The Russian are Coming
The Baltic Fleet guard ship (SKR) Neustrashimyy is transiting the Suez Canal on Tuesday and will set course for the Somali littoral according to high-level sources in the Navy General Staff.
After passing through the Suez, Neustrashimyy will transit the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and end up in the Arabian Sea around Somalia. Before her stands the mission of defending shipping against piracy, convoy of Russian flagged ships and protection of Russian crews and crewmembers," the Admiral said.
According to the Admiral, there is a real threat of capture of Russian ships in the Gulf of Aden around the Horn of Africa.
Earlier the Russian Navy spokesman K1R Igor' Dygalo told RIA Novosti that if the situation around the Ukrainian flagged ship Faina isn't settled by the time the Neustashimyy gets to her assigned area, then the ship will be subject to action by foreign ships which, for the time being, control the maritime situation and are tracking the situation surrounding the ship.
He reminded everyone that UN resolutions adopted recently, aimed at focusing international attention on the problem of piracy, is the foundation of Russian Navy participation in curbing piracy in the Somali littoral.
The SKR Neustrashimyy departed Baltiysk on the 24th of September, setting sail for Somalia to support the security of shipping along the coast of that country. In part, the possibility of the Russian vessel assisting in the freeing of the Faina, which was taken by pirates on 25 September, is not excluded.
The ship was carrying weapons, including 33 T-72 tanks. There is one Latvian, three Russians and 17 Ukrainians on board. The captain, Vladimir Kolobkov, who was a Russian, died. Pirates are threatening to kill the hostages in the event of an operation to free them by force.
According to western analysts, Somali pirates have captured about 60 foreign vessels for ransom in 2008. Their total profits this year may reach 30 million dollars.
(...)
Tuesday, October 21, 2008
Monday, October 20, 2008
Someone Thought the Cole Refueling in Aden was a Good Idea, Too
(Caption: Kashin class BPK 505 Sposobnyy somewhere between Yemen and Ethiopia, 1985. Source: sposobny.narod.ru)
The President of Yemen may bring up the issue of re-establishment of Russian naval bases on Socotra during his visit to Moscow.
Sana'a, 16 Oct. (ITAR-TASS). The speaker of the Federation Council Sergey Mironov does not exclude the possibility that during the Yemeni President would bring up the issue of re-establishing Russian naval bases on Socotra Island in the Gulf of Aden during his visit to Moscow.
In answer to the question if Russia has any plans to do so, Mironov said, "I think that this theme will be discussed concretely during Ali Abdallah Saleh's visit to Moscow". Mironov did not discuss the length of the visit.
The speaker considers the future use of Yemeni ports by the Russian Navy as well as re-establishment of a base to be possible. "We have to proceed step by step, taking into account new vectors in the foreign and defense policies of Russia and the increase in op tempo by the Navy. I think that its possible that we will examine the issue of the use of Yemeni ports by Russian Naval ships", he said.
(Caption: Flight deck entertainment, BPK 505 Sposobnyy, Socotra Anchorage, 1987. Note the use of the ships drum kit by the band. Source and more Socotra liberty pics: sposobny.narod.ru)
Vikramadit'ya Ready for Re-Launch
Caption: "Soon she will leave the dock, 10 Oct 2008"
Sevmash is finishing preparations for re-floating the aircraft carrier Vikramadit'ya, currently being re-equipped for the Indian Navy according to a correspondent from the website arhperspectiva.ru.
"This is an extremely important step in the technological shipbuilding chain," according to the assistant general director for military-technical cooperations Sergey Novoselov. "Therefore we are taking the preparations very seriously."
The documents certifying the completion of work on the hull and the painting of the outer hull were prepared. Workers in the graving dock are disassembling the scaffolding. The operation is complex and will take some time: it will take until the end of October to free it from the entangling web of scaffolding, totalling 200km in length. Besides that, the last 10 (out of 116) tanks need to be painted and eight need to be pressure tested.
After the stempost of the carrier touches the waves once again, the ship will moor at the factory seafront. Then begins the loading of the massive pieces of equipment in the boiler room and the arresting gear, which accoridng to Novoselov, couldn't be done while she was in dry dock.
Area Closure
HYDROPAC 2032/2008(95,96). SEA OF JAPAN. MISSILES.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 2300Z TO 0200Z COMMENCING DAILY
20 AND 21 OCT AND 0400Z TO 0700Z DAILY 21 AND 22 OCT
IN AREA BOUND BY
41-57.5N 131-32.0E, 42-32.3N 133-32.0E,
42-41.0N 133-02.5E, 42-41.0N 133-28.7E,
43-33.0N 135-37.0E, 42-20.0N 136-02.0E,
40-57.2N 135-38.5E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 220800Z OCT.
Point "C" is actually over land on some sort of facility:
For my half-assed "analysis" of a previous Sea of Japan missile closure, see here. I did not note any results from any exercises that may have been held in the September Sea of Japan area closure.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 2300Z TO 0200Z COMMENCING DAILY
20 AND 21 OCT AND 0400Z TO 0700Z DAILY 21 AND 22 OCT
IN AREA BOUND BY
41-57.5N 131-32.0E, 42-32.3N 133-32.0E,
42-41.0N 133-02.5E, 42-41.0N 133-28.7E,
43-33.0N 135-37.0E, 42-20.0N 136-02.0E,
40-57.2N 135-38.5E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 220800Z OCT.
Point "C" is actually over land on some sort of facility:
For my half-assed "analysis" of a previous Sea of Japan missile closure, see here. I did not note any results from any exercises that may have been held in the September Sea of Japan area closure.
Sunday, October 19, 2008
Deep Thought
Colin Powell is right. So what if Obama is Muslim?
I'm also troubled by, not what Sen. McCain says, but what members of the party say, and it is permitted to be said such things as: "Well, you know that Mr. Obama is a Muslim." Well, the correct answer is: he is not a Muslim. He's a Christian. He's always been a Christian.
But the really right answer is: What if he is? Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer is: No, that's not America. Is there something wrong with some 7-year-old Muslim-American kid believing he or she can be President?
Yet I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion: he's a Muslim, and he might be associated with terrorists. This is not the way we should be doing it in America.
Georgians Greet the Barry Warmly
The Georgians greeted the American destroyer Barry in a ceremony with Georgian wine accompanied by a children's choir. According to the Americans there are no humanitarian nor military cargoes. Tbilisi acknowledges that the visit is of a friendly nature. They will remain in Georgia three days. Meetings are planned by the Americans with the Georgian military establishment and also the crew will help to paint a local school.
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Death of a Super Spy
SSV-33 rusting at the pier, 2005? (Source: wikipedia.ru)
SSV-33, June 2008 (Source: vif2.ru)
Fate of the Fleet Superspy, Independent Military Review, April 2006.
The unique nuclear powered Ural rusts away after 25 years of disuse.
The Project 1941 nuclear powered reconnaissance ship Ural is moored to one of the piers in the Far East with a five degree list. There aren't enough specialists on board to maintain her nuclear reactor. There used to be a thousand strong crew and now there are barely one hundred. The main systems on board the giant ship haven't functioned for a long time and to rehab the ship would cost an enormous amount of money.
At the beginning of the 90s the reconnaissance ship Ural was a secret vessel. The hull and the reactor of the Ural were similar to the Project 1144 Orlan class cruisers (Kirov class). But the electonics and the combat missions of the ship were extremely secret.
The Ural wasn't built for combat and could only repel cutters, small ships and helicopters. It had two quick firing 76mm AK-176 gun mounts, four 30mm AK-630 gun mounts, four Igla missile mounts and four Utes-M 12mm dual machine gun mounts. But there is electronic weaponry to detect aerial, surface and subsurface targets, direct fire and also several special radars and supporting systems known as the Korall system, designed to locate and track missiles and track satellites and other objects in orbit that are of particular interest.
The Ural could loiter for an unlimited amount of time in neutral waters without refueling in the American littoral and analyze the electromagnetic spectrum around American ICBM and Strategic Aviation bases. She is equipped to quickly evaluate an enormous amount of reconnaissance data and transmit it to the national command authority. It makes sense that such a ship, which can carry out electronic reconnaissance from the the open ocean as well as from the pier at her home base, has obviously not dealt with hidden and open enemies or with emeging parters of Russia. But even today, 25 years after being laid down, it is very difficult to find reliable information about her construction.
The Spy on the Baltic Wharf
Back in 1977 the Military-Industrial Commission of the Communist Party Central Committee together with the USSR Ministry of Defense decided to construct a large, nuclear powered reconnaissance ship Ural with a length of 265 meters and width of 30 meters. The Ajsberg Construction Bureau was the prime contractor. The ship was laid down in June, 1981, launched in 1983 and accepted into service in 1988 or 1989. Designed for electronic warfare, she was equipped with several ES-1046 and El'brus computer systems in order to crunch massive amounts of collected data. With the help of the Korall system, the spy could track the trajectories of ballistic missiles, manned space systems and pass on that data.
Testing of all the systems began in the Baltic Sea in 1988. A huge scientific research organization was created in support of this testing. This was a huge scientific collective which practically never left the ship during the construction, shipyard and sea trials period of development.
The State acceptance act was signed in 1989 and the ship began her transit to her assigned port of Vladivostok. Complex brigades of specialists were embarked to work out all the possible kinks during the transit. Vladimir Anikeyev lead the scientists who worked on the two El'brus computer systems. The computer systems never wanted to work correctly and were very capricious. Anikeyev was in the tropical sun for the first time and watched from the deck as Singapore passed abeam of the ship. He spent practically all of his time in the bowels of the ship, bringing the computers on line so that they could analyze and use data in real time. Finally after 59 days at sea, the handsome Ural pulled into Strelok Bay in Vladivostok. There wasn't a pier ready for her and she was forced to anchor out in the bay and begin her invisible battle with corrosion and failing machinery, which had to remain running while at anchor to support the systems that supported the huge crew.
Problems
The crew of Ural immediately began to prepare for combat operations around one of the American test ranges testing anti-missile defense. Meanwhile, a lot of things were going wrong aboard the newly constructed ship that even the Baltic Fleet specialists couldn't deal with, such as problems with the reactor cooling system. Now there was no talk of a combat deployment. The unique Korall surveillance system and El'brus computer system didn't want to work. There was nothing fleet specialists could do about them either.
As a result, the first rank ship, which should have become the flagship of the Far Eastern Fleet, became a floating barracks for young or prospectless officers. She never went to sea and her powerful radioelectronic complement, into which was poured and enormous amount of valuable metal, gradually began to decay. Officers sent to crew the ship requested transfer or release from duty after a year or a year and a half of prospectless service on board. There were occasions when the command didn't satisfy such requests and the officers jumped overboard and swam for shore. After several such protests, the command decided not to block requests for transfers from Ural.
Suggestions were advanced to use Ural as a floating nuclear power plant or even sell her abroad for scrap. But nothing came of these suggestions because Russian nuclear secrets needed to be kept. For now the ship is in limbo. No suggestions have been made by fleet command to do anything with her. It is preferred to just not talk about her openly. Only the former Navy Chief of Staff Fleet Admiral Vladimir Khmel'nov has mentioned her in his chronicle of the Russian Navy, "Russian Fleet: Prowess and Poverty", pulling back the curtain on the fate of the giant ship. "On board the Ural, each reactor is served by two people when there should be six".
There are less than a hundred crewmen out of a thousand still serving aboard the Ural, out of them 25 seamen. The cooling system doesn't work and only one pump heroically pumps water out of the huge bilges. Word around the fleet is that the ship will be sold overseas after removal of the nuclear reactors.
A few years ago, there was some preservation work done on the hull at the ship yard. Meanwhile specialists couldn't correct the five degree list. Afterwards, the nuclear spy was welded to the pier, where she awaits her fate.
Ural Fun Facts
- Ural is one of those rare ships free of rats - while the reconnaissance equipment is working all the rats died and only reappeared when the ship moored at the pier.
- When the Ural was in port Cam Ran Bay, Vietnam, the roving patrol employed their weapons (special grenades) against an unknown target in the water near the ship. It turned out to be a large turtle.
- The ship was only 1.5-2km from the site of a memorable fire at the main Pacific Fleet ammunition storage depot. Despite the huge number of shells and missiles flying through the air in different directions, thanks to the efforts of K1R Keshkov and the crew, not one shell, rocket or fragment fell on the ship. Under a hail of fire, the crew, at night, with only the help of one tug and her own power, moved the ship to a safe place.
- A box of 76mm ammunition disappeared during an on load. The commmander of the ship Keshikov asked the crew to return the ammunition anonymously, no questions asked. All the shells were returned that day and Keshikov personally thanked the crew over the 1MC for every shell brought to his stateroom.
- In the fall of 1991 during a powerful storm, the ship broke loose from her mooring and drifted out to sea. She passed within a few hundred meters of the rocky shores of Putyatin Island. The next day the crew got deployment rations (like sausage and condensed milk) since formally the ship was out of home port.
Friday, October 17, 2008
USS Barry (DDG 52) In Port Poti
Poti, Georgia, expects the arrival of the American missile cruiser (sic) Barry. The ship can't approach shore for now because of a storm. According to the American Embassy in Tbilisi, the visit is "friendly". The crew should visit Georgia for three days. The American command denies any connection between the arrival of the ship in Georgian territorial waters and the conflict in South Ossetia.
Peter the Great Update: Great Guns!
The Peter the Great conducted exercises with light deck guns while steaming toward Latin America. According to the narration, the crew conducts these types of exercises every day.
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Independent Military Review Editorial: Bulava vs. Sineva
The Bulava in the Background of the Sineva
Russian Federation President Dmitriy Medvedev was present at the Sineva launch from the SSBN Tula on 11 October. With satisfaction, he noted that, "As a result of the successful launch the range was fixed at 11,547km". He underlined that the Sineva had "good prospects".
Experts were divided. They say that the Sineva is a modernized version of the long obsolescent RSM-54 sea-based missile and that there is no point to the record since the strategic submarines it is for attacks at a range of 3-4,000 km. The acceptance into service of the Bulava is planned for 2009 and the era of the Sineva will be done.
Meanwhile, even the hardest core skeptics agree that the Sineva is the best missile in the world with regards to the balance between energy and mass. The relationship of its mass to throw weight and range is 25-30 percent more than the American Trident I and II. It can carry 10 100kg warheads, it has more protection against electro-magnetic pulse and carries more missile defense penetration aids. The combined Malakhit-3 astro- and satellite navigation system allows it to destroy a target with an accuracy of 500 meters.
The maximum range of the Sineva is 8300km with a front section weight of 2.8 tons. The range increases as the front section weight decreases. Obviously the 11,500km range was acheived by carrying a front section mock-up of minimal weight. The President didn't mention this, but it is known that the 100kt small warhead weighs 100kg.
The coast of the United States, which has long been our potential enemy, is covered by a powerful system of sonars and ASW patrol aircraft. This allows the detection of submarines at a distance of several thousand kilometers. But if Sineva has an 11,000km range then it is invisible. The American anti-missile system covers the United States from the directions of the Russian Far East, the North Pole and Europe, but from the direction of Latin America, there is no protection. And even a small warhead could potentially deal unacceptable damage. In this way the Sineva poses an assymetric answer to the American anti-missile system in Europe.
The next day after the launch of the Sineva from the Tula, two missile were launched in opposite directions from two Project 667 BDRM class SSBNs (Delta IVs): the Zelenograd launched from the Sea of Okhotsk and destroyed a target at the Chiza range in the north of Arkhangel'sk Oblast' while the Ekaterinburg successfully hit the Kura range on the Kamchatka Peninsula from the Barents Sea. This confirms that the Sineva remains the main Russian Navy nuclear deterrent. Meanwhile, six Project 667 BDRM (Delta IV) SSBNs should be stricken by 2015.
(Russian Navy Blog note: Zelenograd is not a 667 BDRM Delta IV armed with the SS-N-23/Sineva, but a 667 BDR Delta III armed with the SS-N-18.)
As far as the Bulava goes, six unsuccessful launches in a row is all it has to show for 10 years of development. By the way, the President of the Russian Federation didn't say anything about the Bulava which leads to fears for the worst - that suddenly the Commander in Chief will decide to leave the Sineva in service and all the people working on and lobbying for the Bulava lose their generous budget allocations....
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Russia, the International Community and Piracy
Problems with Russia's Participation in the Pirate Hunt
About the author: Mikhail Dmitrievich Vojtenko - Chief of the Information and Analysis Department, OAO "Sovfrakht", editor of the journal "Sovfrakht Maritime Bulletin".
Attempted Translation:
03 Oct 2008
Reports have circulated in the press in the last week about how the Russian Navy is supporting the international fight against piracy at sea, including off the coast of Somalia. This has been talked about in both official announcements and in Navy Public Affairs. This is in connection with an incorrect interpretation of remarks made by Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy; that supposedly our fleet would take care of the piracy problem by itself.
“The Russian Navy is supporting the international effort against piracy at sea, including off the coast of Somalia. And when Russian citizens find themselves threatened, the Navy reserves the right of unilateral action”, the Navy PAO Igor’ Dygalo noted. He emphasized that in other circumstances (for instance, during international operations against piracy) the issue of Russian naval participation will conform to Russia’s foreign policy line.
Four Forces
Judging by the first reports in the press, first a Navy ship will be sent to the Gulf of Aden; moreover it is planning on operating independently. And the statement by the CinC Vladimir Vysotskiy has been corrected to reflect that Russian participation in the international fight against piracy at sea will conform to Russia’s foreign policy line. But it is entirely unclear what conditions have to present themselves for Russian participation.
Right now the naval forces in the Gulf of Aden can be divided into four types:
1. Coalition forces. Coalition Task Force 150. The main mission of these forces is to combat terrorism, which is not really understandable, or more likely, to force the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz in the event that the Iranians close it. The closure of the Straits of Hormuz would be more terrible for the world economy than the closure of the Suez Canal. Around 40 percent of world oil exports go through the Straits of Hormuz while the Suez Canal is the main route for the gigantic flow of finished goods that are manufactured cheaply by China and India from Asia to Europe and the United States. The coalition forces look at the piracy fight as an annoyance and not worth the trouble, and to re-orient their mission would be very complicated, even if it were possible.
2. Random ships from random countries, dispatched for a limited amount of time to guard ships with humanitarian aid to Somalia. This is in accordance with the UN program for humanitarian assistance and as far as the author knows isn’t related to the fight against piracy.
3. Unilateral national forces. Right now we have the first “swallow” in Malaysian form, which has sent three Navy ships to the region with the exclusive goal of supporting the safe passage of Malaysian ships. The Malaysian company MISC, which has two tankers held in Somalia as well as a container ship with thousands of containers on board which was attacked with cargo worth hundreds of millions of dollars, is one of the biggest ship operators in the world. The company has a large significance for economies throughout the world. The defense of MISC ships is the defense of its national interest by Malaysia.
4. Last week the European Union decided to a) create a Somali Piracy Command Center in Brussels, and b) possibly send some sort of multilateral task force to the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy threatening the EU economy. If container ships, tankers and dry cargo vessels have to avoid the Suez Canal, it will strike a heavy blow against Old World economies and the pocketbooks of European citizens, including Russia. Asian goods will increase in price since everywhere you look, all you see are goods labeled “Made in China” and the value of the Suez Canal will be quickly understood even in the Russian sticks.
Together With Whom and How?
Meanwhile, I am urgently interested in the following question: what will Russian Navy ships be able to achieve in the Gulf of Aden?
1. It is useless (unfortunately) to talk about combining with Coalition Task Force 150 since, I repeat, this formation isn’t fighting piracy.
2. Guarding humanitarian cargos headed for Somalia only has a tangential relationship with fighting piracy.
3. Unilaterally? There aren’t any ships there that demand national defense. Either you guard everyone who needs guarding or you guard no one. The transit of the Gulf of Aden by a fully Russian ship (Russian flagged, Russian owner and a Russian crew) is too much of a rarity to maintain a squadron of ships in the region on a constant basis (even if there is only one military ship, she needs escort). There are always Russian sailors crossing the Gulf of Aden but, as a rule, as part of a multinational crew under different flags on ships owned by different owners. If the goal is to exclusively defend Russian interests, then it becomes necessary to ask each ship that is attacked if there are Russian citizens on board and if there is cargo bound for Russia or not. That is absurd. So even if unilateral action is taken, in order to operate effectively, water space and technical details would have to be worked out, first of all, with coalition forces, second, with Malaysian ships and, third, with EU forces if and when they show up.
4. Working together with EU forces – this is obviously the most logical, preferable and effective scenario.
5. There is a fifth, extremely undesirable variant: ships sent independently and operating independently. Imagine the situation – there is a family in which a couple of members have been kidnapped for ransom. And help comes from the organized crime unit, from the Ministry of the Interior, from the FSB, traffic cops, private security guards and sundry other “powers”. And all of them work independently, for themselves. They rip the phone receiver from each others hands when the kidnappers call, each on suggests their own solution, each one screams that he has a bigger and more deadly gun. The same would happen in the Gulf of Aden if everyone sent independent actors. I repeat that no one country has enough shipping in the region to send forces that would guard only their own flagged ships. But at the same time, the shipping in the area has importance for many countries, for all of Europe. Quite simply, modern maritime commerce is more globalized and international than any other economic activity and either everybody or nobody defends it. If Russian ships are sent there independently, that means piracy isn’t the issue, it’s ambition.
A further question – what kind of forces should be sent? It should be a ship with a helicopter since the lack of a helo on board during piracy patrols, as experience has shown, would reduce patrol effectiveness by 50 percent or more. The ship should also have a SPETSNAZ detachment on board (or whatever they are called). It doesn’t seem like it to me that I have to explain why.
Not a Solution, but a Phantom
But this is the main point. Somali piracy has uncovered a mass of problems and defects in international relations. For example, what should be done with captured pirates? On whose shores should they be deposited and why? What is to be done when aid is rendered to attacked ships – can pirates finally be sunk or not? Can they be fired upon? Yes or no, and if not yet, then when?
Incidentally, I’d like to clear up one point that is unjustifiably treated as nothing important,. but turns out to be very nearly the most important issue. It is the sensational decision by the UN Security Council to allow free passage by foreign naval forces into Somali territorial waters to fight piracy.
This means that each country should receive permission from the temporary government of Somalia. Meanwhile the discussion continues about formalities anyway. But the main issue has been resolved.
Technically, there isn’t anybody to give permission to follow pirates into Somali territorial waters, that’s a phantom. Only the truly crazy go into Somali waters now anyway; and besides, without exception, all the attacks have taken place outside of these waters and in the territorial waters of, for example, Yemen. As soon as pirates board a ship and the immediate option of freeing it by force is excluded, since that would lead to the death of part or all of the crew. Hijacked ships are already being brought into Somali waters and nothing can be done about it.
Also, patrolling can’t be done near Somalia, but only in international waters. Pirates have long used mother ships far offshore as their jumping off point for hijackings instead of from small harbors along the coast. These mother ships must be hunted. Where is the outcry about this sorry solution? The author doesn’t know. Supposedly this solution has some realistic chance of being possible. There is nothing to it and as matters stand, I repeat, it is a phantom.
About the author: Mikhail Dmitrievich Vojtenko - Chief of the Information and Analysis Department, OAO "Sovfrakht", editor of the journal "Sovfrakht Maritime Bulletin".
Attempted Translation:
03 Oct 2008
Reports have circulated in the press in the last week about how the Russian Navy is supporting the international fight against piracy at sea, including off the coast of Somalia. This has been talked about in both official announcements and in Navy Public Affairs. This is in connection with an incorrect interpretation of remarks made by Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy; that supposedly our fleet would take care of the piracy problem by itself.
“The Russian Navy is supporting the international effort against piracy at sea, including off the coast of Somalia. And when Russian citizens find themselves threatened, the Navy reserves the right of unilateral action”, the Navy PAO Igor’ Dygalo noted. He emphasized that in other circumstances (for instance, during international operations against piracy) the issue of Russian naval participation will conform to Russia’s foreign policy line.
Four Forces
Judging by the first reports in the press, first a Navy ship will be sent to the Gulf of Aden; moreover it is planning on operating independently. And the statement by the CinC Vladimir Vysotskiy has been corrected to reflect that Russian participation in the international fight against piracy at sea will conform to Russia’s foreign policy line. But it is entirely unclear what conditions have to present themselves for Russian participation.
Right now the naval forces in the Gulf of Aden can be divided into four types:
1. Coalition forces. Coalition Task Force 150. The main mission of these forces is to combat terrorism, which is not really understandable, or more likely, to force the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz in the event that the Iranians close it. The closure of the Straits of Hormuz would be more terrible for the world economy than the closure of the Suez Canal. Around 40 percent of world oil exports go through the Straits of Hormuz while the Suez Canal is the main route for the gigantic flow of finished goods that are manufactured cheaply by China and India from Asia to Europe and the United States. The coalition forces look at the piracy fight as an annoyance and not worth the trouble, and to re-orient their mission would be very complicated, even if it were possible.
2. Random ships from random countries, dispatched for a limited amount of time to guard ships with humanitarian aid to Somalia. This is in accordance with the UN program for humanitarian assistance and as far as the author knows isn’t related to the fight against piracy.
3. Unilateral national forces. Right now we have the first “swallow” in Malaysian form, which has sent three Navy ships to the region with the exclusive goal of supporting the safe passage of Malaysian ships. The Malaysian company MISC, which has two tankers held in Somalia as well as a container ship with thousands of containers on board which was attacked with cargo worth hundreds of millions of dollars, is one of the biggest ship operators in the world. The company has a large significance for economies throughout the world. The defense of MISC ships is the defense of its national interest by Malaysia.
4. Last week the European Union decided to a) create a Somali Piracy Command Center in Brussels, and b) possibly send some sort of multilateral task force to the Gulf of Aden to fight piracy threatening the EU economy. If container ships, tankers and dry cargo vessels have to avoid the Suez Canal, it will strike a heavy blow against Old World economies and the pocketbooks of European citizens, including Russia. Asian goods will increase in price since everywhere you look, all you see are goods labeled “Made in China” and the value of the Suez Canal will be quickly understood even in the Russian sticks.
Together With Whom and How?
Meanwhile, I am urgently interested in the following question: what will Russian Navy ships be able to achieve in the Gulf of Aden?
1. It is useless (unfortunately) to talk about combining with Coalition Task Force 150 since, I repeat, this formation isn’t fighting piracy.
2. Guarding humanitarian cargos headed for Somalia only has a tangential relationship with fighting piracy.
3. Unilaterally? There aren’t any ships there that demand national defense. Either you guard everyone who needs guarding or you guard no one. The transit of the Gulf of Aden by a fully Russian ship (Russian flagged, Russian owner and a Russian crew) is too much of a rarity to maintain a squadron of ships in the region on a constant basis (even if there is only one military ship, she needs escort). There are always Russian sailors crossing the Gulf of Aden but, as a rule, as part of a multinational crew under different flags on ships owned by different owners. If the goal is to exclusively defend Russian interests, then it becomes necessary to ask each ship that is attacked if there are Russian citizens on board and if there is cargo bound for Russia or not. That is absurd. So even if unilateral action is taken, in order to operate effectively, water space and technical details would have to be worked out, first of all, with coalition forces, second, with Malaysian ships and, third, with EU forces if and when they show up.
4. Working together with EU forces – this is obviously the most logical, preferable and effective scenario.
5. There is a fifth, extremely undesirable variant: ships sent independently and operating independently. Imagine the situation – there is a family in which a couple of members have been kidnapped for ransom. And help comes from the organized crime unit, from the Ministry of the Interior, from the FSB, traffic cops, private security guards and sundry other “powers”. And all of them work independently, for themselves. They rip the phone receiver from each others hands when the kidnappers call, each on suggests their own solution, each one screams that he has a bigger and more deadly gun. The same would happen in the Gulf of Aden if everyone sent independent actors. I repeat that no one country has enough shipping in the region to send forces that would guard only their own flagged ships. But at the same time, the shipping in the area has importance for many countries, for all of Europe. Quite simply, modern maritime commerce is more globalized and international than any other economic activity and either everybody or nobody defends it. If Russian ships are sent there independently, that means piracy isn’t the issue, it’s ambition.
A further question – what kind of forces should be sent? It should be a ship with a helicopter since the lack of a helo on board during piracy patrols, as experience has shown, would reduce patrol effectiveness by 50 percent or more. The ship should also have a SPETSNAZ detachment on board (or whatever they are called). It doesn’t seem like it to me that I have to explain why.
Not a Solution, but a Phantom
But this is the main point. Somali piracy has uncovered a mass of problems and defects in international relations. For example, what should be done with captured pirates? On whose shores should they be deposited and why? What is to be done when aid is rendered to attacked ships – can pirates finally be sunk or not? Can they be fired upon? Yes or no, and if not yet, then when?
Incidentally, I’d like to clear up one point that is unjustifiably treated as nothing important,. but turns out to be very nearly the most important issue. It is the sensational decision by the UN Security Council to allow free passage by foreign naval forces into Somali territorial waters to fight piracy.
This means that each country should receive permission from the temporary government of Somalia. Meanwhile the discussion continues about formalities anyway. But the main issue has been resolved.
Technically, there isn’t anybody to give permission to follow pirates into Somali territorial waters, that’s a phantom. Only the truly crazy go into Somali waters now anyway; and besides, without exception, all the attacks have taken place outside of these waters and in the territorial waters of, for example, Yemen. As soon as pirates board a ship and the immediate option of freeing it by force is excluded, since that would lead to the death of part or all of the crew. Hijacked ships are already being brought into Somali waters and nothing can be done about it.
Also, patrolling can’t be done near Somalia, but only in international waters. Pirates have long used mother ships far offshore as their jumping off point for hijackings instead of from small harbors along the coast. These mother ships must be hunted. Where is the outcry about this sorry solution? The author doesn’t know. Supposedly this solution has some realistic chance of being possible. There is nothing to it and as matters stand, I repeat, it is a phantom.
Area Closures
(111641Z OCT 2008)
HYDROPAC 1987/2008(96,97). SEA OF OKHOTSK. MISSILES.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 0300Z TO 0900Z DAILY 12 THRU 15 OCT
A. IN AREA BOUND BY 47 36N 151 21E, 47 54N 151 06E,
48 06N 151 40E, 47 52N 151 58E.
B. WITHIN 27 MILES OF 52 49N 146 17E.
C. WITHIN 28 MILES OF 57-09N 140-33E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 151000Z OCT.
I wonder what this was for?
(112026Z OCT 2008)
HYDROPAC 1988/2008(96). TATARSKIY PROLIV. GUNNERY.
1. GUNNERY EXERCISES 2300Z TO 0200Z COMMENCING DAILY
16 AND 17 OCT AND 180400Z TO 180700Z OCT
IN AREA BOUND BY
49 06.0N 140 30.5E, 49 20.0N 140 39.5E,
49 20.0N 140 44.0E, 49 06.5N 140 44.0E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 180800Z OCT.
Not sure at this time who is going to use this. Looks like its going to be ships as the orientation is wrong for shore based artillery.
Monday, October 13, 2008
The Somali Folly: Russia Sends a Mothership...Or Is It Bait?
Gist: The Baltic Fleet tanker Yel'na sets sail for the shores of Somalia. There she will rendezvous with the escort ship Neustrashimyy which has been sent there to fight piracy. The tanker carries water, fuel and weapons for the escort ship. The ship is guarded by a detachment of marines armed with sniper rifles and heavy machine guns. They have orders not to allow pirates to get within shot range.
Sunday, October 12, 2008
Peter the Great Update: Port of Call, Tripoli
In a move guaranteed to boost recruitment and retention levels, the Peter the Great makes a port call in Tripoli, Libya. Read and listen carefully and there is a hint that the promised port calls in Tartus and/or Latakia, Syria, are cancelled.
Gist: The ships of the task force converge in Tripoli, Libya, where the large anti-submarine ship Admiral Chabanenko and support vessels pulled into port while the Peter the Great anchored out in the roadstead. The Baltic Fleet ship Neustrashimyy also pulled into port. The port visit will last until 13 October. While there the ships will reprovision and the crew will get shore leave. Having completed all of their tasking in the Mediterranean Sea, the ships prepare for further sailing. They will set course for South America where they will participate in exercises with the Venezuelans in November. The Neustrashimyy will continue on to fight Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean.
Gist: The ships of the task force converge in Tripoli, Libya, where the large anti-submarine ship Admiral Chabanenko and support vessels pulled into port while the Peter the Great anchored out in the roadstead. The Baltic Fleet ship Neustrashimyy also pulled into port. The port visit will last until 13 October. While there the ships will reprovision and the crew will get shore leave. Having completed all of their tasking in the Mediterranean Sea, the ships prepare for further sailing. They will set course for South America where they will participate in exercises with the Venezuelans in November. The Neustrashimyy will continue on to fight Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean.
Stability-2008: Red Star TV Roundup
Lots of cool footage of the month-long, nationwide strategic exercise Stability-2008.
Strategic Aviation:
Twelve combat aircraft, TU-95 and TU-160 missile carriers took off from Saratov Oblast' this morning. Thirty more aircraft joined them in the air. Their mission was to practice joint operations with interceptors and bombers in simulated battle and to conduct aerial refueling. But the main task will take place in a few hours: cruise missile launches over neutral waters.
A-50s deploy to Komi (probably Vorkuta) to support "War in the Far North", a reflection of the interest the Russians show in the Arctic theater:
Gist: Stability-2008 continues in the polar regions. Airmen complete their tasks in especially harsh conditions. Not every army can wage war in the far north. Here's the report.
The airfield easily handles the maneuvers of the Il-76s and An-12s. This airfield is uniquely huge. There aren't any bigger airfields in the polar region. Its big enough to handle any size aircraft including the Buran space shuttle (Note: that's a little OBE, don't you think?). This 200 ton piece of equipment is an A-50, a modified Il-76. This radar system operating in the one centimeter wavelength range is able to detect fighter sized targets and maritime targets at ranges of up to 200-400 km. The mission of the A-50 during the exercise is to conduct radar reconnaissance, relaying information to the central command post on targets in the area. The commander of the aircraft says that operating in the far north is not easy.
Landing among the MiGs is an An-12 which has already completed its mission. It took off this morning and spent six hours in the air. It has the airplane's symbol painted on the fuselage: a black mammoth. It was deployed to Tiksi, much further north than Vorkuta. The commander reports that the training was outstanding.
All crews have completed their training missions. Today is the last day of exercises and tomorrow they all return to their home airfields.
Medved'ev also visited the space launch center at Plesetsk, where he observed the successful launch of an SS-25 Topol' mobile ICBM, hitting the target at the Kura test range on Kamchatka and inspected the new Angara launch system, consisting entirely of Russian made components (vice the Ukrainian made missiles the Russians previously used).
But before watching the Topol' launch, Medved'ev and Minister of Defense Serdyukov embarked aboard the aircraft carrying cruiser Admiral of the Soviet Fleet Kuznetsov to watch maritime portions of Stability-2008, culminating in a SS-N-23 Sineva launch from Delta IV SSBN Tula, descibed as "record setting", traveling 11,547km and hitting a notional target in the Pacific Ocean.
Gist starting at story footage: The President and the Minister of Defense arrived on board the carrier by helicopter and considering the class of the ship, it was full of symbolism. Despite the strong winds, Medved'ev and Anatoliy Serdyukov walked the entire flight deck and then went down to the hanger deck. The President greeted the sailors, inspected the aircraft and even sat in the cockpits of an Su-33 and a Ka-27. President Medved'ev visited the Combat Information Center before heading up to the flag bridge to watch the progress of training.
Stability-2008 is continuing for a month and of course the ship has been to sea several times already during the exercises. But today was the most spectacular with the full might of the Northern Fleet on display. DM even went to the flag bridge a couple of times to watch missile launches and flight ops. The exercise script calls for the repulsion of an attack by a fleet of enemy submarines, but the highlight of the exercise was an SS-N-23 Sineva launch from a submurged position. For the first time in the history of the Russian Navy, an SLBM traveled more than 11,500km and destroyed a notional target in the Pacific Ocean.
(Cut to reporter with a little spiel about the capabilities of the Kuznetsov).
(Cut to DM on the mess decks): After completion of the main task, DM went to the mess decks to meet with the crew. The crew had the opportunity to ask any question they wanted of the Commander in Chief and the old Russian saying, "Sailors have no questions" (TR Note: its a cute rhyme in Russian) didn't apply. The questions were wide ranging and included questions about the future of the armed forces.
The sailors gave DM a hat and a striped sailor's shirt and DM signed the ship's guest book. The President gave Saturday's training an "Outstanding". Training continues for another month.
Strategic Aviation:
Twelve combat aircraft, TU-95 and TU-160 missile carriers took off from Saratov Oblast' this morning. Thirty more aircraft joined them in the air. Their mission was to practice joint operations with interceptors and bombers in simulated battle and to conduct aerial refueling. But the main task will take place in a few hours: cruise missile launches over neutral waters.
A-50s deploy to Komi (probably Vorkuta) to support "War in the Far North", a reflection of the interest the Russians show in the Arctic theater:
Gist: Stability-2008 continues in the polar regions. Airmen complete their tasks in especially harsh conditions. Not every army can wage war in the far north. Here's the report.
The airfield easily handles the maneuvers of the Il-76s and An-12s. This airfield is uniquely huge. There aren't any bigger airfields in the polar region. Its big enough to handle any size aircraft including the Buran space shuttle (Note: that's a little OBE, don't you think?). This 200 ton piece of equipment is an A-50, a modified Il-76. This radar system operating in the one centimeter wavelength range is able to detect fighter sized targets and maritime targets at ranges of up to 200-400 km. The mission of the A-50 during the exercise is to conduct radar reconnaissance, relaying information to the central command post on targets in the area. The commander of the aircraft says that operating in the far north is not easy.
Flight time is limited because of short daylight hours and there is poor visibility at night and the the weather changes quickly and weather forecasts up here are only right about half the time.
Landing among the MiGs is an An-12 which has already completed its mission. It took off this morning and spent six hours in the air. It has the airplane's symbol painted on the fuselage: a black mammoth. It was deployed to Tiksi, much further north than Vorkuta. The commander reports that the training was outstanding.
Our crew performed littoral weather reconnaissance, and the flight was okay. We completed the mission.
All crews have completed their training missions. Today is the last day of exercises and tomorrow they all return to their home airfields.
Medved'ev also visited the space launch center at Plesetsk, where he observed the successful launch of an SS-25 Topol' mobile ICBM, hitting the target at the Kura test range on Kamchatka and inspected the new Angara launch system, consisting entirely of Russian made components (vice the Ukrainian made missiles the Russians previously used).
But before watching the Topol' launch, Medved'ev and Minister of Defense Serdyukov embarked aboard the aircraft carrying cruiser Admiral of the Soviet Fleet Kuznetsov to watch maritime portions of Stability-2008, culminating in a SS-N-23 Sineva launch from Delta IV SSBN Tula, descibed as "record setting", traveling 11,547km and hitting a notional target in the Pacific Ocean.
Gist starting at story footage: The President and the Minister of Defense arrived on board the carrier by helicopter and considering the class of the ship, it was full of symbolism. Despite the strong winds, Medved'ev and Anatoliy Serdyukov walked the entire flight deck and then went down to the hanger deck. The President greeted the sailors, inspected the aircraft and even sat in the cockpits of an Su-33 and a Ka-27. President Medved'ev visited the Combat Information Center before heading up to the flag bridge to watch the progress of training.
1MC: Next evolution - attack on enemy ground targets with ballistic missiles.
Stability-2008 is continuing for a month and of course the ship has been to sea several times already during the exercises. But today was the most spectacular with the full might of the Northern Fleet on display. DM even went to the flag bridge a couple of times to watch missile launches and flight ops. The exercise script calls for the repulsion of an attack by a fleet of enemy submarines, but the highlight of the exercise was an SS-N-23 Sineva launch from a submurged position. For the first time in the history of the Russian Navy, an SLBM traveled more than 11,500km and destroyed a notional target in the Pacific Ocean.
(Cut to reporter with a little spiel about the capabilities of the Kuznetsov).
(Cut to DM on the mess decks): After completion of the main task, DM went to the mess decks to meet with the crew. The crew had the opportunity to ask any question they wanted of the Commander in Chief and the old Russian saying, "Sailors have no questions" (TR Note: its a cute rhyme in Russian) didn't apply. The questions were wide ranging and included questions about the future of the armed forces.
DM: We have to build new aircraft carrying cruisers. It is completely obvious that it is the most important issue for the Navy. Across the world, all the great powers have great armed forces and powerful navies and I think we should do the same.
The sailors gave DM a hat and a striped sailor's shirt and DM signed the ship's guest book. The President gave Saturday's training an "Outstanding". Training continues for another month.
Saturday, October 11, 2008
Stability-2008: Medved'ev Aboard Kuznetsov
President Medved'ev is aboard the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to observe a sub launched ballistic missile launch today.
Stability-2008 is a month long multi-service, nationwide strategic exercise that has been ongoing since 22 September.
Stability-2008 is a month long multi-service, nationwide strategic exercise that has been ongoing since 22 September.
Thursday, October 9, 2008
Peter the Great Update: Approaching Africa
Gist: In two days the Peter the Great will make a port call in Tripoli, Libya. The crew prepares for a friendly visit. The ship's education officer, K1R Arkadiy Mogilivets explains that the crew is visiting a foreign port and that the fact that they have to understand that they must follow all applicable local customs and laws.
Meanwhile the crew continues to conduct training. The helo conducts flight ops every day except when the ship is in the waters of littoral states.
Monday, October 6, 2008
Cold War Stories: Twenty Two Years on Patrol
It's been 22 years since Yankee I SSBN K-219 blew up and sank in the Sargasso Sea. Here is what happened.
It was the beginning of October 1986. The latest acheivements of Soviet labor blared from the television screens. Although deep in the background were reports of a Soviet submarine catastrophe that went nearly unnoticed - there were only three lines about it in the newspapers - that was a first. It was the first time that they admitted openly that our warships ran into problems off the coasts of America. And the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev informed Ronald Reagan this fact during a meeting in Reykyavik caused one to think about the seriousness of the accident and the possible consequences that those of us for whom the words and phrases "combat patrol", "thermonuclear warhead", "megaton", "TNT equivilent" were nothing more than professional jargon.
Ten years have passed since then (now its more than 20 years). Mass media has more than once tried to cast light on the causes of the loss of the K-219, meanwhile it is impossible to describe in the newspaper the kind of damage suffered by the submarine and the heroic efforts of the crew to save her. I turn you attention to an article written by the President of the Saint Petersburg Submariner's Club K1R (Ret.) Igor' Kirillovich Kurdin, who for a long time served as the XO of Project 667AU SSBN K-219.
The Motherland Says You Must
SSBN K-219 got underway on patrol according to plan on 4 September, 1986. The commander of the submarine, K2R Igor' Anatol'yevich Britanov was an experienced submariner, having been allowed to independently captain a Yankee I SSBN since 1981. While it was his third patrol as commander and his 13th patrol overall, he didn't command his own ship - the watch on board K-219 was actually the first crew of K-241including 31 officers, 38 warrant officers and 49 seamen as well as some highly qualified specialists. But this time preparations to get underway were confused like never before.
The Cold War continued and our Navy (like the Strategic Rocket Forces) carried the burden of strategic deterrance between the two superpowers. The combat forces of the Soviet Navy were the first response to American deployment of the Pershing missile in Europe and patrol areas by our SSBNs were moved closer to American shores. This was done to make the flight time of our missiles to American territory the same as the flight time of American cruise missiles pointed at our military and civilian facilities.
There was pressure to increase patrols to two or three a year. The resources to support this op tempo were pushed to the limits and maintenance wasn't able to keep up. Submariners were in an even more precarious situation - two or three patrols a year, unused leave, and crew muddles became the norm. Under pressure, the high command had to shut their eyes when crews went to sea on boats other than their "home" boat.
An analysis of the sailing list of the combat patrol crew on K-219 shows that eleven of 31 officers were changed out between preparations for sailing and patrol, including many key officers - XO, Missile Officer, Torpedo Officer and the Radio Officer. There was a similar situation in the Warrant ranks - out of 38 warrant officers, 16 were replaced including the two senior warrants in the weapons department. But I never raised a finger to point blame at the then 19th Division Chief of Staff for Personnel, then Rear Admiral N.N. Malov, since five SSBNs were ordered on patrol at that time.
Why didn't the captain himself refuse to take an unprepared, strange boat to sea with a half-unknown crew? Because they just would have replaced Britanov with someone else. But lets turn to the events of 3 October 1986.
(The families of the crew of K-219 at the pier, Gadzievo, August 1986. Source: submarine.id.ru)
Explosion in the Missile Tube
Thirty days in the the deployment, K-219 maneuvered into her assigned water in the Sargasso Sea. The boat came to periscope depth at 0456 on 3 October for the regular broadcast and after five minutes began to dive to 85 meters. Conditions at that moment were the following: the main power plant was operating in single eschelon mode, the starboard reactor was operating at 30 percent while the port reactor was scrammed with all the dampers and the steam generator and turbine were in a ready state; the starboard turbine was turning the screw while the port shaft was hooked up to the emergency electrogenerator.
At 0514, the Missile Officer and the machinist in the fourth (missile) compartment found a leak from the seal around the number six launcher. Under pressure, the water became a stream. After reporting water in launcher six (the third launcher on the port side), the captain ordered a change of depth to 46 meters for safety at 0525. Pumps were turned on to de-water launcher six. At 0532 a reddish-brown fog of oxidizer began to leak from the seal on launcher six in compartment four. The Missile Officer declared an emergency in the compartment and reported the situation to the conn.
Non-essential crew evacuated the fourth compartment. Nine men remained in the affected compartment. The captain sounded general quarters. Within a minute the crew was performing damage control tasks, including sealing the compartments. The boat came to a safe depth. After five minutes, there was an explosion in launcher six at 0538.
Black smoke appeared in compartment four and then water contaminated with missile fuel began to pour into the compartment from destroyed piping in the upper part of the launcher. The captain immediately gave the order to emergency surface. There were other consequences of the explosion: the atmosphere in the fourth compartment was highly toxic and there was about 4.5 tons of water in the bilge; control was temporarily lost over the environmental conditions of the missiles in the rest of the launchers; other systems were damaged: the 1MC, the missile control communications circuit in the fourth and fifth compartments; the R-651 radio transceiver was partially knocked out, lights and lamps in the compartments were broken and the high pressure air piping was damaged. Indicators on the reactor control panel indicated that the 220 volt DC bus on the port side was knocked out, that the automatic valves feeding water to the steam generators on the port side were open and that the seperate valves on the third loop were open. The control panel of the "Kama" electrical system indicated that insulation resistance in both busses had reached zero. Control ordered atmospheric overpressure in the third and fifth compartments as a precaution.
At 0610, the crew in the fifth and sixth compartments (the auxiliary machinery compartment) were transfered to the eighth compartment (turbine). Seven minutes later came word that the fourth compartment would have to be abandoned because of high temperature and toxic gas. The captain ordered the fifth compartment to be prepared to receive the crew of the fourth. At 0635 the crew of the fourth compartment was withdrawn, leaving behind three people, including the Missile Officer. The port emergency generator was brought on line at the order of the Engineer.
A two man emergency party was sent into the fourth compartment at 0645 to evaluate the situation and render assistance to the crew remaining there. But the team could neither find the Missile Officer nor examine the condition of the sixth missile launcher because of heavy smoke. They did drag the bodies of Seaman I.K.Kharchenko and Seaman N.L.Smaglyuk. The team couldn't turn off any electricity consuming equipment in the fourth compartment nor could they find the source of the fire.
The fourth, fifth and sixth compartments were vented to the atmosphere beginning at 0725. At dawn the XO observed the casualty in launcher six from the top of the sail. The launcher hatch was gone, the front section of the missile was not visible, the hinge of the cover was turned to the side, the outer hull around the launcher was damaged, the hydrodynamic covers of launchers one, three, four, five and seven were torn and hung overboard and the deck in the vicinity of the launcher was deformed. Reddish-brown smoke wisped weakly from launcher six.
At 0831 two more men were again sent into compartment four. Atmospheric contamination in the compartment lessened and visibility improved. The flow of water from the upper part of launcher number six stopped. The investigators found the body of the Missile Officer K3R A.V.Petrachkov without signs of life.
By that time they got the overboard drainage pumps for launcher six working and were able to de-water the bilge in the fourth compartment using the main pumps. After turning on the pump to drain the launcher, water and thick smoke began to pour into the compartment from damaged piping in the upper part of the launchers. The pumps were ordered shut off. They removed the body of the Missile Officer, the gas analysis equipment and emergency protection suits.
At 0925 the port reactor was brought on line. Both steam generators were switched on and the level of power was the following - starboard side 30 percent, port side 50 percent.
The captain decided to give the order to emergency drain the oxidizer and de-water the launcher. He instructed four crew members from engineering and weapons departments to go into the fourth compartment with this in mind. All attempts to begin to de-water the launcher led to additional bursts of oxidizer and water steam into the compartment. The next group started the emergency oxidizer drain pumps. Water under pressure flooded the electrical equipment, including the fourth compartment electrical distribution panel. A short circuit occured and a fire broke out in the fourth compartment. The fire burned out the electrical equipment in the compartment and the pumps stopped. Under orders from control, the emergency party evacuated the fourth compartment.
Under orders from control, at 1754 freon flooded the fourth compartment from the chemical extinguishing system in the third compartment and because of damage to the freon supply piping, the freon gas began to leak into the third compartment and so the supply of freon to the fourth compartment was turned off. Around 1800, the atmosphere in the third compartment began to worsen and the levels of nitric oxide in the air reached 10-40 times acceptable levels. The crew in the third compartment was ordered to don protective gear. Some of the crew retreated to the second compartment. The crew was forced to abandon the communications and encryption stations and as a result, radio communications were lost (no situation reports were sent and instructions and advice from Northern Fleet HQ weren't received).
At 1840, investigators opened the hatches between the fourth and fifth compartments. Encountering smoke which they mistook for fire, they reported the situation to control. Control ordered the fifth compartment flooded with freon from the extinguishing station in compartment six.
At 1930, as a result of the loss of the 380 volt, 50 hertz bus on the starboard side, the starboard reactor scrammed and the reactor moderator lattice failed to go into the lowered position.
Twenty minutes later the reactor compartment reported smoke in the lower level of the sixth compartment to control. The compartment was evacuated, the ventilation between the fifth and sixth compartments were closed and people were transfered to the seventh (reactor control) compartment. Soon it was discovered that the hydralic pressure had fallen to zero. In the interests of maintaining safety in the starboard reactor, specialists from the Machinery Division were sent into the reactor compartment to lower the moderator lattice by hand - Senior Lieutenant N.N.Belikov and Seaman S.A.Preminin. After the Sr.Lt. lost consciousness, Preminin lowered the
moderator lattice by himself. At the same time, control ordered the ventilation of compartments eight, nine (turbine) and ten (aft) to the atmosphere and air pressure in those compartments dropped to atmospheric levels, while pressure in compartment seven remained elevated as compared to compartment eight. Because of this, the crew in the eighth compartment couldn't open the hatch to the seventh compartment. Attempts to even the air pressure between the two compartments using equipment in compartment eight, lower level produced thick smoke from the piping. Seaman Preminin was ordered by control to open the exhaust valve to the ventilation, but he couldn't do it. The damage control team in the neighboring compartment couldn't do it either. Seaman Preminin ceased responding to further questions.
Ships from the Soviet Merchant Fleet began to approach the area at 2130, including the Fedor Bredikhin, the Krasnogvardeysk and the Bakaritsa. By 2300 (according to reports from the crew), the atmosphere on board became more toxic, the protective gear had exhausted its resources and the temperature of the bulkhead between compartments three and four was rising. Based on the reports, the captain concluded that there was a fire in compartments four, five and six, that pressure was building in compartment seven and that the possibility of fire in compartments eight, nine and ten couldn't be excluded. Given that the resources for the emergency protective equipment had already been expended and that there was the possibility of one of the missiles exploding in compartmets four or five because of fire, the captain of the submarine decided to shut down the port reactor and to prepare to evacuate the crew to the merchant ships.
The port reactor emergency switch was thrown and the reactor put into cooldown mode. The crew evacuation began, which was finished by one in the morning on the night of the fourth. After the evacuation of the crew, the hatches in the sail and the stern were shut and dogged. Six officers including the captain remained on the bridge.
At 0146, one of the merchant ships sent a message to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet from the captain of K-219: "Fire in all compartments, dead in the water. Six remaining on the boat. Heavy fire in the lower levels of the fourth and fifth compartments. The captain awaits orders to abandon ship." At 0300 came word from the Northern Fleet Command for all officers, except the captain, to abandon ship.
At 2245 a damage control party led by the XO boarded the submarine and investigated compartments one, two and three. These compartments were dry, pressure was normal and the emergency lights were lighted. Besides that the batteries were only partially discharged, the high pressure air was at only 50 percent and there were no hydralics. The pressure hull of the submarine abover the fourth and seventh compartments were burned - its possible that this is from residual heat from the reactor. The pressure hull in the area around other compartments were at air temperature. The bulkhead between compartments three and four up to the upper edge of the intercompartment hatch was cold but above that it was warm.
When the damage control party returned to the forward part of the boat, they leveled out the trim by blowing the forward ballast tank and began to make preparations to tow the submarine. They couldn't investigate the aft end of the submarine since the aft hatch was flooded. With darkness, work on preparations to tow the boat were suspended and the damage control party left the boat.
(Source: atrinaflot.narod.ru)
Loss of the Boat
At dawn on the 5th, the damage control party continued preparations for towing. At 1815 the Krasnogvardeysk began to tow the boat. The submarine continued to settle a bit and the trim began to get out of adjustment. At 0620 on the 6th of October, the towing line snapped and the forward and aft entry hatches went under water. Because of the list, the damage control team couldn't enter the lower hatch on the sail to enter compartment three. The submarine continued to lose seaworthiness and when the boat sank so that the water came up to the deck, the damage control party abandoned ship. At 1100, when the boat sank up to the sail planes, the captain abandoned ship by the order of the Commander of the Navy. On the 6th of October, 1986, at 1102, K-219 sank.
Investigation
A criminal inquery was launched into the circumstances surrounding the loss of the K-219, an investigation that lasted almost a year. As always, the guilty party turned out to be those people who tried to save men and the ship. The captain, the Politcal Officer and the Engineer were forced out of the service for conduct unbecoming and the crew was dispersed. Out of the entire crew, only Seaman S.A.Preminin received any sort of decoration, the Red Star awarded posthumously. (Later, Preminin was named Hero of the Russian Federation in 1997).
It is necessary to note the heroism of the crew, which maintained normal radiation safety during the accident. The maintenance of the reactor cores and systems up to the moment of the sinking prevented the possibility of a nuclear explosion. The control party and the crew correctly organized damage control efforts. The boat was able to surface. All the compartments were successfully hermetically sealed and the correct air pressure was maintained in compartments three and five. The port reactor was brought up correctly and compartments were investigated and corrective actions taken properly when problems were discovered in the missile launcher. Some of them were remedied. The investigations done allowed evaluation of the situation in the fourth compartment and the ventilation of the fourth, fifth and sixth compartments. As a result of all the measures taken, the situation was temporarily stabilized. Both reactors worked at their ordered power levels, the cooling units worked and the boat had electrical power and a speed of 13 knots when she met the merchant ships. Despite all this the boat's command team did not take all the precautions that they should have to prevent the loss of the boat.
The following was established by the investigative commission:
1. The cause of the accident was a water leak in the number six missile launcher. This led to destruction of the missile airframe and the leak of missile fuel into the launcher. The reason for the leak of water into the launcher in the first place could not be established.
2. The reason why nitric oxide spread from the fourth compartment and contaminated the stern compartments was because investigative teams opened the hatch to the fourth compartment too many times to offer help, to begin venting the air in the compartment, to de-water the launcher and emergency drain the oxidizer. The start up of the pumps and the de-watering of the launcher led to additional discharge of nitric oxide from the launcher into the compartment. It was this that led to the short circuits in distribution panels seven and eight and the fire in the compartment.
3. The reason for the loss of K-219 was uncontrolled flooding of overboard water into the fourth compartment which led to the loss watertight integrity and seaworthiness of the boat. The flooding of the fourth compartment came through the open hatch of launcher six. This led to the flooding of compartments five and six through open ventilation valves between compartments four and five and five and six.
It was the beginning of October 1986. The latest acheivements of Soviet labor blared from the television screens. Although deep in the background were reports of a Soviet submarine catastrophe that went nearly unnoticed - there were only three lines about it in the newspapers - that was a first. It was the first time that they admitted openly that our warships ran into problems off the coasts of America. And the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev informed Ronald Reagan this fact during a meeting in Reykyavik caused one to think about the seriousness of the accident and the possible consequences that those of us for whom the words and phrases "combat patrol", "thermonuclear warhead", "megaton", "TNT equivilent" were nothing more than professional jargon.
Ten years have passed since then (now its more than 20 years). Mass media has more than once tried to cast light on the causes of the loss of the K-219, meanwhile it is impossible to describe in the newspaper the kind of damage suffered by the submarine and the heroic efforts of the crew to save her. I turn you attention to an article written by the President of the Saint Petersburg Submariner's Club K1R (Ret.) Igor' Kirillovich Kurdin, who for a long time served as the XO of Project 667AU SSBN K-219.
The Motherland Says You Must
SSBN K-219 got underway on patrol according to plan on 4 September, 1986. The commander of the submarine, K2R Igor' Anatol'yevich Britanov was an experienced submariner, having been allowed to independently captain a Yankee I SSBN since 1981. While it was his third patrol as commander and his 13th patrol overall, he didn't command his own ship - the watch on board K-219 was actually the first crew of K-241including 31 officers, 38 warrant officers and 49 seamen as well as some highly qualified specialists. But this time preparations to get underway were confused like never before.
The Cold War continued and our Navy (like the Strategic Rocket Forces) carried the burden of strategic deterrance between the two superpowers. The combat forces of the Soviet Navy were the first response to American deployment of the Pershing missile in Europe and patrol areas by our SSBNs were moved closer to American shores. This was done to make the flight time of our missiles to American territory the same as the flight time of American cruise missiles pointed at our military and civilian facilities.
There was pressure to increase patrols to two or three a year. The resources to support this op tempo were pushed to the limits and maintenance wasn't able to keep up. Submariners were in an even more precarious situation - two or three patrols a year, unused leave, and crew muddles became the norm. Under pressure, the high command had to shut their eyes when crews went to sea on boats other than their "home" boat.
An analysis of the sailing list of the combat patrol crew on K-219 shows that eleven of 31 officers were changed out between preparations for sailing and patrol, including many key officers - XO, Missile Officer, Torpedo Officer and the Radio Officer. There was a similar situation in the Warrant ranks - out of 38 warrant officers, 16 were replaced including the two senior warrants in the weapons department. But I never raised a finger to point blame at the then 19th Division Chief of Staff for Personnel, then Rear Admiral N.N. Malov, since five SSBNs were ordered on patrol at that time.
Why didn't the captain himself refuse to take an unprepared, strange boat to sea with a half-unknown crew? Because they just would have replaced Britanov with someone else. But lets turn to the events of 3 October 1986.
(The families of the crew of K-219 at the pier, Gadzievo, August 1986. Source: submarine.id.ru)
Explosion in the Missile Tube
Thirty days in the the deployment, K-219 maneuvered into her assigned water in the Sargasso Sea. The boat came to periscope depth at 0456 on 3 October for the regular broadcast and after five minutes began to dive to 85 meters. Conditions at that moment were the following: the main power plant was operating in single eschelon mode, the starboard reactor was operating at 30 percent while the port reactor was scrammed with all the dampers and the steam generator and turbine were in a ready state; the starboard turbine was turning the screw while the port shaft was hooked up to the emergency electrogenerator.
At 0514, the Missile Officer and the machinist in the fourth (missile) compartment found a leak from the seal around the number six launcher. Under pressure, the water became a stream. After reporting water in launcher six (the third launcher on the port side), the captain ordered a change of depth to 46 meters for safety at 0525. Pumps were turned on to de-water launcher six. At 0532 a reddish-brown fog of oxidizer began to leak from the seal on launcher six in compartment four. The Missile Officer declared an emergency in the compartment and reported the situation to the conn.
Non-essential crew evacuated the fourth compartment. Nine men remained in the affected compartment. The captain sounded general quarters. Within a minute the crew was performing damage control tasks, including sealing the compartments. The boat came to a safe depth. After five minutes, there was an explosion in launcher six at 0538.
Black smoke appeared in compartment four and then water contaminated with missile fuel began to pour into the compartment from destroyed piping in the upper part of the launcher. The captain immediately gave the order to emergency surface. There were other consequences of the explosion: the atmosphere in the fourth compartment was highly toxic and there was about 4.5 tons of water in the bilge; control was temporarily lost over the environmental conditions of the missiles in the rest of the launchers; other systems were damaged: the 1MC, the missile control communications circuit in the fourth and fifth compartments; the R-651 radio transceiver was partially knocked out, lights and lamps in the compartments were broken and the high pressure air piping was damaged. Indicators on the reactor control panel indicated that the 220 volt DC bus on the port side was knocked out, that the automatic valves feeding water to the steam generators on the port side were open and that the seperate valves on the third loop were open. The control panel of the "Kama" electrical system indicated that insulation resistance in both busses had reached zero. Control ordered atmospheric overpressure in the third and fifth compartments as a precaution.
At 0610, the crew in the fifth and sixth compartments (the auxiliary machinery compartment) were transfered to the eighth compartment (turbine). Seven minutes later came word that the fourth compartment would have to be abandoned because of high temperature and toxic gas. The captain ordered the fifth compartment to be prepared to receive the crew of the fourth. At 0635 the crew of the fourth compartment was withdrawn, leaving behind three people, including the Missile Officer. The port emergency generator was brought on line at the order of the Engineer.
A two man emergency party was sent into the fourth compartment at 0645 to evaluate the situation and render assistance to the crew remaining there. But the team could neither find the Missile Officer nor examine the condition of the sixth missile launcher because of heavy smoke. They did drag the bodies of Seaman I.K.Kharchenko and Seaman N.L.Smaglyuk. The team couldn't turn off any electricity consuming equipment in the fourth compartment nor could they find the source of the fire.
The fourth, fifth and sixth compartments were vented to the atmosphere beginning at 0725. At dawn the XO observed the casualty in launcher six from the top of the sail. The launcher hatch was gone, the front section of the missile was not visible, the hinge of the cover was turned to the side, the outer hull around the launcher was damaged, the hydrodynamic covers of launchers one, three, four, five and seven were torn and hung overboard and the deck in the vicinity of the launcher was deformed. Reddish-brown smoke wisped weakly from launcher six.
At 0831 two more men were again sent into compartment four. Atmospheric contamination in the compartment lessened and visibility improved. The flow of water from the upper part of launcher number six stopped. The investigators found the body of the Missile Officer K3R A.V.Petrachkov without signs of life.
By that time they got the overboard drainage pumps for launcher six working and were able to de-water the bilge in the fourth compartment using the main pumps. After turning on the pump to drain the launcher, water and thick smoke began to pour into the compartment from damaged piping in the upper part of the launchers. The pumps were ordered shut off. They removed the body of the Missile Officer, the gas analysis equipment and emergency protection suits.
At 0925 the port reactor was brought on line. Both steam generators were switched on and the level of power was the following - starboard side 30 percent, port side 50 percent.
The captain decided to give the order to emergency drain the oxidizer and de-water the launcher. He instructed four crew members from engineering and weapons departments to go into the fourth compartment with this in mind. All attempts to begin to de-water the launcher led to additional bursts of oxidizer and water steam into the compartment. The next group started the emergency oxidizer drain pumps. Water under pressure flooded the electrical equipment, including the fourth compartment electrical distribution panel. A short circuit occured and a fire broke out in the fourth compartment. The fire burned out the electrical equipment in the compartment and the pumps stopped. Under orders from control, the emergency party evacuated the fourth compartment.
Under orders from control, at 1754 freon flooded the fourth compartment from the chemical extinguishing system in the third compartment and because of damage to the freon supply piping, the freon gas began to leak into the third compartment and so the supply of freon to the fourth compartment was turned off. Around 1800, the atmosphere in the third compartment began to worsen and the levels of nitric oxide in the air reached 10-40 times acceptable levels. The crew in the third compartment was ordered to don protective gear. Some of the crew retreated to the second compartment. The crew was forced to abandon the communications and encryption stations and as a result, radio communications were lost (no situation reports were sent and instructions and advice from Northern Fleet HQ weren't received).
At 1840, investigators opened the hatches between the fourth and fifth compartments. Encountering smoke which they mistook for fire, they reported the situation to control. Control ordered the fifth compartment flooded with freon from the extinguishing station in compartment six.
At 1930, as a result of the loss of the 380 volt, 50 hertz bus on the starboard side, the starboard reactor scrammed and the reactor moderator lattice failed to go into the lowered position.
Twenty minutes later the reactor compartment reported smoke in the lower level of the sixth compartment to control. The compartment was evacuated, the ventilation between the fifth and sixth compartments were closed and people were transfered to the seventh (reactor control) compartment. Soon it was discovered that the hydralic pressure had fallen to zero. In the interests of maintaining safety in the starboard reactor, specialists from the Machinery Division were sent into the reactor compartment to lower the moderator lattice by hand - Senior Lieutenant N.N.Belikov and Seaman S.A.Preminin. After the Sr.Lt. lost consciousness, Preminin lowered the
moderator lattice by himself. At the same time, control ordered the ventilation of compartments eight, nine (turbine) and ten (aft) to the atmosphere and air pressure in those compartments dropped to atmospheric levels, while pressure in compartment seven remained elevated as compared to compartment eight. Because of this, the crew in the eighth compartment couldn't open the hatch to the seventh compartment. Attempts to even the air pressure between the two compartments using equipment in compartment eight, lower level produced thick smoke from the piping. Seaman Preminin was ordered by control to open the exhaust valve to the ventilation, but he couldn't do it. The damage control team in the neighboring compartment couldn't do it either. Seaman Preminin ceased responding to further questions. Ships from the Soviet Merchant Fleet began to approach the area at 2130, including the Fedor Bredikhin, the Krasnogvardeysk and the Bakaritsa. By 2300 (according to reports from the crew), the atmosphere on board became more toxic, the protective gear had exhausted its resources and the temperature of the bulkhead between compartments three and four was rising. Based on the reports, the captain concluded that there was a fire in compartments four, five and six, that pressure was building in compartment seven and that the possibility of fire in compartments eight, nine and ten couldn't be excluded. Given that the resources for the emergency protective equipment had already been expended and that there was the possibility of one of the missiles exploding in compartmets four or five because of fire, the captain of the submarine decided to shut down the port reactor and to prepare to evacuate the crew to the merchant ships.
The port reactor emergency switch was thrown and the reactor put into cooldown mode. The crew evacuation began, which was finished by one in the morning on the night of the fourth. After the evacuation of the crew, the hatches in the sail and the stern were shut and dogged. Six officers including the captain remained on the bridge.
At 0146, one of the merchant ships sent a message to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet from the captain of K-219: "Fire in all compartments, dead in the water. Six remaining on the boat. Heavy fire in the lower levels of the fourth and fifth compartments. The captain awaits orders to abandon ship." At 0300 came word from the Northern Fleet Command for all officers, except the captain, to abandon ship.
At 2245 a damage control party led by the XO boarded the submarine and investigated compartments one, two and three. These compartments were dry, pressure was normal and the emergency lights were lighted. Besides that the batteries were only partially discharged, the high pressure air was at only 50 percent and there were no hydralics. The pressure hull of the submarine abover the fourth and seventh compartments were burned - its possible that this is from residual heat from the reactor. The pressure hull in the area around other compartments were at air temperature. The bulkhead between compartments three and four up to the upper edge of the intercompartment hatch was cold but above that it was warm.
When the damage control party returned to the forward part of the boat, they leveled out the trim by blowing the forward ballast tank and began to make preparations to tow the submarine. They couldn't investigate the aft end of the submarine since the aft hatch was flooded. With darkness, work on preparations to tow the boat were suspended and the damage control party left the boat.
(Source: atrinaflot.narod.ru)
Loss of the Boat
At dawn on the 5th, the damage control party continued preparations for towing. At 1815 the Krasnogvardeysk began to tow the boat. The submarine continued to settle a bit and the trim began to get out of adjustment. At 0620 on the 6th of October, the towing line snapped and the forward and aft entry hatches went under water. Because of the list, the damage control team couldn't enter the lower hatch on the sail to enter compartment three. The submarine continued to lose seaworthiness and when the boat sank so that the water came up to the deck, the damage control party abandoned ship. At 1100, when the boat sank up to the sail planes, the captain abandoned ship by the order of the Commander of the Navy. On the 6th of October, 1986, at 1102, K-219 sank.
Investigation
A criminal inquery was launched into the circumstances surrounding the loss of the K-219, an investigation that lasted almost a year. As always, the guilty party turned out to be those people who tried to save men and the ship. The captain, the Politcal Officer and the Engineer were forced out of the service for conduct unbecoming and the crew was dispersed. Out of the entire crew, only Seaman S.A.Preminin received any sort of decoration, the Red Star awarded posthumously. (Later, Preminin was named Hero of the Russian Federation in 1997).
It is necessary to note the heroism of the crew, which maintained normal radiation safety during the accident. The maintenance of the reactor cores and systems up to the moment of the sinking prevented the possibility of a nuclear explosion. The control party and the crew correctly organized damage control efforts. The boat was able to surface. All the compartments were successfully hermetically sealed and the correct air pressure was maintained in compartments three and five. The port reactor was brought up correctly and compartments were investigated and corrective actions taken properly when problems were discovered in the missile launcher. Some of them were remedied. The investigations done allowed evaluation of the situation in the fourth compartment and the ventilation of the fourth, fifth and sixth compartments. As a result of all the measures taken, the situation was temporarily stabilized. Both reactors worked at their ordered power levels, the cooling units worked and the boat had electrical power and a speed of 13 knots when she met the merchant ships. Despite all this the boat's command team did not take all the precautions that they should have to prevent the loss of the boat.
The following was established by the investigative commission:
1. The cause of the accident was a water leak in the number six missile launcher. This led to destruction of the missile airframe and the leak of missile fuel into the launcher. The reason for the leak of water into the launcher in the first place could not be established.
2. The reason why nitric oxide spread from the fourth compartment and contaminated the stern compartments was because investigative teams opened the hatch to the fourth compartment too many times to offer help, to begin venting the air in the compartment, to de-water the launcher and emergency drain the oxidizer. The start up of the pumps and the de-watering of the launcher led to additional discharge of nitric oxide from the launcher into the compartment. It was this that led to the short circuits in distribution panels seven and eight and the fire in the compartment.
3. The reason for the loss of K-219 was uncontrolled flooding of overboard water into the fourth compartment which led to the loss watertight integrity and seaworthiness of the boat. The flooding of the fourth compartment came through the open hatch of launcher six. This led to the flooding of compartments five and six through open ventilation valves between compartments four and five and five and six.
Peter the Great Update: Avast Ye Scurvy Dogs and Prepare to Be Boarded!
Gist: Board a captured ship and free the hostages alive. This is what Marine Spetznaz practiced today aboard ships in the Mediterranean Sea. Spetznaz repelled out a KA-27 and boarded the hijacked ship, which was played by the Peter the Great. The Northern Fleet ships have joined with ships from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets on their way to exercises with Venezuela. They also practiced a medevac from one of the tankers and Marines practiced hand to hand combat. They will conduct a demonstration in one of the foreign ports.
Sunday, October 5, 2008
What the heck?
What the heck is this, beyond "a Russian submarine?"
The picture was allegedly taken in July of this year in the south of Crimea. It's flying the Russian Naval Ensign, and since it obviously isn't the Kilo class Alrosa, it might be Tango class B-380, although this picture looks a little different.
The picture was allegedly taken in July of this year in the south of Crimea. It's flying the Russian Naval Ensign, and since it obviously isn't the Kilo class Alrosa, it might be Tango class B-380, although this picture looks a little different.
Peter the Great Update: PtG Enters the Med
Nothing in here worth gisting, just nice video of the Straits of Gibraltar while the Peter the Great steams toward Tripoli, Libya.
Saturday, October 4, 2008
Peter the Great Update: The Pillars of Hercules
The Peter the Great prepares for an "historic first", the entry into the Med by the Russian Navy flagship:
Gist: After traveling 6000km across the rough Atlantic, the Peter the Great prepares to enter the Med for a port call in Tripoli, Libya.
Cut to a meeting of the Navigation planning meeting where Nav Department is discussing the details of the entry into the Med through the Stratits of Gibraltar. The flag navigator explains to the rest of the navigation department how the straits are 65km long and that there are certain international rules they must follow while transiting the straits. They are not allowed to anchor out, carry out repairs or reduce speed and the task force must proceed at regular intervals in a line ahead formation. The straits are busy and 120 vessels a day proceed through the area. Unedifying interview with the navigator and commentary follows.
Cut to a shot of the crew watching a broadcast of TV Zvezda on the TV for some random reason.
Gist: After traveling 6000km across the rough Atlantic, the Peter the Great prepares to enter the Med for a port call in Tripoli, Libya.
Cut to a meeting of the Navigation planning meeting where Nav Department is discussing the details of the entry into the Med through the Stratits of Gibraltar. The flag navigator explains to the rest of the navigation department how the straits are 65km long and that there are certain international rules they must follow while transiting the straits. They are not allowed to anchor out, carry out repairs or reduce speed and the task force must proceed at regular intervals in a line ahead formation. The straits are busy and 120 vessels a day proceed through the area. Unedifying interview with the navigator and commentary follows.
Cut to a shot of the crew watching a broadcast of TV Zvezda on the TV for some random reason.
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Peter the Great Update: oooo rah. PtG to Enter Med by End of the Week
Marines on the Peter the Great practice for the big exercise with the Venezuelans. Port call in Libya announced.
Gist: After covering 4500km with at least 14,000km to go and passing through many time zones the battle group still lives on Moscow time. The Marines on board began an exercise at 0800 defending the ship as it passes through narrow straits like the Straits of Gibraltar which the Peter the Great will pass through at the end of the week when she receives new orders from the CinC Navy. Our Marines will be exercising not only in Venezuela, but also during a port call in Tripoli, Libya.
The exercises start by checking the cleanliness of weapons and assembling and disassembling weapons which they can do with their eyes closed. Everyone has their assignment on deck. They are armed with mortars (!), machine guns and grenade launchers.
(Practice firing with the target at 500m)
With 45 corridors totalling 20km, the Marines have to be in good shape.
Segment about a member of Nav Department celebrating his 30th birthday at sea.
Segment about the use of AFFF in fire fighting.
Gist: After covering 4500km with at least 14,000km to go and passing through many time zones the battle group still lives on Moscow time. The Marines on board began an exercise at 0800 defending the ship as it passes through narrow straits like the Straits of Gibraltar which the Peter the Great will pass through at the end of the week when she receives new orders from the CinC Navy. Our Marines will be exercising not only in Venezuela, but also during a port call in Tripoli, Libya.
The exercises start by checking the cleanliness of weapons and assembling and disassembling weapons which they can do with their eyes closed. Everyone has their assignment on deck. They are armed with mortars (!), machine guns and grenade launchers.
(Practice firing with the target at 500m)
With 45 corridors totalling 20km, the Marines have to be in good shape.
Segment about a member of Nav Department celebrating his 30th birthday at sea.
Segment about the use of AFFF in fire fighting.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Head Up Display Video
After having been burned last time, what can I definitely say about this video?
The pilot reports "working".
The pilot reports being "hot" (na boyevom) before rockets are apparently launched.
I think the bitching betty announces "limit of angle of attack" after pulling up.
I've never seen Russian HUD video before.
The title of this video is "Employment of the Su-25 in South Ossetia".
I'll never learn, will I?
SKR Ladnyy Goes to Italy
SKR Ladnyy (Source: flot.sevastopol.info)
The Black Sea Fleet Escort Ship (SKR) Ladnyy to Exercise With Italians in IONIEKS-2008
Last Sunday the SKR Ladnyy departed the main naval base in Sevastopol' and set course for the Black Sea straits. The ship under the command of K2R Aleksandr Shvarts has set sail for the area around the straits for the second time in a month. In August the Russian warship made a port visit to the Turkish Navy base at Akzas-Karaagach on the Mediterranean and afterwards carried out missions in the Black Sea.
In October the SKR Ladnyy will represent the Navy during the bilateral Russian-Italian exercise IONIEX-2008. These exercises have become tradition and are conducted by the two navies every other year.
The Russian ship will make visits to several Italian ports.
There is a Marine detachment on board the SKR. They will guard the ship during port visits.
Comment: It's already been announced that the Peter the Great battlegroup will visit Tartus, Syria. There are more than five weeks until the exercises with Venezuela, which means it is looking more and more likely to me that the Peter the Great will spend October in the Med. We'll see.
Will the Ladnyy join the Peter the Great in South America after the exercises with the Italians? Will the Russian Navy show ship, the Admiral Chabenenko join the Ladnyy for exercises with the Italians? Will the Ladnyy join or relieve the Neustashimyy off the Horn of Africa after the exercises with the Italians?
Lots of questions as more Russian ships go to sea...
OAO Sevmash Begins Nakhimov Fuel Offload
TRKR Kirov at the pier in Severodvinsk, home of Sevmash, 2005 (Source: TRKR Kirov website)
From the 29 September OAO Sevmash press release:
Nuclear Fuel Unloaded.
The unloading of spent nuclear fuel from the TAKR Admiral Nakhimov has begun. The defueling is proceding normally. Specialists from PO Sevmash and the crew of the cruiser are joined by representitives from Experimental Machine Construction Bureau Afrikantov and the crew of the specialized ship from the Belomorsk Naval Base.
The heavy nuclear missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov arrived at Sevmash in 1999. However, the repairs that were planned for the ship were delayed due to lack of financing. All that time the crew and the shipyard kept the ship in good condition. In 2008 the work schedual was corrected and a chance to hurry up and do some work appeared.
Comment: Back in May, the project manager noted that they planned to "unload the active zone of the reactor" this year. I am not suprised that they defueled the Nakhimov.
I will be suprised if they actually refuel it though.
Russian Navy SSBN Transits North Pole
Delta III SSBN Ryazan' (Source: Wikipedia.ru)
Russian Submarine Transits Under Arctic Ice Without Surfacing
Navy Public Affairs Officer K1R Igor' Dygalo informed RIA Novosti on Tuesday that the Northern Fleet SSBN Ryazan' completed an interfleet transfer under the Arctic ice without surfacing .
"At around 0400 Moscow time today after more than thirty days underway the SSBN Ryazan' moored at the pier at the Pacific Fleet submarine base at Vilyuchinsk (Kamchatka)", Dygalo announced.
"The crew of the submarine completed all missions during the deployment with honor and are doing okay", the PAO said.
The transit of the submarine was done under the command of K1R Igor' Stepanenko and the senior officer present afloat was the commander of Northern Fleet submarines K1R Aleksandr Moiseyev.
The Ryazan' was met at the base by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral Konstantin Sidenko and the Commander of Forces in North-East Russia Rear Admiral Aleksandr Vitko.
"Russian submariners didn't waste any opportunities during their long deployment and confirmed the quality of their skills by carrying out complicated tasks in Arctic latitudes", the Commander of the Russian Navy Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy said, evaluating the results of the Arctic expedition.
"The role of the Navy in supporting economic activity on the world seas as well as in the Arctic is clearly rooted in the maritime doctrine of the state. The Navy is called upon to support the economic and research activities of the Russian Federation in the world oceans including in the Arctic."
Video here.
The Zvezda TV report emphasizes that the boat went 30 days without surfacing and illustrates the route. The Ryazan' is noted as carrying the upgraded SS-N-23 Sineva. The Ryazan' has been permanently assigned to Vilyuchinsk and is expected to perform combat patrols on a regular basis, a change from the usual Russian practice of welding them to the pier.
Monday, September 29, 2008
Peter the Great Deployment Update
26 Sep:
Gist: NATO forces shadow Peter the Great and the Chabanenko from the sea and the air in the Norwegian Sea while the Russians conduct flight operations. Norwegian P-3 Orions circle the ships, obviously making observations as NATO will probably do every step of the way to Venezuela. The film crew observes as the P-3 drops sonobuoys in the water, listening for Russian submarines in the area and collecting data for analysis. The captain of the Peter the Great knew that the Norwegians were coming long before they got within visual range because of all the radar equipment mounted on the superstructure the size of a 17 story building. The navigator has more pressing concerns: avoiding bad weather on the way to Venezuela.
There are also a lot of contract sailors on board.
Toward the evening the sea state is five, which means waves up to seven meters. Flight ops were planned. Peter the Great is carrying two, one SAR bird and a second ASW helo. The fire fighters get on deck to erect the crash net so that the helo doesn't fall overboard. Flight ops are cancelled because of the winds and rain and put off until tomorrow.
26 Sep:
Gist: Peter the Great conducts exercises under the watchful eye of NATO. Crew training is conducted every day on board the Peter the Great and the Admiral Chabanenko. Since the 63,000 horsepower engines of the Chabenenko aren't nuclear powered, she requires a lot of fuel. A Baltic Fleet tanker provides 70 tons of fuel per hour through a flexible hose while underway to the Chabenenko. The Yel'na also provides the Chabenenko with fresh water. The procedure takes seven hours while underway. Its just like in the air, differing in speed and scale. Navigators are careful so as not to cause a collision and spill even a drop of fuel into the water.
Sailors attend training below deck to learn Navy tradition and their rights. If sailors have any questions about their responsibilities or rights they can ask representitives of the military procurator's office or the Federal Security Service (FSB). Usually no one has any questions.
After training, some go off to an unexpected field day while others gather on deck - the Marines. They gather for training on repelling boarders while traversing a narrow strait.
29 Sep: Flight ops. Eavesdropping on a pre-flight briefing. Good flying weather is noted - sea state 2-3, wind 7 meters/sec (appx 14 kts). The crew chief says that the crew members wear special survival suits that will keep them warm and buoyent in the event of an accident. They put on two suits - the first is warm and hooks up to tubes on the helo to provide warmth. The second is orange and waterproof. A crew member demonstrates the inflatable "waterwings" he wears on his hips. The emergency heating system will keep a crew member warm in the water for up to an hour.
Everything is ready, permission is given for flight and a special elevator brings the helo up to the deck. There are two Ka-27s on board the Peter the Great, a SAR helo and an ASW helo. The reporter goes over the characteristics of the Ka-27 and names other country that flies this "most reliable helo of its class". Tonights task is to demonstrate mastery of night flying by flying over to and landing on the Chabanenko and returning. They do this a dozen times tonight while being watched by NATO ships and planes.
Gist: NATO forces shadow Peter the Great and the Chabanenko from the sea and the air in the Norwegian Sea while the Russians conduct flight operations. Norwegian P-3 Orions circle the ships, obviously making observations as NATO will probably do every step of the way to Venezuela. The film crew observes as the P-3 drops sonobuoys in the water, listening for Russian submarines in the area and collecting data for analysis. The captain of the Peter the Great knew that the Norwegians were coming long before they got within visual range because of all the radar equipment mounted on the superstructure the size of a 17 story building. The navigator has more pressing concerns: avoiding bad weather on the way to Venezuela.
There are also a lot of contract sailors on board.
Toward the evening the sea state is five, which means waves up to seven meters. Flight ops were planned. Peter the Great is carrying two, one SAR bird and a second ASW helo. The fire fighters get on deck to erect the crash net so that the helo doesn't fall overboard. Flight ops are cancelled because of the winds and rain and put off until tomorrow.
26 Sep:
Gist: Peter the Great conducts exercises under the watchful eye of NATO. Crew training is conducted every day on board the Peter the Great and the Admiral Chabanenko. Since the 63,000 horsepower engines of the Chabenenko aren't nuclear powered, she requires a lot of fuel. A Baltic Fleet tanker provides 70 tons of fuel per hour through a flexible hose while underway to the Chabenenko. The Yel'na also provides the Chabenenko with fresh water. The procedure takes seven hours while underway. Its just like in the air, differing in speed and scale. Navigators are careful so as not to cause a collision and spill even a drop of fuel into the water.
Sailors attend training below deck to learn Navy tradition and their rights. If sailors have any questions about their responsibilities or rights they can ask representitives of the military procurator's office or the Federal Security Service (FSB). Usually no one has any questions.
After training, some go off to an unexpected field day while others gather on deck - the Marines. They gather for training on repelling boarders while traversing a narrow strait.
29 Sep: Flight ops. Eavesdropping on a pre-flight briefing. Good flying weather is noted - sea state 2-3, wind 7 meters/sec (appx 14 kts). The crew chief says that the crew members wear special survival suits that will keep them warm and buoyent in the event of an accident. They put on two suits - the first is warm and hooks up to tubes on the helo to provide warmth. The second is orange and waterproof. A crew member demonstrates the inflatable "waterwings" he wears on his hips. The emergency heating system will keep a crew member warm in the water for up to an hour.
Everything is ready, permission is given for flight and a special elevator brings the helo up to the deck. There are two Ka-27s on board the Peter the Great, a SAR helo and an ASW helo. The reporter goes over the characteristics of the Ka-27 and names other country that flies this "most reliable helo of its class". Tonights task is to demonstrate mastery of night flying by flying over to and landing on the Chabanenko and returning. They do this a dozen times tonight while being watched by NATO ships and planes.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Paper Calls B.S. On Bulava
The editors of the Independent Military Review better watch out or Putin thugs will make sure they will fall out an apartment window like Ivan Safronov:
Editorial: There Is Nothing To Celebrate.
The outbreak of celebrations in the Russian press after the Bulava launch on 18 September was based exclusively on cheap words from representatives of the MoD. Nobody even deigned to look into them more carefully. It is worthwhile. Especially instructive is this passage: “…at 1905 Moscow time the training section reached the target at the Kura test range”. That immediately raises a question: if the launch was a test launch, why was there a practice unit? What does that mean?
It means this: the Bulava didn’t carry anything, not even carrying a mock up of its regular warheads. And nothing fell in the 800,000 hectare Kura test range on Kamchatka. It missed and not a thing hit the “battlefield”.
In November 2007, almost a year ago, the previous Bulava test flight finished 23 seconds after failure of the first stage. Then it was announced that it needed 12-14 additional test launches to reach operational readiness and be accepted into service. While the next Bulava succeeded in not blowing up immediately upon launch, it is still far from being ready for acceptance.
In 1998, when the leadership at the Ministry of Defense and the government canceled the Miass Missile Center-made Bark SLBM in order to redirect money to the Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), which is physically closer to Moscow, it was announced that the new Bulava missile would be accepted into service in 2005. The chief argument was the project cost savings. They said that they would adapt the land-based Topol’ (SS-25/27) for submarines. Experts warned that water and air were two different physical states and nothing good would come of it.
The Bulava project was valued at 227 million dollars and the cost of a missile around 10 million dollars. The real expenditure hasn’t been calculated, but MITT received 14 billion rubles for the project in 2004. It is obvious that Bulava has swallowed at least 300 million dollars over the last 10 years. […]
Its defenders assert that the country will get the 10 warhead super-weapon. But it must be said that the Bulava throw weight is 1.15 tons. It is the most important missile parameter which characterizes its combat effectiveness. That includes not only the warheads, but also the last stage consisting of the bus, guidance system and fuel. What room is left for warheads?
Take for example the Sineva with a throw weight of 2.15 tons with four medium or ten light warheads. There is a suspicion that miniaturized warheads for the Bulava still haven’t been developed. Most shamefully, the 12 Bulavas on the SSBN Yuri Dolgorukiy will have an aggregate throw weight 4.9 times less than an Ohio SSBN with the solid fuelled Trident II missile.
So for now the victorious fanfare is cancelled while the budgetary allocations flew down the tubes.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)