” was set on fire. The helicopter carrier “Okinawa” with accompanying amphibious group is located 180 miles north of Da Nang.
David Minton writes further: “In the course of the next two days, the Soviet SSGN often slowed and was at periscope depth for a long time, evidently receiving additional instructions from HQ. During the trail of the Echo II, Guardfish slowed her speed, significantly increasing the frequency response of her sonar. To the surprise of the crew, they could hear at least two, maybe three additional Soviet boats in the area. To follow three submarines is more complex than just following one, while following four is impossible. The tracking party on Guardfish has concentrated all of its efforts on maintaining contact with the Echo II, which we have already visually identified.
12 May. Water again began to come out of the cable raceway in container six through the drain valve in compartment seven. Accordingly I made the decision to continue at depths no greater than 80 meters. At 0600 we passed abeam of Ulin-Do. At 1200, I came to periscope depth to determine our position. There were up to 50 Japanese trawlers on a bearing of 120 to 250 on the horizon at a range of seven miles. The sonar officer, K3R V. Voronin reported that the depth finder went out of service. The navigator determined our position instead using the sun and Loran A and C. At 1634, we got the depth finder working again and thankfully passed abeam a bank with depths ranging from nine to thirty meters.
David Minton writes: Since the Echo II was proceeding to the south-east toward the exit of the Sea of Japan, as the captain, I had to make two important decisions. First, if it was worth breaking radio silence to report sighting three or maybe even four Soviet submarines. The first task during submarine surveillance operations is to report unusual Soviet vessel deployments as soon as possible after recognition. Those types of reports are known as “critics”, and although one had not been sent before, I decided that this was one of those times when Guardfish should break radio silence and inform the CinC about the situation. Second, should Guardfish break off from its surveillance mission and trail the Soviet boat. The orders were silent on this issue. But it occurred to me that the CinC would want to know where the Soviets were going. Since I didn’t have enough time to wait for orders, I remembered the motto of our CinC: “The faint of heart don’t become heroes” and we pressed on.
Details about American submarine special operations aren't very common. While it is "common knowledge" and "everyone knows" that American submarines conduct special operations off the coasts of foreign countries, especially with the publication of books such as "Blind Man's Bluff", operational details are (rightfully) rare.
There are exceptions. There is a little bit of operational detail of one particularly tense, wartime operation at Guardfish.org, a website dedicated to the men who have served on board the USS Guardfish (SSN 612). Entitled The Saga of the 1972 Guardfish Patrol, it is a little bit of Commander David Minton's account of operations by the USS Guardfish that ranged from the Sea of Japan to the South China Sea in the late spring of 1972.
There are always men on the eyepiece of the other periscope and their stories (in English) are even rarer. In what may be a unique instance, we have the memories of two Cold War submarine captains on opposite sides of the periscope participating in the same events. Commander Minton has his story, as does Admiral Al'fred Simenovich Berzin, who as a Captain First Rank (K1R) commanded Echo II class SSGN K-184, the Guardfish's target, in 1972 during its transit to Vietnam in response to the failure of the Paris Peace Talks.
This is his side of the story, "Guardfish vs. K-184":
Not long ago, someone gave me a book, “United States Submarines”, in which I read an article by retired Navy Captain David Minton called “The Guardfish Trails an Echo”. I immediately understood that David Minton trailed the K-184, which I commanded at the time. I will tell you about this event from my side, paying attention to David Minton’s commentary.
While serving in the position of commander of the SSGN K-184 in the Pacific, I had to participate in reconnaissance operations against the strike carrier America, the anti-submarine carrier Ticonderoga and the submarine Guardfish. The experience received benefited me in my further service. During my education at the naval institue, at the post-graduate courses and at the Naval Academy, an officer had to receive a deep understanding of how to conduct reconnaissance, have a practical mastery of reconnaissance assets, know how to analyze information obtained about the enemy and make corresponding conclusions which is necessary to make a decision about employment of torpedoes or missiles or to decline (break off) from the anti-submarine warfare forces of the enemy. This learning process must continue even in the fleet, that is, it a constant process. For any submarine commander in peace time, the opportunity must present itself to get experience conducting a reconnaissance operation against surface and subsurface vessels of the probable enemy. Our commander must completely know the following facts about the submarine of the probable adversary:
- noise level, - capability of the sonar system, - parameters of the radar set, - tactical action, - acoustic countermeasures, - maximum and minimum speed, - maximum diving depth, and - capabilities of the torpedo and missile armament.
The submarine I commanded, K-184 was already on combat duty for a month in Bukhta Pavlovskaya on the 9th of May, 1972. That morning the whole division mustered on the parade ground, the division commander Contra-Admiral I.I. Vereniki greeted us and congratulated the whole crew on Victory Day and afterwards we marched past the division commander's reviewing stand. After that I went to the duty officer and read the intelligence summary: “The area of the Indo-China Peninsula. Combat action against the patriotic forces of Indo-China from the Tonkin Gulf (130 miles to the north of Da Nang) carried out by the strike carriers Coral Sea, Kitty Hawk and Saratoga; and from an area 170 miles to the south east of Saigon the strike carrier Constellation with 38 ships in support. The carriers have launched 353 sorties, 256 of them strike sorties.” In the second half of the day the Pacific Fleet went to a higher state of readiness and our submarines sounded general quarters, while the alarm was sounded on our boat and the crew responded, the crew on the boat was ordered not to fire up the main reactor. That evening the division commander Contra-Admiral I.I. Vereniki called me to his office and said succinctly, “Go to the South China Sea and support our Vietnamese brothers.” I also found out from him that behind us were going Echo I SSGN K-45 (Captain First Rank Yu.N.Ganzha, commanding) and Echo II SSGN K-57 (Captain First Rank Yu.F.Shipovnikov, commanding).
10 May. By morning both reactors were brought on line to the turbo-generators. The combat orders came in the form of a telegram, which was given to me along with the route charts by the Division Chief of Staff, Captain First Rank M.B.Abramov. I received my final instructions from the division commander and then we slipped away from the pier and got underway.
David Minton writes: In the summer of 1972, the USS Guardfish (SSN 612) was in the Sea of Japan when world events pushed her and her crew into participating in a key event. With the collapse of the Paris peace talks, the war in Vietnam took a more forceful turn on the 9th of May and our troops began to mine Haiphong and other important North Vietnamese ports in order to cut the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) off from sea resupply. A message came to the Guardfish warning of operations at sea on the part of the Soviets in response. The world situation was white hot. No one knew how the Soviet Union would react to the mining. The Guardfish took a position near the Soviet Pacific Fleet's largest base at periscope depth. Later that night on the 10th of May, a submarine was sighted visually, intersecting our course at a high speed and heading straight for the Guardfish, which was expecting her. Closer contact allowed us to visually identify the maneuvering black mass as a Soviet Echo II class SSGN. This SSGN, which displaced 5000 tons, was equipped with a nuclear reactor and carried eight surface to surface Shaddock cruise missiles which could destroy targets at a range of 200 miles. The Guardfish followed behind her. Soon the Echo II submerged and took a course to the south-east at high speed. Was this sortie the answer to the mining of Haiphong harbor?(/i)
From the memoirs of Kaptain 2nd Rank Aleksandr IosofovichOstrovskiy, "We Deployed":
Excerpt from the chapter, "Was There a Cold War?" -
December, 1961. After finishing the Academy, I was assigned to project 613 (Whiskey class) submarine "S-290", 19th Brigade of Submarines, 6th Squadron, Pacific Fleet which was based in BukhtaMalyyUliss, Vladivostok.
Kaptain 2nd Rank A.A.Kodes was the commander. The boat was assigned to support combat training by surface ships of the 10th Squadron of the Pacific Fleet at the end of December.
This incident happened at the end of December. A Project 56 (Kotlin class) destroyer, the winner of seven battle stars for training, was preparing for deployment and had to complete several training serials. S-290 was tapped for support.
We took up a position in training area #47, located to the south of Askhold Island. The depth in the area is more than 5000 meters. We came up in voice comms with the commander of the destroyer. The commanders agreed on a scheme of maneuver. The sub dove and began to maneuver according to fleet doctrine determining the course of action during exercise support.
After the completion of each maneuver, we surfaced and came up in voice to determine the next serial. That day the destroyer was unlucky. Whether it was bad acoustic conditions or bad sonar men, the destroyer couldn't attack our boat once.
Understanding the complexity of the situation, K2R Kodes suggested that the CO of the destroyer set up so they could attack the sub and complete the task. The commander of the destroyer indignantly rejected our suggestion. We submerged and began to carry out the maneuver scheme.
It was noon. The watch officer gave the order to feed the crew. During lunch the commander ordered a change of depth from 40 to 80 meters. Literally two or three minutes later we heard the sound of a torpedo, similar to a whistle. The first to hear it was the sonar man, and ship's doctor, KapitanYu. Volkov, upon hearing it, commented that at last the surface guys finished their task and that we could go home.
The whole crew could hear the "torpedo whistle". The sonar man made a recording of it and the Officer of the Deck logged it the moment the torpedo passed above the conn.
After surfacing, the CO of the boat and the CO of the destroyer conferred and returned to base.
This incident would have been forgotten were it not for a clarification that the CO received after flying to Vladimir Bay in January, 1962, where the boat was moored in its winter roadstead. He told us that he took the recording of the torpedo to the 6th Squadron intelligence officer, K2R A.T.Shtyrov, who, after analyzing the situation explained:
- The destroyer never made a practice torpedo firing during her exercise with us, - Intelligence showed that there was an American sub in the area of Peter the Great Bay where the destroyer vs. sub ex occurred, and - It was probably an American torpedo. If the torpedo had hit our boat, the boat would have been destroyed and she would have sank in water more than 5000 meters deep, making it impossible to determine the cause of the loss.
K2R Ostrovskiy retired in Riga in 1985. After the break up of the Soviet Union, he retained his Russian citizenship. He currently resides with his wife in Carmel, Israel.
K2R Ostrovskiy also believes that the loss of the Kursk was due to a possible collision with (or even attack by) an American nuclear submarine.
