"Soviet Means Quality!"

Bulava fail. Again.

Из-за нештатного срабатывания первой ступени ракета самоликвидировалась", - говорится в сообщении управления пресс-службы и информации Минобороны РФ.

First stage.

Missile Testing Update

A claim of a successful Bulava test:

Gist: There was a test of the newest ballistic missile Bulava today. It was launched from the Dmitriy Donskoy from the White Sea and a notional target was destroyed at the Kura test range. The Bulava missile can carry up to 10 independently targeted re-entry vehicles. The range is not less than 8,000 km. It is planned to introduce this super-modern missile into service next year.

(RNB Comment: Unedifying commentary by Igor' Dygalo about how all the "combat components" successfully arrived at the range in Kura follow, plus yadda, yadda, yadda).

RNB Note: There have been initial claims of success followed by reports of failure before, so take it with a grain of salt. Also, if the Bulava is deployed next year as is so often claimed, that would make it a very undertested missile. Just as a reminder, according to this Soviet era documentary, the SS-N-23 were extensive, with nine sea-based tests, 16 firings from a land based test stand and multiple firings in different configurations from the lead boat of the Delta IV class. According to the testing timeline at Russian Strategic Forces, the Russians have pretty much foregone the land-based testing and seeing as that the Yuri Dolgoruki has just started to split atoms, there will probably be just one or two tests from the boat that the Bulava was intended for before the end of next year. Then, with fingers crossed, the Dolgoruki will conduct an under-ice transit to Vilyuchinsk and be anni-dominied as "combat certified".

We shall see.

Also, despite the fact that the news reports says that the Bulava could carry "up to ten" warheads, I believe that the Russians declared six re-entry vehicles per RSM-56 (the START name for Bulava) in the last Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Memorandum of Understanding.

Speaking of START, in anticipation of the demise of START on 04 December, 2009, the Russians have conducted their latest test of the obviously treaty violating derivative of the SS-27 (and cousin of the Bulava), the RS-24 on the 26th:

Gist: An RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with a multiple re-entry vehicle front section was test launched from a mobile launcher in Plesetsk. The Strategic Rocket Forces announced that the target at the Kura test range was destroyed. (RNB Comment: The rest of the piece is about a Soyuz-U launch from Baikonur).

How the development, testing and deployment (see next clip) of the RS-24 isn't a pretty blatent violation of START Article V, para 5 4 is a mystery to me. Article V, paragraph five four states that "[E]ach Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs".

I guess this means that START I as we know it, from the Russian perspective at least, is dead. Now the parties have already held their treaty-mandated meeting to discuss the future of START. It will be interesting to see how Obama will handle the START situation. Obama has demonstrated a keen interest in arms control, even going as far as being the "new Nunn" in the Nunn-Lugar series of agreements known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative. I hope he would consider extending the treaty as is, if only so that inspectors can get a good first hand look at the Bulava and the RS-24. After all, satellites can't see under ascent shrouds, while inspectors conducting a paragraph six inspection can.

But I'm just a cranky, old retired Petty Officer and not a lawyer or a diplomat or lawyer-diplomat or a policy wonk and shit, so what do I know?

Finally, fresh on the heels of the successful RS-24 launch, the Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces announces that the Teykovo division will be re-armed with new mobile missiles. Although it is unclear from the text in this announcement if the new battalion will be armed with the road mobile SS-27 (a firing unit is depicted in the video) or the new treaty-mocking RS-24, the timing of the announcement certainly arouses suspicion as to the identity of the new missile:

Gist: The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces has announced that new ICBMs will be commissioned in the Russian Army next year. The first battalion will be stood up at the Teykovo missile unit in Ivanovskaya Oblast'. According to one colonel, the combat potential of the SRF strike force is increased many-fold with the introduction of this missile. A complete replacement of systems is planned in 2015. Its development should be complete soon. The first tests will be next year.

The text of this news report is a little muddled since the first tests of the RS-24 happened last year and wont happen next year.

Again, we'll see.

Independent Military Review Editorial: Bulava vs. Sineva

The Bulava in the Background of the Sineva

Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev was present at the Sineva launch from the SSBN Tula on 11 October. With satisfaction, he noted that, "As a result of the successful launch the range was fixed at 11,547km". He underlined that the Sineva had "good prospects".

Experts were divided. They say that the Sineva is a modernized version of the long obsolescent RSM-54 sea-based missile and that there is no point to the record since the strategic submarines it is for attacks at a range of 3-4,000 km. The acceptance into service of the Bulava is planned for 2009 and the era of the Sineva will be done.

Meanwhile, even the hardest core skeptics agree that the Sineva is the best missile in the world with regards to the balance between energy and mass. The relationship of its mass to throw weight and range is 25-30 percent more than the American Trident I and II. It can carry 10 100kg warheads, it has more protection against electro-magnetic pulse and carries more missile defense penetration aids. The combined Malakhit-3 astro- and satellite navigation system allows it to destroy a target with an accuracy of 500 meters.

The maximum range of the Sineva is 8300km with a front section weight of 2.8 tons. The range increases as the front section weight decreases. Obviously the 11,500km range was acheived by carrying a front section mock-up of minimal weight. The President didn't mention this, but it is known that the 100kt small warhead weighs 100kg.

The coast of the United States, which has long been our potential enemy, is covered by a powerful system of sonars and ASW patrol aircraft. This allows the detection of submarines at a distance of several thousand kilometers. But if Sineva has an 11,000km range then it is invisible. The American anti-missile system covers the United States from the directions of the Russian Far East, the North Pole and Europe, but from the direction of Latin America, there is no protection. And even a small warhead could potentially deal unacceptable damage. In this way the Sineva poses an assymetric answer to the American anti-missile system in Europe.

The next day after the launch of the Sineva from the Tula, two missile were launched in opposite directions from two Project 667 BDRM class SSBNs (Delta IVs): the Zelenograd launched from the Sea of Okhotsk and destroyed a target at the Chiza range in the north of Arkhangel'sk Oblast' while the Ekaterinburg successfully hit the Kura range on the Kamchatka Peninsula from the Barents Sea. This confirms that the Sineva remains the main Russian Navy nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, six Project 667 BDRM (Delta IV) SSBNs should be stricken by 2015.

(Russian Navy Blog note: Zelenograd is not a 667 BDRM Delta IV armed with the SS-N-23/Sineva, but a 667 BDR Delta III armed with the SS-N-18.)

As far as the Bulava goes, six unsuccessful launches in a row is all it has to show for 10 years of development. By the way, the President of the Russian Federation didn't say anything about the Bulava which leads to fears for the worst - that suddenly the Commander in Chief will decide to leave the Sineva in service and all the people working on and lobbying for the Bulava lose their generous budget allocations....

Paper Calls B.S. On Bulava

The editors of the Independent Military Review better watch out or Putin thugs will make sure they will fall out an apartment window like Ivan Safronov:

Editorial: There Is Nothing To Celebrate.
The outbreak of celebrations in the Russian press after the Bulava launch on 18 September was based exclusively on cheap words from representatives of the MoD. Nobody even deigned to look into them more carefully. It is worthwhile. Especially instructive is this passage: “…at 1905 Moscow time the training section reached the target at the Kura test range”. That immediately raises a question: if the launch was a test launch, why was there a practice unit? What does that mean?

It means this: the Bulava didn’t carry anything, not even carrying a mock up of its regular warheads. And nothing fell in the 800,000 hectare Kura test range on Kamchatka. It missed and not a thing hit the “battlefield”.

In November 2007, almost a year ago, the previous Bulava test flight finished 23 seconds after failure of the first stage. Then it was announced that it needed 12-14 additional test launches to reach operational readiness and be accepted into service. While the next Bulava succeeded in not blowing up immediately upon launch, it is still far from being ready for acceptance.

In 1998, when the leadership at the Ministry of Defense and the government canceled the Miass Missile Center-made Bark SLBM in order to redirect money to the Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), which is physically closer to Moscow, it was announced that the new Bulava missile would be accepted into service in 2005. The chief argument was the project cost savings. They said that they would adapt the land-based Topol’ (SS-25/27) for submarines. Experts warned that water and air were two different physical states and nothing good would come of it.

The Bulava project was valued at 227 million dollars and the cost of a missile around 10 million dollars. The real expenditure hasn’t been calculated, but MITT received 14 billion rubles for the project in 2004. It is obvious that Bulava has swallowed at least 300 million dollars over the last 10 years. […]

Its defenders assert that the country will get the 10 warhead super-weapon. But it must be said that the Bulava throw weight is 1.15 tons. It is the most important missile parameter which characterizes its combat effectiveness. That includes not only the warheads, but also the last stage consisting of the bus, guidance system and fuel. What room is left for warheads?

Take for example the Sineva with a throw weight of 2.15 tons with four medium or ten light warheads. There is a suspicion that miniaturized warheads for the Bulava still haven’t been developed. Most shamefully, the 12 Bulavas on the SSBN Yuri Dolgorukiy will have an aggregate throw weight 4.9 times less than an Ohio SSBN with the solid fuelled Trident II missile.

So for now the victorious fanfare is cancelled while the budgetary allocations flew down the tubes.

Latest Bulava Test "Partially Successful"

Via the not official Navy site navy.ru, Kommersant reports that the latest Bulava test conducted a few days ago was "partially successful".

[...]
"The active part of the trajectory went without a hitch and ended up in the correct area, the front section separated fine but the warhead bus wasn't able to effect warhead separation", a source told the paper.


He explained that the warheads of the missile wouldn't have worked in combat conditions because of the peculiarities of the device in the Bulava. The paper was not able to obtain comment about this from the Navy spokesman Igor' Dygalo.

Recall that the latest Bulava test took place 18 September, launched from the Dmitriy Donskoy while submerged. Immidiately after the test a representitive of the Ministry of Defence announced that the launch was successful. In his words, the missile successfully destroyed the target at the Kura test range on Kamchatka.

[...]

I was curious about the radio silence concerning the Bulava launch from TV Zvezda. Usually after a successful launch, they'll at least have a 30 second snippet.

When talking about the Bulava, its always a good idea to put an "alleged" before any claim of success.

Upcoming Russian SLBM Tests

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces is reporting that it may be an interesting week for the naval leg of the Russian strategic nuclear triad:

A RIA Novosti report quoted an unnamed representative of the military that the Russian Navy is planning to conduct SLBM launches in the Pacific, most likely on September 15th (although the launch window would last until September 20th). The missiles will be launched from submarines deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.

What's interesting, the missiles will be launched to the Kura test range in Kamchatka and not to the usual Chizha test site at the Kanin Peninsula. This means that the missiles would be tested at an unusually short range (this would require a lofted trajectory) - no more than about 1500-1700 km and maybe as short as 600 km. The purpose of these tests is not entirely clear at this point (although I'm sure we'll hear obligatory references to missile defense).

Another interesting aspect about the upcoming launch is that while the report mentions submarines of the Pacific Fleet, it says that these are Project 667BDRM/Delta IV submarines even though the Pacific Fleer does not have submarines of this type. It is probably just a journalistic error, fairly common in Russia, but it could be something else - some Project 667BDRM submarines may have been moved to the Pacific. I hope we'll find out soon.

Another launch that we should expect next week is the long-awaited flight test of the Bulava missile. It's about time - the Dmitri Donskoy submarine recently returned from sea trials and presumably is ready for action. Also, I have some information that the test is indeed scheduled for some time next week.

This is going to be an interesting week to watch for Russian SLBMs. Stay tuned.

A couple of questions immediately spring to my mind:

1) Did the Russians deploy on a temporary basis a Delta IV to the Pac? If they have, I haven't seen the slightest indication of it.

2) Is the short, lofted trajectory intended to be a response to Polish acceptance of the missile defense system on it's soil? A cursory examination of Google Earth reveals that the distance from the White Sea to Redzikowo, Poland, site of the future interceptor base is, wait for it, 1600km. Conincidence?



3) Are there going to be multiple launches, a short range launch from the Delta IV in the Pac and a long range test from the Dmitriy Donskoy from the White Sea?

4) Or is this just typical civilian journalist attention to detail on military matters?

I guess we'll have some answers by next week...

Yuri Dolgoruki Prepares for Sea

04 Sep 2008

In the near future, the SSBN Yuri Dolgoruki will conduct sea trials in the test range in the White Sea. According to a 04 Sep story by Interfax, the preparations to go to sea are being done jointly with the crew and specialists from OAO Sevmash.

The testing will include checks of the power plant and combat systems. The exact date the boat will go to sea hasn't been announced.

The Yuri Dolgoruki is the lead in the Borey-class/Project 955 strategic missile cruiser. She was launched in April, 2007 and it is expected to be commissioned later this year. Sevmash is currently constructing two more of the class - the Alexandr Nevskiy and the Vladimir Monomakh.

The Yuri Dolgoruki displaces 24,000 tons. The maximum speed is 29 knots. She is armed with six 650mm torpedo tubes, four 533mm torpedo tubes and 16 ballistic missile launchers for the Bulava.

For more of the latest on the troubled Bulava program, see Pavel Povdig's Strategic Nuclear Forces blog.

My bet is she goes to sea unarmed. And if she does go to sea with something in the tubes, it will be with ballast cans or a half tested, unreliable Bulava system so that the Russians can claim the usual bullshit about how their systems are "the best in the world with no analogue".

First Look - 30 May 2008

France Visits Baltiysk Ahead of BALTOPS-2008

A French minehunter and the tender “Loire” visit Baltiysk. There is opening footage of a damage control demonstration. French squadron commander discusses mine hunting technology, using a remote TV camera to locate a WWII wreck. During similar exercises in Lithuania a few years ago, they found four WWII mines. There is a shot of the French tender “Loire”, which has already served for over five decades. There is a tour of the on board workshop. A shot of the crew’s mess where the crew eats on tables they made themselves. The reporter notes that the French ship’s next port is Sweeden and has already spent 10 days in port in Gdynia and will remain in the Baltic for BALTOPS-2008, to which the Russians plan on sending the Large Landing Ship “Kaliningrad” and the Escort Ship “Neustrashimyy” (maybe).

“There Shouldn’t Be a Race” to Deploy the Bulava: Navy CinC

Testing of the new solid-fueled SLBM “Bulava”, designed for use on the new project 955 SSBNs will continue this year, according to the Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Vysotskiy. “We will accept it when we are absolutely sure. Russia has invested a colossal amount of resources in the development of this new strategic weapon…”, the Admiral said. “There shouldn’t be a race. We will not accept a half-tested weapon into service.”

How much testing is enough? See the Soviet Era Documentary on SLBM trials and testing. The Bulava isn’t even close to that level of trials and testing yet.

Navy CinC: Russia Could Increase the Number of Ships at Sevastopol’

“The basing agreement allows us to base up to a hundred ships in the Black Sea Fleet and we have thirty five. We can have up to 25,000 sailors based there and we have 11,000. The question arises – what is keeping us from increasing numbers up to what we are allowed”, he explained to journalists in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. For Russia, he adds, it is not a question of preserving the Black Sea Fleet, but of developing it because of its proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and because of its role of maintaining Moscow’s interests in the world oceans.


The Japanese Ship “Tsugaru” Arrives on Sakhalin for a Friendly Visit.

During the three day visit in Korsakov, the Japanese sailors will pay an official call on local officials, make a courtesy call on the Japanese General Council in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and participate in a cultural program.

The port visit is being conducted in honor of the 90th anniversary of the Border Guard Service in Russia and the 60th anniversary of the Japanese Maritime Safety Directorate. On 13 May, Sakhalin Border Guards paid a visit to the Japanese port of Yakogame.

Soviet Era Documentary on SLBM Trials and Testing

This Soviet Era film (and it is a film, not video) documents the trials and acceptance testing of the SS-N-23 "Skiff". It was probably made sometime in the mid- to late 80s. There are shots of the missile undergoing pop-up testing from an underwater test stand as well as shore-based test firings.

It is interesting to compare the amount of test launches of the SS-N-23, a Soviet era missile, with the Bulava test history. The Russian government has committed to deploying the Bulava, despite the limited testing. According to Strategicforces.org, there have been only nine test launches, at least four of them failures. With the sea trials of the Borey expected to begin this year, the Russians need a missile for it fairly soon or the Yuri Dolgarukiy and her sisters will be nothing but money pits.
Compare the Bulava testing with the testing of the SS-N-23: according to this film, there were nine sea-based tests, 16 firings from a land based test stand and multiple firings in different configurations from the lead boat of the Delta IV class. In other words there were probably at least three dozen test launches before acceptance into the fleet. What wasn't mentioned in the film was how many of those tests were failures.



00:33 - With the nine launches of the missile, submerged test launches by the design bureau were complete. The calculated and actual parameters of the ignition process were confirmed as well as the parameters of the movement of the missile in the underwater and transition phase of the trajectory.

01:08 - The completion of design bureau flight testing allowed transition to the next step of the natural development of the system.

01:35 – Two phases of flight testing of the D-9RM missile at the northern test range were performed jointly – from a shore based launch facility and from the first nuclear submarine built of its class. The purpose of simultaneous testing is to completely finish the development of the missile system and to confirm its tactical-technical characteristics.

02:15 – ((Sentence fragment because of poor editing)).

02:22 - The missile was tested from a shore based test stand 16 times. Unlike operational missiles, these missiles had telemetry gear that sent back information about the launch and the flight of the missile.

03:10 – The final phase is launching the D-9RM from a project 667BRDM (Delta IV class) SSBN.

03:33 – The main goal of the testing is to test the capabilities and technical characteristics in as close to combat conditions as possible.

03:55 – The missile firings were carried out at minimum, intermediate and maximum range in salvos of one, two and four missiles.

04:36 – Missiles away! Maximum range and accuracy of the firing, with multiple independently targeted warheads. (TR Note: I'm guessing here. The circular error probability). The astronavigation mode and also the tactical-technical characteristics and conditions for combat use of the missile. .

05:10 – Congratulations to the Chief Designer Academic Viktor Petrovich Makeyev. By proclamation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the strategic missile system D-9RM with the D-29RM missile is accepted into service with the Navy.